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The focus of this hypothesis generating study is to open new areas of research within the 
study of regions and regionalization in the East African Community and beyond. By using a 
null hypothesis that encapsulates the reigning attitudes within models of economic 
integration, this paper exposes many of the issues that are left unaddressed in models of 
regionalization driven by economics. In order to accurately assess the relevant issues, the 
paper is divided into three statements that underpin the null hypothesis; each statement 
focuses on an aspect of economic integration and explores the effect that it has on member 
states in the regionalization process. Through this evaluation the three statements and their 
respective effects are linked to each other and to the null hypothesis to form a web that 
supports the alternative hypothesis. As a result, it offers paths for future research to improve 
on regional theory. 
 
The aim of this paper is to uncover the failings of an “economics-first” approach. As a result 
it includes many of the prevalent debates within regional theory, including the issues of 
Eurocentrism and the false dichotomy between politics and economics within integration. In 
addition, it includes ideas around nationalism, identity and the role of the state and citizenry 
within regions. It also introduces the idea of a confederation as a possible alternative to a 
federation with a monetary union. Through assessing the work of David Mitrany and Ernst B. 
Haas, this paper tracks the failings within the foundations of regional integration theory 
through to New Regionalism and the work of Bela Balassa. This forms the basis for attacking 
the null hypothesis. The issues raised are pulled through the paper, attaching the theoretical 
flaws to their practical consequences. By applying these findings to the case study of the East 
African Community, this paper paints a compelling argument as to why regions in Africa 
should reassess their methods and goals within the regionalization process. Developing states 
in particular must be cognizant of the effect of neglecting their domestic responsibilities. In 
addition, due to the nature of this study the findings can be transposed to the European 
context. This is particularly pertinent given the political, economic and social issues the EU 
currently faces in the wake of the 2008 recession. 
 
The results suggest that regional integration programmes need to incorporate a political 
approach within integration models. Economic integration can only be sustainable and 
beneficial where agreements are underpinned by political will and where the state is an active 
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and empowered participant in the integration process. By alienating the state the 
regionalization process sabotages itself. The solution must therefore include a reassessment 
of the intentions of regional theory with the aim of re-linking the goals of member states to 
the methods and outcomes they choose. This empowers the participants in a regionalization 
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Regions and regionalism are powerful concepts within the study of international relations and 
political economy today because of the powers they may or may not grant to states within the 
international system. Many claims have been made about their value, however fundamental 
questions about their place in the international system persist. So much remains undecided – 
what is a region? How should a region evolve? What should the end-point look like? The 
assumption of linearity and an idealisation of the European model have proven to be 
problematic not just for Europe herself, but much more so for other regions seeking guidance. 
 
These questions highlight the reality of regional studies today; it is a discipline with little 
certainty and no defined end-point that can guarantee welfare. Many regional bodies reach 
towards what has become the accepted goal of regionalism – political federation with a 
monetary union – however, the assumption that integration should lead to a complete 
amalgamation of member-states is problematic. The choice to federate should not be 
automatic, but ought to rather focus on the questions of whether a super-state can provide 
anything that a state cannot and more importantly, what is sacrificed in the process of 
integration? Is there an alternative to federation? In addition, what is the effect of regional 
theory on these goals, and should the theory be challenged? 
 
Europe and the Nationalism-Globalisation Challenge 
 
In order to explore this challenge we need to look at the theory as well as the literature on 
regional bodies. Europe, above all others, has been placed on an academic pedestal for the 
world to admire its levels of integration, growth and stability. Until recently that is. The 
economic crisis that hit the United States of America (USA) had the crushing effect of 
bringing many European banks down with it, creating turmoil amidst the perceived stability. 
Unparalleled in post-war history, its knock-on effect has caused Europeans to reassess many 
of the assumptions around the benefits of regionalization. In particular, the powers that 
remain clearly in state hands versus those that have been transferred to the European 
Community (EC) have become contentious. Although the Community called for collective 
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action and harmonisation of policy,1 many questions and emotions have been stirred up 
within states themselves. Could countries have fared better had the issues been dealt with at 
state level?  
 
The crisis has uncovered weaknesses in economies that were hidden by the collective force of 
the European market. These weaknesses pose a risk to more than just the nations they exist 
within.2 The effect has been a reawakening of nationalist identities and sentiment, and a knee-
jerk reaction against further integration.3 The EU still wishes to pursue a federal end-point, 
but as a consequence of the recession there has been a pull towards statehood and a surge in 
the movement to maintain the integrity of the independent states. This begs the question – 
should they continue along this path or is there a feasible alternative? 
 
Although the crisis itself is not the focus of this paper, the effect it has produced forms the 
most appropriate starting point for the argument. The recession has created a space in which 
to reassess how we see regions and how we can better understand the idealised model of the 
European Union (EU) in light of the current disenchantment of its members. The argument 
this paper makes is that the challenge that federating and creating a monetary union presents 
to member states within a region is too great a burden for many states to endure. To forsake 
certain state attributes is to forsake the pillars of statehood themselves, which has a direct 
effect on the citizenry. The state, by virtue of its structure, must first and foremost be 
accountable to its citizenry. Therefore, central in this debate is the role of the “post-
Westphalian state” and the push and pull of domestic and global forces within regional 
systems. This paper argues that the long-cherished ideas of Ernst Haas4 and David Mitrany5 
need to be challenged – that the belief in ever-greater integration must be questioned, 
reworked and reassessed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate General “Economic Crisis is Europe: 
Causes, Consequences and Responses” European Economy 7 (2009) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf . 
2 “The time-bomb at the heart of Europe: Why France could become the biggest danger to Europe’s single 
currency”, The Economist, 17th November 2012 at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21566640-why-
france-could-become-biggest-danger-europes-single-currency-time-bomb-heart. 
3 “About Face: Chancellor Merkel Cools on European Integration” Spiegel Online International, 25th June 2013 
at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-chancellor-merkel-cools-on-european-integration-a-
907339.html#ref=nl-international. 
4  Haas, E.B. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (USA: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1976). For more discussion by Haas on the obsolescence of regional 
integration theory, see Haas, E.B. “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration” International 
Organization Vol. 30, No.2 (Spring 1976): pp. 173-212. 
5 Mitrany, D. A Working Peace System, 4th Edition (UK: Broadwater Press, 1945). 
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The Case: The East African Community 
 
Although neither the biggest nor the most powerful regional body in Africa, the East African 
Community (EAC) has had two incarnations – the first in 1967, which lasted only until 
1977,6 and its second incarnation which was revived formally in 1996 and continues to 
operate.7 The EAC has proved to be one of the fastest growing regions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and one of the fastest growing regions in the world between 2005 and 2009.8 Its aim is to 
deepen political, economic and social cooperation, with the final goal of creating an East 
African Federation of States.9 By 2020, the region hopes to have reached the status of a 
middle-income GDP country. This requires the region as a whole to not only maintain its 
current growth rate, but increase it, maintaining a growth rate of 8.5 percent per annum.10 The 
EAC has embarked on an ambitious development strategy and has established successive five 
year development plans, each superseding the previous in deepening integration.11 The EAC 
may be small, but it represents a powerful regional model on the African continent. 
 
 The idea of federalism has been one that has pulsed through the veins of the EAC since its 
first incarnation. At that time it was fuelled by Pan-African sentiment and filled with the hope 
of collective action, increased wealth and bargaining power in the international sphere.12 
Although those sentiments may persist, presently we see a far more structured approach to 
integration. In the Treaty Establishing the East African Community, Article 5 paragraph 2 
states that the Community seeks to establish a customs union, a common market, a monetary 
union and finally a federation.13 This is the method that Bela Balassa advocated for;14 it is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Umbricht, V.H. Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and Lessons (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1989). Mitrany’s ideas have functioned as the starting point for many regional thinkers, and as such, 
his ideas have become quite stretched in places. A concise reassessment of his ideas in perspective can also be 
seen in Green, A.W. “Review Article: Mitrany Reread with the Help of Haas and Sewell” Journal of Common 
Market Studies Vol. 8, No. 1 (September 1969):pp. 50-69. 
7 Nkonki, S.R. The EAC in Retrospect (Norway: Unknown Binding, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1983) at p. 21. 
8 “World Economic and Financial Surveys Regional Economic Outlook - Sub-Saharan Africa: Recovery and 
New Risks” International Monetary Fund (2011) at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/afr/eng/sreo0411.pdf at pp. 50-51.  
9 Nkonki (1983) at p. 53. 
10 Nkonki (1983) at p. 54. 
11 Apoo Oitamong, M. The Revived East African Community: Fast-tracking the Political Federation (USA: 
Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010) at p. 24. 
12 Umbricht (1989) at p. 8. 
13 East African Community “Treaty Establishing the East African Community” (30th November 1999) Art. 5 
Para. 2 at http://www.eac.int/treaty/. 
14 Stephan, H., Power, M. (eds.) The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century- From the Old World to the New 
(Cape Town, South Africa: Renaissance Publishers, 2012). 
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model embodied by the EU15 and it describes the process that must be followed in order to 
reap the benefits of regional economic integration. A monetary union is the last and most 
risky stage, since it means giving up a national currency. This aspect in particular will be 
discussed since it touches directly on the issue of sovereignty and the powers a state must 
relinquish within the process of integrating markets. The EAC has not yet established a 
monetary union, but aims to do so as fast as possible, making this question particularly 
pertinent. 
 
The effect that fast tracking the regionalization process may have is that the EAC may soon 
face a similar crisis to the EU. The issue is not whether there would be a benefit to further 
integration or a monetary union – the question is, rather, whether the member states are 
willing to sacrifice their independence in order to maintain benefits that may not endure. This 
brings as back to the issues of citizenry, nationalism and sovereignty.  
 
The Hypothesis Generating Approach in Context 
 
The method this paper has chosen to use is that of a hypothesis generating approach. Single 
case studies may be used to confirm or challenge a theory or alternatively to represent an 
extreme case.16 In contrast, Lijphart describes the process of hypothesis-generating as a 
method wherein one starts with a vague notion of possible hypotheses with the aim of 
establishing theoretical generalizations where no theory exists yet.17 Levy states that 
hypothesis-generating case studies aim to generalize beyond the data. They examine one or 
more cases for the purpose of developing more general theoretical propositions which can 
then be further tested through other methods. Hypothesis-generating case studies contribute 
to the process of theory construction rather than to theory itself. Lijphart, while emphasizing 
that “the primary function of the comparative method is to test empirical hypotheses,” argues 
that “a comparative perspective – not to be confused with the comparative method – can be a 
helpful element in discovery.”18 Similarly, Stretton argues that “the function of comparison is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Lee, M. “Regionalims in Africa: A Part of Problem or a Part of Solution” (Polis/R.C.S.P./C.P.S.R Vol. 9, 
Numero Special (2002) at http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol10ns/lee.pdf at p.1. 
16 Tellis, W. Application of a Case Study Methodology The Qualitative Report Vol. 3, Nr. 3 (September 1997) at 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html. 
17 Lijphart, A. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
65, No. 3 (September 1971): pp. 682-693 at p. 692. 
18 Lijphart, A. “The Comparable- Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 
8 (July 1975): pp. 158–177 at p. 159. 
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less to simulate experiment than to stimulate imagination... comparison is strongest as a 
choosing and provoking, not a proving, device: a system for questioning, not for 
answering.”19  
 
Given the complexity of the EAC and the EU as regional bodies, as well as within their 
complex, multi-layered relationship, the hypothesis generating approach will allow for 
sufficient space to explore the relevant topics whilst still maintaining the goal of narrowing 
the paper’s view point to eventually finding hypotheses to test further. This paper’s intention 
is to assess the literature that is currently taken as standard in its application to regional 
bodies, especially in developing nations, and to challenge it with the aim of generating 
hypotheses that could not only give regional economic communities (RECs) the option of 
choice in their method of regionalisation, but more importantly, choice in the outcome of that 
process. Locked up in integration is the challenge of sovereignty, nationalism and identity. 
Federalism is not, and should not be, the only option for regions. This paper aims to sift out 
the relevant issues in order to create future paths of interest that could challenge this 
federalist norm. 
 
Layout of the Study 
 
The central argument that runs through the paper and the overarching hypothesis being 
challenged is: 
 
Null Hypothesis: If a region wishes to be successful in this economically globalized world, 
then it should follow the path of economic integration. Political integration will 
follow as a result, eventually leading to a more competitive federal state. 
Sovereignty is no longer a useful concept. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis: If a region wishes to be successful in this economically globalized 
world, then it should follow a path of regionalization that is politically 
reinforced. Economic agreements can only be successful and sustainable where 
they are backed by political will. Confederation can be a better option and 
sovereignty is as powerful today as it was in the past. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Stretton, H. The Political Sciences: General Principles of Selection in Social Science and History (London, 




Regionalism driven by economics alone is insufficient. If a region is to be successful, 
political will and drive must be present and acknowledged throughout the process. One key 
aspect of failure for Haas as well as for Balassa is that both assume that political support will 
manifest naturally within the process, however, in reality, the political element cannot be 
circumvented. The political element is vital to developing and sustaining the long term 
success of a region, a factor that will be highlighted throughout the assessment of the 
statements below. These assessments will then be related to the case study as well as to the 
overarching hypothesis in order to contextualise the findings and link them meaningfully. 
 
This paper has five chapters; the first will assess what a region is, and how we are to 
understand regions. This chapter will introduce the reader to the complexity inherent in 
regional studies and will supply a context in which to understand the current system as well 
as the ideas within New Regionalism. The second, third and fourth chapters will address the 
three statements that this paper wishes to challenge. The statements were selected based on 
their prevalence in debates within regional theory, and through challenging them this paper 
intends to open new ways of understanding the relevant dynamics and assumptions inherent 
in their application. The fifth chapter will link the findings in the previous chapters to the 
case study and will look at the challenges as well as the possible appeal of an alternative 
outcome in context. 
 
The statements will structure the paper in the following order: 
 
Statement 1: Regional theory is well established; if regions follow the prescribed economic 
theory, they will be successful. 
 
The second chapter is a literature review that will focus on Mitrany and Haas, two of the 
primary contributors to early regional integration theory. The chapter includes a discussion of 
the respective theories and their criticisms; it uses Statement 1 to challenge the null 
hypothesis on the basis that the criticisms of Neofunctionalism in particular mean that the 
theory cannot be said to guarantee success or welfare. The contrast between the approach 
taken by Mitrany versus that taken by Haas accentuates the shortfalls of Neofunctional 
thinking. The chapter also links the predispositions within Neofunctionalism to those within 
the theory of Bela Balassa, thereby exposing the fact that the faults that began with 
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Neofunctionalism have managed to filter down through the waves of regional theory, into the 
models we see today. These faults need to be identified and considered, with special 
reference to the intentions behind the theory as well as its prescribed models.  
 
The third and fourth chapters will focus on Balassa’s stages of integration, and will challenge 
them through looking at two hypotheses with linked outcomes: 
 
Statement 2: A successful region will lead to a federation and a monetary union. 
 
This is the assumption inherent in the theory of economic integration. It espouses that the 
model of a federation and a monetary union ought to be the final step in merging national 
markets. The effect should be increased wealth and growth within the economy while 
simultaneously eliminating the issue of sovereignty that acts as a block to successful 
integration. Hypothetically it seems ideal, however in practice few regional blocs have 
managed to overcome issues of sovereignty in order to reach these goals efficiently and 
without serious political consequences both domestically and regionally. This paper will 
challenge this idea by assessing the concepts of political identity, nationalism and the 
relationship between the state and citizenry. This chapter shows that the Statement is not only 
false, but actually damages regional initiatives today by undermining the state system. 
 
Statement 3: Leadership within a successful region will require a post-Westphalian solution 
in order to move beyond bounded state politics. 
 
The fourth chapter will address the issues in the statement above and, in light of the earlier 
chapters, will make the argument for an alternative to federalism – confederation. 
Confederation as a concept has been shunted to the side in favour of federalism, however, 
considering the findings of this paper as well as recent events in both Europe and the EAC, it 
could prove to be a compelling alternative. Confederation could have the potential to 
circumvent many of the issues we see arising within partnerships moving towards federalism. 
Combined with the findings in chapter three, it becomes clear that if regionalism is to be 
sustainable, a system such as confederation will go much further in supporting the necessary 
political requirements to ensure that partnerships endure and that growth and development is 
meaningful. In this way, nationalist backlashes are undermined before they obstruct the 




The fifth and final chapter will relate the findings to the case, the EAC. In order to do so 
effectively, it starts with an overview of regionalism in Africa. By unpacking this initial 
contextual layer, we have a greater understanding of the effect of the theory in understanding 
the case itself. Following this, the chapter will be structured in line with the statements above, 
each section assessing the case in relation to the literature in order to establish whether, in 
practice, the suggestions made in the previous chapters hold. In so doing, this paper makes a 
compelling argument as to why the EAC ought to abandon their current regionalization track 
and ought to realign their strategy with the goal of confederation. Linking the theory to the 
case allows a practical understanding of the possible effects of continuing towards a 
federation and a monetary union.  
 
The conclusion will then take these ideas a step further. The aim of this paper is to challenge 
the theory in the hope of generating new possible paths of study and understanding. Having 
considered an overview of regionalism and the specific challenges by statement, as well as 
having pulled the theory down into a specific case, the conclusion will once again expand the 
findings of this paper through linking the EAC to the EU. As a result it will assess whether, 
as advocated by Lijphart, a comparison can stimulate ideas around how the EU could 




















Regions in a Globalized World – Uncertain Relationships and an Undefined Future 
 
The following chapter aims to provide a framework for the rest of the paper by laying down a 
foundational understanding of the reality of regions today. In order to understand the power 
of what regions represent, we need to understand what they consist of and how states may use 
them in the global system today. This chapter will look at what constitutes a region, how 
Europe has influenced our idea of a region, the challenge of separating politics and 
economics in a functional context and the relationship between states, regions and the process 
of globalization. The importance of understanding the connections cannot be 
underemphasized; unlike in the past, where the state was considered to be the center of 
international political economy, recently, that status has been challenged. As a result, regions 
have become contentious spaces in which the state must balance its domestic responsibilities 
with its international goals. 
 
What Is A Region Really?  
 
Many speak of regions as defined spaces; in fact, regions are deceptively multi-faceted and 
multi-natured. A fitting metaphor for the region is a purpose-built home – each region is 
constructed to meet a need – and this affects our ability to create a narrow definition of what 
a region is and how its “regionness” should be measured. Hurrell20 notes that while the 
attempt to define what a region is has been difficult, elements still help us to define regional 
spaces. Regionalism has often been assessed in terms of social, political, economic and 
organizational cohesiveness or regional interdependence, but none of these can be said to 
completely measure the concept.21 Importantly, what does make a difference is how actors 
perceive and interpret the idea of a region.22 Hurrell notes that instead of looking at elements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hurrell, A. “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 
Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 1995): pp. 331–358 at p. 333. See also Telò, M. (ed) European Union and New 
Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a post-Hegemonic Era 2nd Edition, The International 
Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series (USA, UK: Ashgate, 2007). 
21 Hurrell (1995) at p. 333. For a concise discussion of this issue and some of its dynamics, see also Keating, M. 
“The Political Economy of Regionalism”, Chapter 1 in Keating, M. And Loughlin, J. (eds) The Political 
Economy of Regionalism (UK: Routledge, 2004). 
22 Hurrell (1995) at p. 334. 
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of regions in order to classify what a region is, we should instead look at them as a means of 
analyzing regions and the depth of integration.23  
 
Grant and Söderbaum make the important distinction between regionalism and 
regionalization;24 “regionalism” is a generic term and in a very broad sense refers to the 
concept of a region – it embodies a set of ideas, goals or values and is not an operational tool. 
Alternatively, “regionalization” is an operational concept and refers to the process of creating 
or maintaining a region. Regionalization may be caused by regionalism, but may also arise 
without a concrete goal in mind, as a product of interactions rather than intentions.  
 
The history of the region as we know it today is a turbulent one; regions were not a directly 
desired effect and were produced by a security-focused world system. Other than the wave 
we are currently experiencing, the study of regions has had two major waves to date.  The 
first wave started post World War II in the 1960s with the proverbial fathers of regionalism – 
David Mitrany and Ernst Haas.25 Although Mitrany himself was not considered a true 
regional theorist, his work influenced that of Haas and other theorists of the time, and made a 
significant contribution through doing so.26 These theorists used the European experience as 
the basis for their studies, with the aim of establishing generalizations that could be 
transferred elsewhere. By the mid-1970s, the first wave of regional studies had died down. 
Haas himself dampened the movement through his own work, which claimed that integration 
theory as they knew it had become obsolete. In addition, regional projects elsewhere had 
failed, taking with them the hope of transporting the success of the European model.27  There 
was a growing distaste for grand predictive theories and a refocus of the regional debate 
towards interdependence.  
 
The next wave was inspired by the single-market programme embarked on by Europe in the 
mid-1980s.28 With this wave came greater understanding that the European model itself was 
not easily directly transferred, but the model of free trade areas did start appearing elsewhere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hurrell (1995) at pp. 335-337. 
24 Grant, J.A and Soderbaum, F. (eds.) The New Regionalism in Africa, The International Political Economy of 
New Regionalisms Series (USA, UK: Ashgate, 2003) at p. 7. 
25 Breslin, S., Hughes, C.W., Phillips, N. and Rosamond, B. (eds.), New Regionalisms in the Global Political 
Economy - Theories and Cases, Warwick Studies in Globalisation (UK: Routledge, 2002) at p. 2. 
26 Breslin et al. (2002) at p. 2. 
27 Breslin et al. (2002) at p. 3. 
28 Breslin et al. (2002) at p. 3. 
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– in North and South America, as well as in Asia and Africa.29 This is arguably where links 
started between regions as the assumption was that various forms of regionalism had 
common driving forces. These include the end of the Cold War and as a reaction to 
globalization.30  
 
Regions became feasible options for state interaction due to the ideas formed around Western 
imperialism.31 For the first time the whole world was integrated into a single economy, with 
ideas and ideologies following in an attempt to explain it. The idea of a region was a middle-
ground, with neither the appeal of international cosmopolitanism, nor the comfort of a 
defined state.32 Regions were in part formed as a product of the United Nations and were 
based on ideals of cooperation.33 The formation of the United Nations in 1945 was based on a 
desire to form a world order designed to provide security through cooperation, however, 
given the destruction of World War II, merely returning to the status quo was considered to 
be insufficient – a new world required a new structure .34 The Charter of the United Nations 
(UN)35 established the primacy of the sovereign state. Regionalism was not a central feature 
of its ideas around statehood, but, given that Article 51 expressly allowed for military 
alliances and Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)36 excluded 
customs unions and free-trade areas from the principles of non-discrimination and most 
favoured nation,37 a space was created in which regions could not only grow, but could safely 
be acknowledged in the political landscape without the fears of alliances evoking fear as they 
had during the war. Along with these changes, came the influx of new states in post-colonial 
Africa in the 1960s. The UN became the stage upon which the anti-colonial struggle was 
enacted, with many states obtaining independence under the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1514, which condemned any delay in the granting of independence.38 With the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Breslin et al. (2002) at p. 4. 
30 Breslin et al. (2002) at p. 4. 
31 Mayall, J. “National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism” Chapter 6 in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.), 
Regionalism in World Politics - Regional Organization and International Order (USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) at p. 167. 
32 Mayall (1996) at p. 170. 
33 Mayall (1996) at p. 170. 
34 Mayall (1996) at p. 172. The UN has promoted not only the sovereignty of states, but has been directly 
involved in state-building. See Chesterman, S. You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional 
Administration and State Building (USA: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
35 United Nations “Charter of the United Nations” ( October 24th, 1945) at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. 
36 GATT “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade TIAS 1700; 55 UNTS 194 (Havana Charter)” ( GATT 
1948) at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
37 Mayall (1996) at p. 174. 
38 Mayall (1996) at p. 175. 
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advent of the Non-Alligned Movement, regions became a bulwark against imperialism and 
domination, cementing the idea of regionalism in the third world.39  
 
How did regionalism become what Acharya calls the “intrusive regionalism” that we see 
presently?40 Whereas regionalism started as a means to promote and protect sovereignty and 
was established based on sovereign rights, regions have subsequently become an anomaly 
that erodes sovereignty. Regions had been based on security frameworks, but the brand of 
regionalism pursued in Europe in the late 1950s promised a step beyond. This model was not 
simply there to remove the security threat, but was also there to create a sense of community. 
It promised to go beyond the state in order to ensure a lasting agreement.41 Even though after 
Haas himself stated the theory was obsolete and the ideas waned in popularity, they regained 
momentum after the Cold War for three reasons: Firstly, the experience of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the 1980s was a powerful intervening 
factor in the usual sovereignty trap that encouraged non-cooperation. The OSCE 
implemented an extensive range of measures that would promote transparency and provide 
for constraints to regulate the behavior of states within Europe. This was the first of its kind, 
and was more intrusive in its application to states than measures previously put in place. It 
provided an understanding that relinquishing aspects of sovereignty could have positive 
outcomes.42 The second influence was the move towards a single market in Europe. This was 
a major change within the regional landscape and although the political changes associated 
with Europe could clearly not be transferred to other regions directly, the market-driven 
approach remained appealing, specifically due to the realities of regional-based methods of 
production. This “soft regionalism”, spurred on by the globalization of finance, was far more 
marketable, albeit still a challenge to sovereignty.43  
 
The third change that influenced regionalism was the advent in the 1990s of the theory of 
“New Regionalism”. This idea of a new regionalism came about as regionalism had to 
expand and develop with the changing international system; regionalism was now focused on 
existing in a multi-polar context. Regionalism was no longer simply a narrow, security-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Mayall (1996) at p. 176. 
40 Acharya, A. Regionalism and the Emerging World Order – Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity Chapter 2 in 
Breslin, S., Hughes, C.W., Phillips, N. and Rosamond, B. (eds.) New Regionalisms in the Global Political 
Economy - Theories and Cases Warwick Studies in Globalisation (UK: Routledge, 2002) at p. 20. 
41 Acharya (2002) at p. 22. 
42 Acharya (2002) at p. 24. 
43 Acharya (2002) at p. 26. 
13	  
	  
defined relationship in a largely bi-polar world, but one that incorporated human rights, 
economics and finance, with a host of new actors, including non-state actors, to take into 
account.44 This was the most fundamental change experienced by the regional concept, since 
it affected why a region existed, who could join and how regional identities were formed. 
These changes were felt most intensely, and almost exclusively, in Europe.45  
 
This brings us back to the challenge of sovereignty; the old regionalism was sovereignty-
freeing, but not sovereignty-defying.46 This older model asked states to voluntarily relinquish 
aspects of sovereignty for the good of collective goals while acknowledging that sovereignty 
was still the paramount ideal. In contrast, the model we see today is sovereignty-challenging; 
it’s intrusive and almost coercive in its structure, despite still being consent based.47 
Sovereignty has become more of a stumbling block than the enabling force it started as. The 
issue is that this regionalism can be a double-edged sword; intrusive regionalism has the 
ability to foster greater integration with better guarantees of security and prosperity, however, 
it also has the ability to cause greater tensions, not least of all due to its challenge of 
sovereignty.  
 
As a result, it becomes evident that the concept of a region, regionalism, and the process of 
regionalization has changed substantially from its early beginnings. As a political animal its 
behavior has changed, and so what we expect from it and how we are able to use and assess it 
must also change. In order to understand more about regional theory, this paper will assess 
the issues of Eurocentrism and the false dichotomy created in the theory by the notion that we 
have the ability to separate economic and political initiatives. These issues will set the stage 
for the challenges in the chapters that follow. 
 
The Problem of Eurocentrism – Putting The Issue to Bed 
 
Europe has served as the point of departure in some respect in almost every regional study. It 
has been relevant as a testing ground for theory, as a model to reflect on in making future 
prognoses for regional bodies and as a model to emulate – all three very powerful spheres of 
influence. Regions the world over have sought to mimic Europe and have failed in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Acharya (2002) at p. 26. 
45 Acharya (2002) at p. 27. 
46 Acharya (2002) at p. 28. 
47 Acharya (2002) at p. 28. 
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attempts. In addition, this model seems to have hit its own challenges and has hit similar 
challenges before. It has created confusion within the discipline, and in order to understand 
its real relevance we need to put the issue of Europe in regional studies to bed. This section 
will provide a brief overview of the process of European integration.48 In highlighting 
selected points, it will allow a clearer view of the effect of the evolution of European 
integration on regional integration theory.  
 
The aim of the Bretton Woods system was not only to create an international system based on 
neoliberal principles, but also to open an economic environment that had been stunted by 
World War II. Many states had turned to protectionist policies and closed economics meant 
that politics had been directly influenced as a result. A closed and potentially hostile political 
environment was ripe for war and conflict. The situation required a sustainable change.49 
Neoliberal practice could therefore be the means by which states opened up again. Neoliberal 
principles required that governments allow major currencies to be convertible and that states 
should refrain from discriminatory trading practices.50 These principles did not specifically 
call for regional action, though it was permitted, but the emphasis was on universalism rather 
than regionalism. Regions were tolerated as long as they were trade-creating and not trade-
diverting.51 These policies were always more Western than universal. For Europe, there was 
also concern around the relationship between France and Germany. A solution needed to be 
found to stop another altercation as there had been three since 1870.  
 
Although the economic approach took time, it shows considerable success within the slow 
build up of integrated economies. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
established in 1952 and was the precursor to the European Economic Community (ECC) 
established by the Treaties of Rome in 1957.52 The ECSC was actually a test in the value of 
espousing economic integration as a guarantor of peace; Jean Monnet a French political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For a concise overview of regional integration, see Mattli, W. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and 
Beyond (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a more in-depth study of the EU and the debates around 
integration, see Caporaso, J.A. The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration (USA: Westview Press, 
2000). 
49 Mayall (1996) at p. 178. For a more detailed discussion of the Bretton Woods system see Kenen, P.B. (ed) 
Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods (USA: Institute for International Economics, 
1994).    
50 Mayall (1996) at p. 178. 
51 Mayall (1996) at p. 178. 
52 Balaam, D.N. and Veseth, M. Introduction to International Political Economy, 4th Edition - Pearson 
International Edition (USA: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008) at p. 217. For an inclusive overview of the evolution 
of the EU, see Gilpin, R. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (USA: 
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economist suggested that a free trade area between the borders of France and Germany be put 
in place to unite the productive forces of their heavy industry. The project was a success, and 
it lead to the belief that a greater number of committed participants could further integrate, 
reinforcing the ECSC while expanding it.53 The objectives of the ECSC were not openly 
politically or peace-orientated; instead, it aimed to increase employment, raise standards of 
living and expand markets.54 An attempt to politically federate into the United States of 
Western Europe failed in 1954 due to France.55 The obvious solution seemed to be a different 
way around the politics of the situation – by working through economics.56 In light of the 
failures of political integration, the ECSC and later the ECC became a means to unite states 
that were politically unwilling to compromise on their sovereignty.  
 
The Treaties of Rome established a customs union that brought together the markets of Italy, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, as well as the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). These states were already natural trading partners 
so the opening of their markets eased trade further, allowing them to benefit in the post-war 
boom.57 The common market was based on the “four freedoms”. These include the free 
movement of persons, services, goods and capital and the programme was designed to evolve 
over a twelve year period consisting of three periods of four years each. Each period had 
requirements that needed to be fulfilled in order to deepen integration. In addition, it 
established institutions that would facilitate greater political integration, namely a Council, a 
Commission and a Parliament.58 Britain was not willing to cede any sovereign rights, but 
equally did not want to miss the benefits of economic integration. It therefore established a 
weaker free trade area between partners not wishing to join the customs union, however the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), due to its loose geographic and trading relationships, 
could not offer the same benefits. It was this that led members of EFTA to seek to join the 
EEC later. The EEC also faced significant challenges; there was a need to institute 
subsidization for farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in order to pacify 
politically powerful farming communities and in addition, non-tariff barriers permeated the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Balaam and Veseth (2008) at p. 225. 
54 Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community” (18th 
April 1951) at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm.  
55Pinder, J. “European Community and the Nation State: A Case for Neo-Federalism?” International Affairs 
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system causing considerable set-backs to integrative endeavours.59 The principles of the 
Treaties of Rome were based on a separation of formal economic integration from the high 
politics of foreign policy and security and America dominated the negotiation process.60 The 
process was backed by the USA as part of the Atlantic partnership that would eventually 
result in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For the 
USA, the idea of Western Europe had to be viewed within the wider framework of “the 
West”. The European Economic Community implemented a customs union ahead of schedule 
and the process seemed to be on its way. The image amongst academics and politicians at the 
time was one of Europe having “nations going beyond the nation state”.61 It was a Europe 
constructed through intergovernmental bargaining, compromise, summits and 
incrementalism. The process remained state-centred, but with increasing integration came 
increasing in-roads into state sovereignty.  
 
In 1967, the EEC and ECSC merged with EURATOM and formed the European Community 
(EC) which in 1993 became the European Union (EU).62 The change in the name of the EC 
indicated a change in intention; the EC aimed to expand its ambit to political issues, though 
economics still dominated its agenda.63 In accordance with what has become known as the 
“bicycle theory” of integration, as espoused by Walter Hallstein the first president of the 
European Commission, there was a need for European integration to move constantly 
towards “ever closer union”.64 However, the expanding Community also faced significant 
challenges; the admission of poorer countries such as Greece and Portugal created worry but 
also increased the burden of the costs for Community projects on wealthier nations.65 In 
1969, after the departure of de Gaulle who had blocked previous initiatives, Western 
European integration was once again relaunched as a civilian politico-economic structure.66 
The process seemed to be progressing well until 1971, when currencies world-wide felt 
shocks due to the delinking of the Dollar to the gold standard. This would set Europe back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Balaam and Veseth (2008) at p. 226. 
60Wallace, W. Regionalism in Europe: Model or Exception? Chapter 7 in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.) 
Regionalism in World Politics - Regional Organization and International Order (USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
61 Wallace (1996) at p. 212. 
62 Balaam and Veseth (2008) at p. 217. 
63 Balaam and Veseth (2008) at p. 228. 
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Europe: Challenge and Opportunity (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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once again, creating instability in the region.67 As Europe recovered more states were added 
to the region’s participating members. Growing pains were felt by all parties, especially 
between France and the USA in 1973-4. America, having dominated the negotiation 
processes in the EEC and having included Western Europe in foreign policy strategies, was 
compelled to allow for a more significant contribution by the growing region to foreign 
policy. The process was turbulent, dominated by en external party and had a distinct agenda – 
Western unity.  
 
By the mid-1980s the Community was taking significant strain. Jacques Delors, then the 
president of the European Commission, issued a white paper in 1985 suggesting the answer 
was to deepen economic integration. He suggested the creation of a single integrated market 
by 1992. This produced the Single European Act (SEA) which allowed integration to 
continue – effectively for the bicycle to continue moving forward.68 One of the main 
contributions of SEA was to counterbalance the disproportionate contributions between 
stronger and weaker members, but more importantly, it included social provisions. Included 
in the provisions was the need to improve working conditions for labour across Europe and 
the need to increase dialogue between management and labour.69 This shows a significant 
increase in the level of permeation of Community initiatives; although the provision could 
benefit any state, the fact that it was introduced as a Community effort displays the degree of 
encroachment into state sovereignty. SEA more importantly set the stage for the Treaties of 
Maastricht; it removed the requirement of a unanimous vote in Community matters, changing 
it instead to a qualified majority. SEA also allocated a lot more power and importance to 
European institutions which meant that with the qualified majority, these institutions could 
make decisions against the respective wills of the member states.70 Nevertheless they 
persevered, and after the SEA was negotiated and ratified, it seemed the darkest times were 
over.71 The late 1970s saw another commitment to widening the community, an agreement to 
direct elections for the European Parliament and most important of all, a distancing from its 
initial supporter the USA.72 By the 1990s it became clear that the idea of Europe once again 
needed to change; it needed to adjust and include the Eastern European countries, now free 
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from Soviet rule, that were vying to join a Western system.73 The bridges had been subtly 
built through communication, broadcasting services, through minimal tourism and through 
the need for advanced technology and the time had approached for a new take on the 
European Community.74  
 
The Treaties of Maastricht, signed in 1992, took integration even further with the decision to 
form a single currency area by latest 1999. National currencies were to be converted to a 
single currency – the Euro.75 In addition, two decisions were made to support this initiative; 
the European Central Bank (ECB) was to become independent of national monetary 
institutions and was tasked with maintaining price stability. In addition, those countries 
wishing to join the Euro-zone had to meet the convergence criteria of low interest and 
inflation rates and low state debt. This was accompanied by an acceptance that there had to 
be a limitation on state debt and spending, summarised by the Stability and Growth Pact of 
1997.76 The Maastricht Treaty also aimed to increase the scope of political integration by 
expanding the political agenda to cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy as 
well as “Home Affairs and Justice”.77 In addition, there was a heavy focus on improving the 
legitimacy and efficiency of Community institutions, particularly since they were making 
decisions for the benefit of the Community without total support.78 In increasing the 
legitimacy of institutions, the need to remain accountable to the European public became a 
priority. As responsibilities moved away from states and towards intergovernmental 
institutions there was a need to ensure that citizens remained part of the process. Increasing 
the perception of the legitimacy of these institutions was and is therefore paramount. After 
this significant deepening, the community started to once again expand, with new admissions 
to the Union in both 2004 and 2007, bringing the EU structurally and geographically to what 
it is today.79 
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Despite this success, Europe was left with questions; should the European Community be 
based on security or economics? How far should the Community geographically extend? 
How should foreign policy be designed?80 These questions, which had previously been 
neglected, started to come to the surface. The Maastricht Treaty added rather than subtracted 
from the confusion of integration. Its challenge of the familiar concepts of the nation, 
statehood and national identity caused backlash even in the most enthusiastic states.81 
Regions are built by states with their own internal interests and responsibilities, and although 
integration may be beneficial, states remain answerable to their citizens. Even though the 
region may now be a powerful way to relate globally, problems and solutions still come back 
to its basic building blocks – states.  
 
Given its history and its current crisis, how can any regional body use Europe as a textbook 
model for success? It has withstood many knocks, but it has done so less through the theory 
than through political negotiation and compromise. So many compromises were made that it 
can hardly be seen as a clear cut model.82 What regions, particularly those which include 
developing nations, are not giving any credence to is the reality that Europe took decades to 
come together and when it did it was no easy task. Therefore, despite the fact that Europe is 
perceived to be successful, there is a lot more to consider than economic integration alone.  
Having discussed the influence of Europe within regional theory today, we now look at the 
models that have become the dominant options within regional integration theory in the New 
Regionalism movement – open regionalism and developmental regionalism.   
 
Politics and Economics – Separating the Inseparable? 
 
Although many argue that economics may be separated from politics, in reality, the 
relationship is far more complicated. The investigation into what this paper considers to be a 
false dichotomy will link the issues around regionalism to the debate around globalization. 
By looking at the dominant structures that drive the regionalization process, we can start to 
see the tensions inherent in the balancing act that every region must maintain if it intends to 
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be successful – the need to balance state and domestic needs with international demands and 
competition.   
 
Baylis et al. make a distinction by separating the concepts of “cooperation” and 
“integration”.83 Regional cooperation may appear in numerous forms. Economically, this 
occurs where partners foresee a degree of commercial preferentialism, however, this may 
occur without any harmonization of domestic rules and no expectation of common action in 
international affairs. Political cooperation occurs when partners engage in mutual support and 
commitment with regards to the implementation of certain values and practices within their 
respective states. However, under cooperation alone, no obligations beyond those attributed 
to states under international law are created.84 In contrast, formal regional integration goes 
beyond agreements and the removal of obstacles of interaction and it includes a regional 
space that is subject to common rules.85 There are degrees of interaction, and in order to 
achieve higher forms of integration, the partner nations are expected to not only harmonise 
their rules but also to act internationally with a unified voice.86 In discussing regional theory, 
a few initial distinctions need to be made along two broad lines – old versus new regionalism 
and Market-based, Open regionalism versus the Critical or Developmental approach.  
 
The differences between old and new regionalism are significant; old regionalism was shaped 
by a bi-polar system and was created by the superpowers of the time. It tended to be inward-
looking, protectionist and had specified objectives, namely security and economics. Its main 
actors were states. In contrast, new regionalism has taken form in a multi-polar world and is a 
more spontaneous process, driven from within and incorporating non-state actors in both 
driving and influencing the process. It tends towards more open economies that are integrated 
into the global economic system and has multi-faceted objectives, which may be political, 
economic or social.87  The old is out and the new is in, but the issues that we see today are not 
necessarily issues that the newer version can answer without the aid of the theory that helped 
the old version evolve. Europe has evolved through both, and remains a patchwork quilt of 
influences. It is important to note the changes and how these have affected the member states 
in regional groupings. The process today is more complex; it paints a picture of regions as 
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very open within their options and influences, but in reality, they are not. Having touched 
briefly on the differences, we leave the old versus new comparison and look at two models 
that dominate the New Regionalist landscape.  
 
The Critical approach, or Developmental approach, emphasizes the idea of state intervention 
in the market in order to promote national development agendas. It flows from the idea of the 
developmental state and the fact that while openness helps an economy to grow, it has the 
potential to create issues such as uneven development.88 It fits well into the new regionalist 
framework due to the fact that it remains committed to open markets and increased trade and 
financial flows, however, it goes beyond that ambit in that it advocates for a much bigger role 
for the state. It acknowledges that social and political forces remain relevant, but the state 
itself is what is pivotal in driving and directing the regionalization process.89   
 
The model has a few core characteristics; firstly, unlike other models that maximize 
efficiency, it focuses on economic and social development. This means that the focus is not 
just on increasing productivity, it is also on making sure that development is even and 
meaningful for both the state as a whole and for those within the forces of production. It is an 
attempt to move away from disjointed development hubs and a move towards more 
sustainable and overall change. This is especially relevant for developing nations that are 
geared towards production for external markets, where, in order to take advantage of those 
markets, infrastructure, policy coordination and loans and subsidies must be made available 
before the state can truly see the benefits of that trade. Since unevenness is not only created 
within a state, but between states, this form of regionalization also includes compensatory 
and corrective measures between states.90 The most difficult aspect is found in its interaction 
with nationalism; allowing industry to move is to lose that industry in your own territory, 
which is a sensitive topic in any state.91  
 
It therefore becomes clear that unlike Market-based systems, in which the political aspect of 
integration occurs after the economic aspect, here the state functions as the backbone of the 
system. It may seem from the description that this echoes early forms of inward-looking 
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regionalism and the Developmental approach does have some connection to those ideas, 
however, due to its emphasis on trade and open markets, it significantly departs from that 
tradition. The Developmental model’s relationship to globalization is an interesting one; it 
does not act as a form of total resistance, but does allow for regions to protect themselves to a 
degree from globalization by allowing the state to intervene and work around the problems 
brought in by a totally open regional system, such as purely extractive industries.92  
 
What makes the Developmental model most interesting is that it driven by politics. It does 
not allow for a snowball effect in economic relations to dictate which political structures are 
needed. The model starts with setting goals and intentions that are shared and communally 
pursued. This could be both good and bad; good in the sense that the model allows states to 
understand from the start the kinds of sacrifices that will need to be made politically in order 
to achieve goals, but also bad, in that it means that cracks in the system should show faster, 
since a much higher level of commitment is required much sooner. This may create early 
instability and collapse. Also, a state driven approach may emphasize what have been two of 
the greatest challengers of the regionalization process – nationalism and sovereignty. If the 
state drives the process, it is able to pursue its interests more emphatically, but is equally 
prone to guarding and protecting them more virulently.  
 
The Market-based approach is the antithesis of the state-centered approach.93 Since the 1980s 
it has been the dominant form of regional integration. It consists of forming regional trading 
blocs in which barriers to trade, production and financial flows are removed internally, while 
the combined bloc’s trade is outwardly orientated. It is underpinned by neoliberal trading 
policies and is considered to be “open regionalism”.94 This structure has many costs and 
benefits, but the major issue is redistribution. A side effect is that there is a tendency towards 
“poles of development” and “poles of stagnation”. There is therefore a need to combat this 
negative view through a redistributive mechanism that will allay fears within the partner 
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states.95 The other necessity is to ensure the convergence of national economic objectives. 
This is activated where partners in a trading bloc need to pursue industries that are useful 
within the given trading scheme; where a state does not produce goods that their partners 
wish to trade, the benefits of the trading bloc are significantly lowered. This is an issue 
prevalent in Africa, which is mainly a producer of raw materials and has low levels of 
industrialization. This stunts the ability to both produce and process what is traded. Non-tariff 
barriers also remain a significant stumbling-block.96 Open regionalism is orientated towards 
trade within the global market, with export-led trade and development being its core 
objective. Economic efficiency and growth are priorities. The end goal is to derive the 
benefits that accrue from a larger, more competitive market. It is driven not by the state, but 
by the private sector and market forces.97 
 
A key contributor to the theory is Bela Balassa, who wrote about regionalization around the 
same time as Haas, and borrowed from his concept of “spillover”. He suggested that regional 
integration occurs in a sequence, with each stage requiring completion before a new phase 
may be embarked upon. Each stage has economic costs that would be misallocated where a 
new phase is started without the last being completed. 98 His theory has five stages: firstly, a 
free trade area must be established where members slowly eliminate barriers to internal trade 
while they are free to maintain barriers with non-partner states. This is followed by a customs 
union,99 which moves beyond the free trade area by establishing a common external tariff for 
trading with non-member states. It also frequently includes a redistributive mechanism to 
allocate the tariff revenue. This then develops into the establishment of the common market, 
which establishes a free flow of factors of production in addition to the free flow of products. 
Lastly, there is the establishment of an economic and monetary union. This allows for the 
implementation of a common currency and common external trade policies. It includes the 
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final stage of total economic integration – the establishment of a supra-national authority that 
governs a federation and allows the full benefits of a monetary union to take effect.100  
 
In Balassa’s model, it is the political that follows the economic programme. It essentially 
allows the state a period of adjustment, wherein it can start to integrate and assess the benefits 
without embarking on giving up state sovereignty until the benefits have been proven. 
However, there is a danger in this approach; requesting that a state relinquish its sovereignty 
over a period of time may seem wiser, but it does allow for the possibility that a state may 
follow the process only to fail to completely integrate due to an unwillingness to federate. 
This is the issue we see today in Europe; when the political option was unsuccessful, an 
economic alternative was found, but politics cannot be pushed aside. As a result we continue 
to see political tensions despite the level of economic integration. 
 
Considering the sensitive nature of trade and monetary policy, an additional issue to consider 
is the effect and the political implications of a monetary union. It is easy to understand why a 
monetary union was listed towards the end of Balassa’s process of integration. Ultimately, 
the decision to create a monetary union is a political one, but it requires a very high level of 
political commitment and trade integration. Monetary unions establish a complete union of 
fiscal and monetary policies so that in effect, the states become regions of one nation.101The 
political implications are obvious; a state must relinquish the entirety of its ability to regulate 
its own monetary policy and must as a result, give up its sovereign rights in totality.102  
 
Although in most places it is seen as a predominantly political decision, there must also be an 
economic cost-benefit analysis. This is analysed in line with Optimum Currency Area 
Theory, as espoused by Mundell. His theory focussed on defining the optimal geographic 
area in which a single currency would create the most benefit.103 His theory was very 
structural and included both micro and macro-economic considerations, but in recent times 
the debate has shifted to looking more towards whether there is a political commitment from 
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the necessary partners and whether there are converging policies, along with flexible labour 
markets and prices.104 There is also debate as to whether monetary policy should coincide 
with fiscal policy. Cohen’s challenge to Mundell’s theory is that historically, institutional 
linkages are insufficient. In addition a region requires a hegemon that is committed to the 
union as well as a series of linkages and commitments that make the cost of a dependent 
monetary policy acceptable to other partners.105 
 
One of the main issues to tackle is the sequencing of political and monetary integration. 
There are various views within the debate; some argue that a workable monetary union is 
only feasible where a considerable degree of political integration has occurred. Political 
integration allows for a convergence of policy preferences and political will.106 Many current 
views see political integration, whether previous or simultaneous to a monetary union, as a 
possible strategy to reduce national idiosyncrasies which may be disruptive.107 Some argue 
that where a monetary union does not coincide with an optimum currency area, the 
imbalances caused may accelerate political integration. Having said that, without political 
integration the monetary union would struggle to succeed without it being situated within an 
optimum currency, which as a standalone would be hard to achieve.108 A strong criticism of 
the Maastricht Treaty is that monetary integration precedes political integration – Pivetti 
argues that as long as a state remains responsible for certain political and social objectives, it 
cannot relinquish its control over capital flows. Therefore, in order for the process to work, he 
argues that monetary and political integration should occur simultaneously so that a state may 




We can therefore understand that any state wishing to pursue integration to this level faces a 
massive challenge within its regional commitments; sovereignty is a state-attribute that is 
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held tightly for it is what defines a state’s being. It is, in the Kantian sense, an “I have 
sovereignty therefore I am” situation. This is the heart of the instability inherent in 
regionalism and within the Market-based model in particular. There has been a false 
dichotomy constructed between politics and economics. The idea that one can perform 
without the support of the other is void since they are inherently intertwined in their actions. 
 
Regionalism is a middle-ground; in order to understand the pressures states face, it is 
essential to understand the relationship between state, region and globalization. The appeal of 
regional bodies for states is that they provide for bigger markets, growth and development. 
Joining a region should also give them greater political and economic bargaining power 
internationally. Globalization does not simply mean greater interconnectedness – it means 
that borders and boundaries become less meaningful.110 It is a multi-dimensional process, but 
can also be an asymmetrical one; some areas are more integrated into the process of 
globalization than others.111 Foqué and Steenbergen hold that societies risk disintegration 
when they are faced with forms of destructive behaviour that they feel are beyond their 
control and that states feel threatened by the process of globalization because it causes them 
to lose control over their domestic markets and identity.112 This can cause isolationism, 
protectionism and militant nationalism and reinforces the value of regionalism. Schulz, 
Söderbaum and Öjendal113 discuss the fact that New Regionalism encourages the drive to 
proceed faster with regionalism than what appears to be possible within the normal 
multilateral framework. The New Regionalism approach does this by using the same forces 
that are used to sustain globalization and multilateralism – Neoliberal policies.114 This creates 
significant overlap in influence of state, regional and global forces.115 States access the global 
framework directly, but have much more power to do so through regions which supply a 
framework through which they can balance internal needs with external demands. The cost, 
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however, is that all three levels need to buy into one system – the dominant Neo-liberal 
ideology – which allows all three to remain integrated.  
 
Regional ideas have evolved historically; theory is not simply a product of modelling, or 
projecting what could be effective, but has been modified as the predominant case – Europe – 
has modified itself. What started out as a political initiative, based on sovereignty, has 
become an economic initiative that undermines it. This first chapter has laid out the 
fundamental issues going into the debate about regional theory; due to the perceived success 
of Europe most regions favour the “economics before politics” approach. There is a rush 
towards a federation and a monetary union, as espoused by Balassa and reinforced by the 
forces of globalization that use Neo-liberal theory, and regions feel that their end-point is 
defined. However, as impossible as it is to divorce the state from the international economy, 
it is equally impossible to divorce politics from economics. The result is that regions face a 
struggle within their existence; they are challenged from above and from below, and this 
struggle is compounded by the idealisation of the European model and the attempt to 
universalize the economic model as a response to the effects of globalization. Having 
explored the context around regions today, this paper will look towards the null hypothesis 
and the respective statements in order to interrogate the validity of what have become 




















Statement 1: Regional theory is well established; if regions follow the prescribed economic 
theory, they will be successful. 
 
 If we are to understand fully how the ideas behind the null hypothesis were formed, we must 
return to the source – the beginnings of modern regional theory. The above statement is a 
simple one; if a group of states signs on to an agreement to become a region, there are 
theories and models available that will enable them to reach their goal. The basis of any 
theoretical model is to supply a solution to a problem. However, the assumption inherent in 
this statement is that the theory itself is dependable and tested.  
 
New Regionalism has very defined qualities. The economic model of integration is favoured 
due to its positive knock on effects for regions wishing to compete in the global market. 
However this new regional theory is not divorced from its past; the theories of Ernst Haas are 
still used within regionalist circles and have had an under-acknowledged impact on new 
theory, particularly through the work of Bela Balassa. If the null hypothesis is correct, 
economic integration will lead to political integration and a federation. However, if the theory 
itself is flawed and these flaws have been passed down through the theory, then the very basis 
of the popular model of New Regionalism that focuses on economics at the expense of 
politics is also flawed, which undermines the validity of the null hypothesis. In the following 
chapter this paper will describe the work of David Mitrany and Ernst Haas, who dominated 
early regional theory.  Through looking at the criticisms and juxtaposing the theories, this 
chapter will challenge Statement 1 and the null hypothesis. 
 
Regionalism’s Theoretical Beginnings: 
 Functionalism 
 
Wiener and Diez discuss that the change in the relationship between member-states should be 
seen as the process of integration .116 This places emphasis on both the process, as well as the 
outcome. The tendency within theory today is for it to be parsimonious and prescriptive, 
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however this cuts down significantly on the value that theory may provide. In using theory, 
particularly within regionalism, the goal is to look for a single answer, but, as shown in the 
following analysis, this tendency to narrow theoretical findings can impact how we are able 
to see that which it describes. Regionalism is dynamic and cannot fit into a neat box. The 
early theoretical ideas around regionalism illustrate this issue quite clearly.  
 
A Working Peace System was first published in 1943; it was a direct response to the failing of 
the League of Nations and WW II.117 Mitrany’s goal within the theory was to maintain peace 
more than promoting a set programme for integration.118 His idea was that the League of 
Nations failed as a coordinating body because the organisation could not structurally cope 
with continual adjustment.119  Agreements were based on relationships formed around pacts 
at state level, not on behaviours, and as such emphasised set relationships based on rules.120 
He holds that international federalism must be considered in a different light to national 
federalism due to the notion of sovereignty. It was impossible to remove states from their 
people, but to assume that states could make decisions and hold them over the people that 
they governed was equally illogical.121  This meant that states could not act without the 
support of their populations and as a result, the process had to be inclusive and beneficial for 
the respective state populations. Also, states would still behave as separate entities due to 
their fear of domination and a focus on security issues.122 What Functionalism provided was 
an alternative that circumvented the problem of sovereignty and aimed itself at popular 
interaction, moving interests from parochial politics to common rights and interests. This 
formed the basis of Mitrany’s notion of technical and functional coordination.123 Mitrany 
essentially designed a kind of step system; he held that modern states were organised more 
around rules and norms than constitutional values and the requirement to meet needs.124 As 
such, any system that was to be successful needed to respond to both the state structure as 
well as to the needs of the people in order to make it sustainable.  
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 Mitrany argued that in many national situations, there is resistance to change. The problem 
he found with regional agreements was that not only did they keep nations separate, they 
reinforced geographical boundaries within the process of compliance; the functional approach 
would get around this problem by entirely removing the notion of boundaries. They would 
run across territories and would progressively deemphasize national differences.125 He 
focussed on the issue of how power and sovereignty were exercised in communal spaces.126 
The issue is that countries tend to want to dominate each other as a natural reaction to issues 
of security. The answer to this, in Mitrany’s mind, was that practical grounds should provide 
the basis upon which certain nations should become more involved in issues or not. For 
instance, if one country has more experience in a field, they should command greater respect 
in that arena, regardless of their placement in general in international matters.127 This was a 
softer approach to the redistribution of power and would allow those nations with common 
interests to act together.128  
 
 Mitrany argued that where interactions are based on common interests a network of 
overlapping fixed interests is created. This also allows for more change because interaction is 
localised around focal points.129 Therefore, the Functional approach was very much about 
uniting people through their interests and using these relationships to create networks that 
would ensure a peaceful coexistence. Simultaneously, the system would undermine what had 
been the biggest stumbling blocks to peace – sovereignty, power, security and resistance to 
change. Functionalism was essentially a kind of undercover unity that would outlast 
leadership and generate greater benefits because it would be driven by people and not 
governments.  
 
These observations describe the functional aspect of his theory, but it also had a technical 
component. Greater integration would require technical support. This would necessitate 
greater communication, particularly in sectors such as transport and mail etc. This could 
easily be facilitated within one interest, but may, in a step higher in integration, require 
coordination amongst groups of interests and may even lead to international planning 
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agencies.130 In terms of his argument, an organising body could be formed, however it had to 
follow as a result of action rather than precede it and had to operate within strict 
boundaries.131 
 
The only warning he highlights is that such agencies may overstep their power bounds, but 
Mitrany maintained that any laws must remain in the ambit of national governments to both 
make and enforce – no nation ought to be subject to another unwillingly.132 The confusing 
reality for Mitrany was that as much as he wanted to work around statehood, he knew it 
would persist, therefore he also had to accommodate state concerns. As a result, Mitrany did 
not want to reinvent the system; instead the aim within his thinking was to find the easiest 
and fastest route to peace without rocking the foundations the system stood on, possibly 
promoting another war. Instead, his is a “back-door” theory – one that works from the bottom 
up, promoting people-centred change rather than forcing political weight downwards.  
 
In The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?133 Mitrany puts more emphasis on 
developing countries and the challenges they face as new nations.134  His option of 
integration is the easiest to apply to newly independent or developing nations as it does not 
challenge sovereignty. He also emphasized the effect that Functionalism could have on 
democracy. It works around the need to maintain the democratic system, especially where 
certain functions have escaped the control of parliaments.135  Therefore, although the 
Functionalist programme seems to undermine sovereignty, it actually reinforces sovereign 
rights.136 He believed that federalism focused more on tightening ties between states than 
encouraging cooperation.137 Lastly, he introduces a response to the question of a functional 
end-point; function determines structure and structure determines practice, therefore the 
political nature of any end-point would need to be dependent on how it evolved. He avoids 
prescribing a defined end-point.138 
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In his work The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective139  Mitrany highlights two 
important factors; firstly, the idea of federalism in the current system could actually be said to 
work against the democratic initiative, a concept that we know today as the democratic 
deficit. Technical agreements are made more frequently by experts than by the people 
themselves and for Mitrany, this is devastating to the cause of cooperation and fair 
representation.140 Secondly, he responds to critics by stating that no process can be scientific 
where integration is concerned. Science operates within restraints, but these restraints are the 
limits that Functionalism tries to circumvent.141 Mitrany makes strong arguments against 
federalism, and whilst he does not specifically apply his theory to a monetary union, it is easy 
to see that he would be against it too. In order to create a sustainable system Mitrany 
understood that upholding sovereignty, the basis of the state, was paramount. In order to do 
so, any theory had to support rather than disempower the driving force of the state – its 
population. For Mitrany, Federalism offered no benefits; it challenged the state, it activated 
nationalist concerns and in addition, worked against the democratic initiative, systematically 
minimizing the ability of populations to hold their governments accountable. Functionalism 
was therefore a fundamental departure in intention and outcome; Mitrany’s theory was a 
direct response to these criticisms. 
 
 In the article A Working Functionalism?142 Sewell notes that it does appear that 
Functionalism would create more enduring relationships, but that to the date of the article, the 
theory itself has been quite overrated, with little practical success.143 He also responds to 
Mitrany’s view of developing countries and argues that before they can commit to a 
functional endeavour, they must also create space to develop economically. In order to get to 
a viable stage of integration, development is required, but development also requires a level 
of nationalism, which is the antithesis of the functional perspective.144 Mitrany does not, 
however, state that nationalism is always bad – he simply states that it is not always useful to 
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achieve goals because it can become a hindrance. Mitrany holds that nationalism needs to be 
tempered and Functionalism is the least offensive means to achieve this.  
 
McLaren, however, is very critical of Functionalism; in Mitranian Functionalism: Possible 
or Impossible?145 he notes six main aspects that he finds problematic. Firstly, he notes that 
the theory is oversimplified.146 One clear example of this can be seen in the notion that 
“function” is never clearly defined.147 Secondly, he attacks the idea that these functions may 
operate across borders.148 This notion offers very little to the understanding that partners not 
only have to agree on the best way to solve a problem, they also need to be at equal levels of 
economic development in order to apply and benefit from a strategy. In addition, Mitrany 
failed to properly account for the fact that many welfare options are already state-centred.149 
This is relevant, but it also takes away from the simplicity that Mitrany was aiming for in his 
organic approach. His whole emphasis was on not overprescribing in order to maintain the 
scope of possible application of the theory. This both weakens, as well as strengthens his 
theoretical approach.  
 
Thirdly, McLaren takes issue with the operationalisation of the theory. He argues that the 
assumptions made by Mitrany around his concept of “technical self-determination”, including 
that the world’s experts will unite and agree on a single solution based on rational, objective 
understandings, are not substantiated.150 Fourthly, Mitrany held that regarding the structure of 
interactions, form would follow function. The problem arises in that there is no “one best 
way” to do anything and the assumption of automaticity is unjustifiable. Within this 
challenge, he also raises the issue that any international body becomes politicised and that 
technical experts are also often related to governments. There is therefore no way of clearly 
escaping governmental influence.  
 
McLaren’s fifth major criticism lies in that no mention is made anywhere about the costs of 
integration. In working from the bottom up, Mitrany removes the option of government 
funding, but also removes the decision process around the desirability of agreements, as this 
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would normally fall within the government’s purview.151 The response Mitrany may have 
given here is that decisions still need to go through governments, so it would not be removing 
them – it would simply be reassigning where the motivation for decisions would come from. 
In addition, McLaren problematizes the behavioural nature of Functionalism. As a theory, it 
assumes that the reaction to an issue should be proportional to the concern around it. 
However, this notion implies that a group should not be concerned with a problem that does 
not directly affect them.152 It also not only assumes away any benefits of centralization, it 
also does not address any justifications for why it is reasonable to assume that the primary 
aim in any interaction would be welfare.153 A final issue is found in the notion of self-driving 
change, or what became known as “spillover”. Mitrany assumed that if change proved to be 
successful, it may promote further change. However, activities need funding and that must 
come from sources benefitting from economic growth. If the growth stumbles, so will the 
drive to cooperate.154 This casts serious doubt over the durability of the notion of spillover, as 
well as how sustainable the theory was in practice. These last few criticisms are the most 
valid. We can only gather Mitrany would have expected the answers to work themselves out 
within the process, but this does not allow for any guarantees of success. 
 
These holes in the theory really beg the question of whether the theory was intended, in its 
parsimonious approach, to deliberately ignore these aspects in order to work around the 
system in place or whether these were technical aspects not considered vital at the time. The 
difficulty is that Mitrany addressed new additions to the global stage, such as developing 
nations in the 1960s and 1970s, but failed to provide greater light on these criticisms. 
Through Mitrany’s on-going writing, it becomes clear that his theory could be meant more as 
a guideline to processes than as a process itself.  
 
The fact that Mitrany’s theory emphasizes working within the bounds of sovereignty and 
within the modern state structure translates to a far more stable approach to the process of 
regionalization. In relation to Statement 1, we are able to see that even Mitrany saw the 
possible threat of Federalism as a significant challenge to overcome. Theory today advocates 
for a Federal end-point, however, that is exactly what Mitrany was working against. The 
belief is that, in following the theory provided, regions would successfully integrate. It is the 
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basis upon which the null hypothesis operates. The success of economic integration, as well 
as the expectation that political integration will follow, is grounded in the validity of the 
benefits of expanded markets, the ultimate expression of which is a federation. If there is 
doubt cast on the benefits of that theory in the earliest writings around regional integration, 
then there ought to be doubts about the value of the theory now, especially since the 
fundamental state structure has not significantly changed since Mitrany’s writing. Having 
noted these initial doubts, this paper turns to Neofunctionalism in order to address the 




Neofunctionalism can be said to find its theoretical bases within Functionalism, Federalism 
as well as communications theories.155 Essentially, the major writers - most notably Haas – 
combined federalist goals with functionalist mechanisms.156 The outcome was that according 
to Neofunctionalism, ever greater interdependence would eventually lead to the relocation of 
governance from states to a new supranational authority, superseding pre-existing national 
ties.157 This appears to be the initial point at which the idea of the federal end-point for 
integration really took hold within integration studies.  
 
Like Functionalism, Neofunctionalism highlighted technocratic decision-making, incremental 
change and learning processes. However, whereas the Functional understanding of an 
organisation stated that its form, scope and purpose was determined by the task it was 
intended to fulfil, the Neofunctionalists attributed more influence to the autonomous nature of 
supranational organisations and the strength of organized interests. In addition, whereas 
Functionalists focussed on issues with popular support, Neofunctionalists believed that 
changes occur due to attitude changes within the elite, sharply diverting from the 
Functionalist idea of change from the bottom-up.158  
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The Neofunctionalists had a few primary aims; firstly, they aimed to create a general theory 
that could be applied anywhere. Secondly, integration was understood as a process, and 
thirdly, that as part of the process, relationships would develop over time, evolve and assume 
their own dynamic.159 Fourthly, Neofunctionalism is pluralist in nature; it departs from the 
Realist understanding that states are the main and only relevant actors and accepts instead 
that regionalism is driven by multiple actors, including governmental and non-governmental 
elites.160 Lastly, an element that was regularly implied in Haas’ writing was that as countries 
enjoyed economic growth, they would naturally look more towards growth than they would 
towards nationalism.161 His theory was focussed on economics rather than politics. In his 
view, economics would form the basis of the theory of integration and politics would 
follow.162 
 
As a theory, Neofunctionalism focussed on European integration. As a result, several 
assumptions were made; it was accepted that the relevant actors were rational and self-
interested, had preferences and could therefore change them and learn from the process.163 
Neofunctionalists also believed that once organisations developed sufficiently, they would 
slowly escape the influence of their creators. It was also accepted that not every game played 
between actors was zero-sum; exchanges were more likely seen to be positive-sum, in that 
the nature of the exchanges were geared towards compromise and continued relations.164  
 
One of the main concepts within neofunctionalism is spillover. The term was originally used 
in two ways – firstly to connote the occurrence of further integration, and secondly to 
describe the driving force behind further integration due to increased economic or functional 
interdependence. Haas described the process as one in which successful integration in one 
area puts pressure on states to cooperate in other technical areas.165 In the literature, the term 
functional spillover was developed to describe this technical aspect. It is structural in nature 
and the pressure to change is not homogenous – it is driven by agents. The difficulty was that 
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the conditions in which spillover could occur were numerous and no single description could 
cover the issue effectively.166 Political spillover becomes appealing when it becomes apparent 
that problems cannot be solved at a domestic level.167 Neofunctionalists also emphasized 
governmental elites and the process of socialization and learning. Processes need time to 
develop and depend very heavily on trust between members, tying into the fact that the issues 
become increasingly problematic where they become politicized. Most importantly, those that 
are participating must feel as though they are doing so willingly.168  
 
Haas believed that elites were valuable in that once they perceived that problems could not be 
solved locally due to the widening spillover, they would turn their expectations, political 
actions and even possibly their loyalties to a new European centre, thereby adding political 
stimulus to the process.169 Another focal point is the role played by supranational institutions; 
organisations are vital in creating outcomes that facilitate greater cooperation because they 
act almost as mediators, ensuring that the parties feel that agreements are voluntary and 
cooperative. This has a further spillover effect Haas termed “cultivated spillover”.170 
Conventional wisdom at the time stated that agreements were usually the outcomes of 
domestic bargaining, but Neofunctionalism changed the orientation of the integration process 
by relocating state concerns to an inter-state level.171 Where this change in orientation 
occurred, we find one of the sharpest departures from Mitrany’s theory; citizens are no longer 
at the centre of integration and Neofunctionalism is firmly placed as top-down approach, with 
changes being enforced by elites from above.  
 
Some main terms are clarified in Haas’ The Uniting of Europe;172 functions are a product of a 
system, and are based on the idea that a correct response to a need will eventually grow and 
become independent of the system that produced it.173 Haas is very critical of Functionalism. 
He heavily questions how it could be reasonable to expect states to support cross border 
transactions unless political and military security is in place,174 which is ironic, since his 
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theory works against the state, not, as Mitrany’s does, around it. In The Challenge of 
Regionalism,175 we do not see the same treatment of sovereignty that we see within 
Functionalism, and Haas seems to lack the concerns that Mitrany had around processes being 
blocked.  
 
In Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas176 
Ruggie et al. examine how Haas viewed Neofunctionalism. Haas at no point called his 
theoretical investigations a theory as such – like Weber, he believed that entire systems 
cannot be prescribed.177 Haas also used an approach that was value based and included both 
material and ideational elements. These values shaped interests, and as values changed or 
interests could not be filled, change within behaviour was facilitated.178 A by-product of 
Haas’ non-theory predisposition is that no time specification was actually made, which drew 
significant criticism.179 However, for all of his protests that integration theory was obsolete, 
he was actually “wrong about being wrong”; when integration once again fell to the fore in 
the 1980s, Haas’ work formed much of the backbone of the thinking at the time. However, 
Haas was sceptical of the application of his thinking to other regions, especially with regards 
to Neofunctionalism as a prescriptive methodology.180  
 
For the purposes of this literature review, the most interesting of all of his works must be The 
Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory.181 This work shows changes in Haas’ thinking 
from his original works. In contrast to the claims of other theorists, the book is not an 
admission of obsolescence, but rather an opportunity for challenging the theory and 
developing it. As Haas states, the theory may need revising, but the patient is still living – the 
spread of regionalism and integration has not shown any signs of deterioration.182 
Interestingly, in terms of transferring the theory, he does refer to externalization for 
developing nations. The initiative starts by an effort of collective action, either economic or 
administrative, and is followed by a crisis of equity and distribution. This is followed by 
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locating the problem in an external source, allowing for growth and the development of a 
common front towards external parties. This allows for a reduction in integration costs to the 
members while increasing integration itself.183 This is one version of how integration can 
occur, and was certainly seen in many early attempts to regionalize in the developing world, 
including the EAC.  
 
Speaking about European institutions, Haas notes that in established integration norms, the 
authority and legitimacy of an institution should evolve simultaneously.184 He makes an 
important distinction between a central authority and a managed partnership;185 a central 
authority can choose to prioritise interests, while in a managed partnership it means that if 
interests are to be noticed it is dependent on forming the right alliances. In the second 
instance, aspects of sovereignty are not removed. 186  In actually allowing for them, Haas 
creates a space for the state, however, he equally opens the door to criticism as he cannot 
account for whether the interests pursued will be welfare centred. The problem within Europe 
was that the sovereign state was both “obstinate and obsolete” and the system mirrored that 
reality.187 Within the study of institutions in Europe at the time, three likely outcomes of the 
regional process were considered – a slow but continual growth leading to an equilibrium, a 
dramatic growth in authority, leading to a federal outcome, or a collapse and a return to 
national governments. However, Haas disagreed with this approach; he held that these 
options were insufficient as institutions were constantly subject to change. Neofunctionalism 
provided an imperfect system of growth188 and even Haas was eventually unsure of the 
outcome. Perhaps the answer Haas was looking for was that the fallacy was not in the theory, 
but in looking for neatness within it – the curse of parsimony. 
 
Neofunctionalism is one of the most criticised schools of integration theory.189 The theory 
does not accurately account for unintended consequences or for the fact that any actor has 
multiple interests and loyalties. In addition, it was criticised for its predictive nature.190 
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However, these criticisms are based on perceptions of the theory. The theory never really 
claimed to be predictive – it claimed that the process should continue, but does not espouse a 
timeline or a process.191 It also does not deal with the effect that such changes have on 
popular representation as it focuses on elites and their influence. This seems to be a criticism 
that follows Neofunctionalism from its Functionalist roots; are these purposefully omitted in 
order to allow for the space for the relevant processes? It could be, as noted above, that since 
Haas never actually called Neofunctionalism a theory, these were ideas that were meant to 
guide practice but not become exclusionary. Therefore the theory only provides an 
explanation for the process that is integration, not a general theory, which is a huge issue for 
the way these ideas are applied today.  
 
However, some criticisms are more valid; firstly, Neofunctionalism bases itself on 
assumptions, minimizing its ability to travel; it assumes that countries are relatively 
developed and diversified within their productive capacities and have democratic policies, as 
in the European case.192 The assertion that spillover is inevitable and the theory’s heavy 
dependence on economic determinism have been questioned.193 There were later 
reformulations that applied some qualifications to its occurrence and moved away from the 
notion that it was an automatic process, but even so, these were insufficiently elaborated.194 
The lack of attention paid to the pervasive and enduring nature of nationalism and 
sovereignty has been heavily criticised.195 The assumption that economic growth and 
prosperity will continue and be equally shared has been questioned as well. Neofunctionalism 
appears to be a fair-weather process that does not account for deviations. In addition, some 
have claimed that Neofunctionalists assumed too much of the domestic leadership and 
expected more homogeneity in interests and interest groups than was likely.196  
 
Haas’ Neofunctionalism is therefore radically flawed as a basis from which to build regions. 
His theory has remained pertinent, however its criticisms are substantial. Yet, theorists 
remain enamoured with his ideas. Neofunctionalism’s weaknesses hit at the heart of the 
hypothesis at hand. How has Haas’ theory filtered through to modern regional theory? His 
ideas have driven theorists to believe that federalism is the full stop that regional initiatives 
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crave, despite the fact that it significantly challenges the foundation of the region politically – 
the Westphalian state. His model, which he wanted to apply universally, is tailored around 
European assumptions and influences, and cannot effectively be applied to the developing 





Neofunctionalism remains one of the fundamental reasons why states today move towards a 
monetary union and a federation. The theory remains influential directly, but also indirectly 
through the work of Bela Balassa. Balassa’s model incorporates many of the same 
understandings as Neofunctionalism;197 it includes an economics before politics approach that 
assumes that politics will follow economics and advocates for a federal end-point. The state 
is seen as a stumbling block to integration and both theories espouse the ideals of extending 
markets and developing methods of trade expansion. Both theories are also driven from the 
top-down and use the idea of spillover to explain the evolution of economic integration. Both 
also assume prerequisites in order for the theory to be effective and both theories aimed to 
create a unified theory of integration that could travel. Had Haas not published a book about 
the obsolescence of his own theory, and had his version of economic integration had the 
structural appeal of Balassa’s five stages, we may see his influence more clearly today. The 
effect of the similarity between the two theories, written around the same time, is that we can 
expect to see similarities within the criticisms and effects of both. It is on this basis that this 
paper is able to link the old to the new theory; the ideas within the theory have, in essence, 
not changed substantially despite the changes in politics, economics, trade and development. 
 
If we link these ideas to the previous chapter, it seems that in order to access global markets, 
states must sacrifice elements of their sovereignty, and where they will not, the functional 
aspect of integration within these theories will do so for them. It seems to be an ideal counter-
balance to the issue of stubborn states, disabling their ability to return to protectionist tactics, 
however, in practice, it is not entirely effective. As a result, it is clear that at its very 
foundations, regional theory, old and new, has fundamental issues. The intention is not to 
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disregard all regional theories, or to cut regional theory down in totality, however, it is to 
expose the fact that many of the assumptions made around how, where and why theory is 
used should be considered far more. This opens the first door towards unlocking the validity 
of the null hypothesis; on a theoretical level, the basis of the statement is flawed. Economic 
integration is neither universal, nor a guarantee for regional success, nor even necessarily the 
most effective model.  
 
Where Haas was criticised and the same underlying logic exists in theory today, there should 
be greater concern around the theory behind integration models. In linking the criticisms of 
Neofunctionalism with Functionalist theory, clearly where Mitrany tried to work around 
inherent issues in the state structure Haas tended to essentially ignore them, counting on the 
fact that they would be naturally overcome within the integration process. Holding Mitrany’s 
theory up against Haas’ and as a result, indirectly against Balassa’s, we are able to uncover 
the weaknesses in the current theory; it works against the state structure, undermining state 
sovereignty. The process is dislocated from popular interests, with elites promoting change. 
The theory assumes that elements are present in a given case, thereby undermining the 
integration process before it has begun. This lack of structural support is an added danger as 
the theory itself is centred on the idealised European model, which, as an idealisation, does 
not portray a realistic path for states to follow. Above all, the ability for regional economic 
integration to undercut democratic processes can have multiple negative effects, including the 
inability to reign in state power. Therefore, whereas Mitrany lacked the structures to make his 
theory more practical and appealing, he considered the issues that were likely to stunt the 
success of regions much more so than Haas, thereby revealing many of the weaknesses in 
Haas’ theory.  
 
 Statement 1 holds that following the theory will lead to successful integration, however on 
interrogating the literature, this proves to be incorrect. Since many of the essential traits 
within Neofunctionalism can be seen in New Regionalism in Balassa’s economic programme 
of integration and New Regionalism unquestionably forms the basis of most regional 
initiatives today, there should be significant concern around the use of this theory as a means 
to achieving successful integration. The success of the null hypothesis is dependent on sound 




In terms of the criticisms above, this chapter has shown that the theory itself needs 
reconsidering if it is to remain beneficial to states and regions. On analysis, the economic 
approach to integration could be said to actually activate those aspects that could most 
threaten the integration process by isolating the state and citizenry within the integration 
process, essentially removing the most powerful drivers of change. The overpowering 
assumption within regional integration is that integration itself will continue to progress, 
however without these drivers it is difficult to understand how integration can be supported. 
Having established that there are significant concerns around the theoretical bases for the null 
hypothesis, the following chapter will interrogate how this theoretical predisposition that 
works against both state and citizenry has had an impact on regional initiatives. When regions 
fail, it is not often the theory itself that is blamed, but the application. In assessing the effect 
that this model has on state-society relations, the following chapter will address why an 
alternative to federalism and a monetary union is required in order to move towards more 

























Statement 2: A successful region will lead to a federation and a monetary union. 
 
The previous chapter made a significant dent in the fundamental aspects of the application of 
regional theory, but despite this, it is also clear that regions can and do work up to a point 
within the economic programme. However, regions are built by sovereign states and 
sovereignty is an essential state characteristic. Many regions stumble or falter along their path 
to regionalization because they are unwilling to sacrifice their own existence in order to 
amalgamate into a federation.   
 
In order to unpack Statement 2, we need to look at two of the constituent parts of a state – 
sovereignty and nationalism – that underpin much of state behavior. In addition, the key to 
understanding how we should view member states in regions is by exploring how a region 
affects a state and its relationship with its citizens, thereby adding to our understanding of 
why states may be more or less committed to regions. If economic integration is effective, 
then political commitment to a permanent regional alliance should follow. So far, this paper 
has focused on the state’s outward objectives in relation to other states, however a state also 
has domestic obligations. In looking downwards into the domestic realm of the state, this 
paper will extend the ideas established in the findings of the last chapter; it will highlight the 
importance of prioritizing politics within the integration process and as a result, will expose 
the opposing forces a state must contend with in order to act within a region.  
 
Westphalia – The Beginning of the Modern State and the Challenge of Identity 
 
The notion that states have boundaries and by virtue of such boundaries have certain rights is 
a relatively new idea, historically speaking. Despite its status as a recent construct, it has 
established itself solidly as the central idea and starting point for most concepts within 
international relations and international law.198  
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The state as we understand it today was established via the Treaties of Westphalia and 
Osnabruck in 1648.199 Over the four centuries that followed, the system developed into the 
normative structure that today constitutes the modern world order. At the heart of the 
agreement was the mutual recognition between European leaders of the rights of others to 
rule their own territories free from outside interference.200 However it was only truly in the 
twentieth century with the collapse of empires that sovereign statehood and national self-
determination really became solidified as universal values.201 Three key principles dominate 
the idea of the modern nation-state: territoriality, sovereignty and autonomy.202 Territoriality 
is defined as an exclusive territorial political community with fixed boundaries, while 
sovereignty guarantees that within those boundaries the state is entitled to unqualified and 
exclusive political and legal authority.203 Autonomy allows for a separation between the 
global and the domestic; it grants the state the rights of self-determination and self-
governance in political, economic and social activity within those borders.204 The idea of a 
state and the rights around it were formally integrated into customary international law in the 
Montevideo Convention of 1933, in which it states that: 
 
“a state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a 
permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government and d) the capacity to enter into 
legal agreements with other states.”205  
 
This has become such an influential idea that in order for any new state to succeed in its 
claim for statehood, it should meet the standards of the international community on these 
grounds. These have importantly been included in the idea of regions through the 
requirements that states must fulfil in order to join a region, or be recognised in an attempt to 
join one, as seen in the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in 
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the Soviet Union issued by the European Community in 1991.206 Statehood may be 
recognized collectively or unilaterally, but without recognition,207 a state cannot function.208 
Statehood and the rights surrounding it have therefore come to define inter-state 
relationships. Regions themselves are dependent on the ability of the state parties to commit 
to the necessary agreements in order to establish regional arrangements.  
 
It is consequently clear that both federalism as well as a monetary union significantly 
influence the rights of the member states.209 What is most challenged is an underlying 
attribute of statehood that is deceptively persuasive – the identity of the state itself. Processes 
of regional integration are driven by people that are existing citizens of a state with a national 
identity. One of the most interesting and, for this paper, influential questions in regionalism 
today is how a regional identity can be formed, particularly regarding moving the national 
gaze to the regional level. This is important because if economic integration theory is correct, 
and political integration follows economic integration, we should see the effects of that 
change within regional identity, as espoused by Haas and Balassa. The real issue around 
identity is that it is so integrated in all of us as citizens that it is difficult to demarcate where it 
begins, ends and changes. In order to understand the role of state identity, we need to first 
understand the structure that gives it life – nationalism. 
 
Nations and Nationalism 
 
Nations can be defined at a minimum as large scale political communities, frequently with a 
political background and a unique form of social consciousness that is historically anchored. 
The idea of the nation is inseparably integrated with our habits of language, and therefore 
appears as natural in our everyday interactions.210  
 
Nationalism also has multiple elements within its definition; it can be described as an intense 
expression of feeling from people attached to a national collective that is paired with a sense 
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of dedication to the group and its wellbeing.211 It includes a nationalist ideology, which 
constitutes the core narrative, political priorities and goals for the nation. These goals are 
meant to depict the will of the nation and are therefore closely tied into its ideology. Lastly, 
nationalism includes nation-building and incorporates national symbols and nationalist 
discourse, which reinforce and perpetuate the idea of the nation and its goals.212 A nation, in 
turn, is an imagined political community that is limited by virtue of its boundaries but 
sovereign within those boundaries.213 Gellner argues that there is an essential difference 
between the nation and the state; although many assume they are the same thing, they are 
quite separate. The state can exercise power independently of the nation, as well as the 
opposite. Where that connection is reinforcing rather than destructive, it is to the benefit of 
both.214 This is vital to consider when considering identity, accountability and legitimacy 
within governance. 
 
There are three perspectives on nationalism which are useful in understanding the role it 
plays; the functional perspective stresses that nations did not develop by accident. They fulfil 
their functions better than their alternatives, which makes them functionally indispensible in 
the context of the modern state system. The nation is associated with a homogenous language 
that facilitates communication and allows for national sentiments to be constructed and 
preserved. This also filters through to education and other means of standardization that 
reinforce homogeneity. The nation therefore imbues the individuals with a sense of 
connectedness and group commitment.215 Apart from the obligations derived from being part 
of a nation, nations are expected to produce social trust, which is formed primarily from the 
cultural layer within a nation. This is essential within a democracy as citizens need to be able 
to trust the redistributive mechanisms within an economy.216  
 
The constructivist perspective looks at a nation as an imagined community, built on social 
interaction and historical experience. The nation is developed through suppressing various 
dialects whilst favouring one dialect that will become the vernacular, producing a 
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homogenising effect. It is seen as imagined as most members of a sovereign state will never 
meet the majority of their co-members, yet imagine the collective as a bonded community.217 
The imaginary community becomes real through belief, interaction and media. Alternatively, 
discursive constructivists highlight two claims; firstly, there is a construction of national 
difference and uniqueness that is produced which emphasizes domination and has the by-
product of isolating those that are different. The second aspect is that national identity in this 
view is not stable – it is constantly produced and reproduced.218   
 
The rationalist approach understands the nation as a group of people motivated by self-
interest. People behave in a cost-sensitive way that is intentional and have a consistent set of 
preferences. Cooperation is based on self-interest and is based on the advantages and 
disadvantages of collective action, as well as the information that is accessible and the 
likelihood of success within the action taken. Therefore cooperation will occur where 
individuals see that based on the information at hand, the interaction will most likely be 
successful and bring benefits to the individual.219  
 
Given the perspectives above, we can use a derivative, more complete definition of a nation; 
it is a political community endowed with a collective identity. The nation relates to the 
collective identity within a political space, which includes a political decision making system. 
This creates a direct link between the nation and the political collective identity. There is a 
dynamic relationship between the individual citizens and the nation, therefore the national 
element produces a sense of belonging despite the fact that citizens may hold more than one 
identity.220  
 
In terms of the goals related to statehood, Brubaker identifies types of nationalism within two 
categories – state seeking and non-state seeking nationalism. State-seeking nationalism 
occurs when political representation wishes to establish the state itself. It eventually becomes 
obsolete, however, non-state seeking nationalism endures and is likely to change and evolve. 
Brubaker identifies four different types within this category, but the most significant is 
defensive populist nationalism. This is the type of nationalism that attempts to protect the 
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nation against external threats.221 This may take many forms, but it activates the “us versus 
them” complex and can be applied both internally and externally. It is this response which we 
see in the retraction into statehood, away from regions. Writing in 1963, Bolles222 described 
nationalism as either outwardly orientated, politically dominant and economically 
preferential, or inwardly orientated, isolationist and protectionist.223 He noted that where a 
threat exists, the first response is national self-sufficiency, at that time seen with de Gaulle in 
France. As part of a union or not, states by their nature tend towards maintaining their own 
welfare and independence. He was cautious about times of success versus times of strain – he 
noted that it would be times of economic recession or political instability that would be 
telling regarding the efficacy of a region.224  
 
As a result, where the nation is threatened, national identity becomes activated. In both a 
political and economic sense the implications for the state are significant. We can understand 
this further by looking at what political identity is, how it is constructed and used and how it 
is activated.  In relation to economic integration, we already have a plausible stumbling 
block; where integration is perceived to be a threat to national interests, it will elicit a 
reaction, however, if economic integration acts as it claims, it should be able to circumvent 
the tendency towards protectionism, emphasizing a policy of open regionalism. Whether it is 
able to do this depends heavily on the effectiveness of the theory, how identity and 
nationalism are constructed and how state action or external action within a region is 
perceived.  
 
Political Identity  
 
Political identity is a tricky issue to pin down because of its complexity, layers and its 
subjective nature. There are various understandings around what the concept of identity can 
mean.225 One interpretation is that it is what characterises a single individual and separates 
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them as distinct from another. A second meaning is that identity can be seen as what may be 
common amongst a group of people. With equal ease, identity may be attributed to a 
geographically defined space, such as Europe, or Africa. A person may be Kenyan, but in a 
larger sense he is also African.226  
 
With the birth of the idea of sovereign states, came the ideological belief that people living 
within those boundaries share an identity that transcends differences and emphasizes a 
collective interest. Within the nation-building exercises of the twentieth century, most states 
promoted a sense of homogeneity and unity. This became the basis of nationalism and 
national identities.227 Within this view, identity is based upon a narrative that dictates who is 
a group member or not based on a particular view of history.228 Borders are established by 
states and identities follow, regardless of where there may be overlaps. For example, in 
Belgium, French, Dutch and German are spoken, however, they still identify themselves as 
separate to those nations due to their territoriality. 
 
Von Busekist takes an interesting approach to identity;229 although she holds that identity as a 
concept is relatively useless in the social sciences, her arguments as to why are quite useful 
for understanding the complexity of the idea. She holds that identity is dynamic and 
constructed, and therefore dependent on the context in which it is used. It rests on tradition or 
a collective understanding which may evolve and reproduce itself but maintains a close 
relationship to the political system that produces it.230 
 
In order to understand how identity plays a part in the relationship between citizen and state, 
we look to Hegel. Despite the fact that he lived and wrote in the century between 1750-1850, 
his understandings are valuable because he was present at a time when political thinkers were 
observing the evolution of national identity.231 He wrote on what modern political identity 
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should look like in order to allow both state and citizen to thrive. Within an individual’s 
identity, he separates out two aspects; firstly, he states that every individual has a practical 
identity within a state. This identity is constituted by the practical obligations of a citizen, for 
example, voting. These characteristics are uniform, and endow an individual’s life with a 
positive purpose. This is distinguished from political identity and may be termed as action-
motivating identification. A person will therefore vote because they identify themselves as 
part of a group that holds this collective responsibility.232 Identifying oneself as having a 
political identity has certain repercussions. It involves an association with a particular history, 
but also, with a particular prospective narrative – identifying oneself as British, for example, 
means that your state represents you in international affairs.233   
 
Regarding political identity, Hegel states that an individual must have agency – he must lead 
a “healthy” political life in order to flourish as a human in a structured environment. Hegel 
sees the relationship with the state as dynamic and dependent on its citizenry and holds that a 
mutually beneficial relationship is vital.234 When a citizen sees the laws of the state as being 
part of who he is and how he wishes to live, rather than being imposed from above, it makes 
for greater fulfilment. In line with this, citizens must adjust some of their desires in order to 
fit in with the interests of the whole.235 This description of identity ties in neatly with the 
understandings of Mitrany, in that his theory espouses changes from below, however, it 
contradicts the theories of Haas and Balassa, since their theories have a top-down approach.  
 
We can also assess the nature of national identity by looking at three aspects that constitute 
its effect – internal cohesion, exclusion, and the balance between the individual and the 
collective.236  The construction of the nation as an abstract community occurs by activating a 
specific set of institutionalised values and national symbols that can convey the ideas of the 
nation to its members. This, as well as developing a sense of obligation to their fellow 
members affects cohesion within the nation.237 Exclusion can be measured by looking at the 
exclusion of non-citizens, the access granted to the political community and the assimilation 
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of new citizens. In this sense, nations are double-coded as they function by bonding 
internally, but drawing boundaries externally. The nation defines itself in contrast to “others”, 
but others are not constant – they are subject to redefinition. The third aspect refers to the 
“We-I” balance. Every individual finds his identity balance between him/herself as an 
individual, and in relation to the group he belongs to. Any overemphasis on either pole will 
result in a backlash in the opposite direction, creating a need for balance in order to maintain 
stability.238 Therefore, if nations are a fluid concept, this means that identity itself is fluid – it 
is reconstructed and reanimated depending on the changes experienced by the nation itself.239 
 
Alternatively, Giddens argues that, in line with his theory of structuration, it is neither the 
experience of the individual nor the existence of society in its totality that dominates how 
social sciences should be studied; instead, it is social practices ordered across time.240 
Working on the basis that human social interaction is recursive, it is the activities of actors 
that are re-enacted and reproduced on a daily basis that form the basic structures of behaviour 
and agency. Therefore they are not brought into being, but are continually replicated through 
their expression. This process of expression creates phenomena like “acceptable behaviour”. 
It is through expression that conditions are created that allow for behaviour to continue or 
cease.241  
 
Human character, in Giddens’ theory, is therefore defined by knowledgeability which he 
defines as reflexive. This is a product of the flow of social life that is distinctively the same 
across time and space.242 To be a human being is to be a purposive agent, but the purpose is 
not divorced from the given context. People therefore monitor this reflexive action as an 
ongoing process, and this process is rooted in what can be considered, in simple terms, to be 
history. History, within Giddens’ definition, is a series of human “happenings” that link in 
time to create the greater human narrative.243 All actions depend on the practice of 
rationalization, which is integrated into the process of this continual flow of experience.244 
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Actors are judged as more or less competent based on their ability to rationalize within a 
situation, and these judgements are vital in forming relationships and expectations.245  
 
Giddens argues that human experience is contextual; if behaviour is acceptable, it has been 
made acceptable through repeated interactions that make sense at that time. He sees agency 
as a result of what individuals perceive as acceptable and effective in a given context. As a 
result, political behaviour, for instance, the support of democracy, is not a permanent 
structure. It is made acceptable through repetition and is reinforced through an ongoing 
process of rationalization and reflexivity. He pulls agency back from the context in which it is 
activated and places it squarely in the hands of the individual. Agency cannot, in Giddens’ 
view, be seen as controlled or defined from above through systemic norms. He also warns 
that one cannot give too much sway to institutions, as it does not give sufficient weight to 
autonomous social forces, and equally, one cannot “blame” actions on dark external forces as 
it attributes far too little control to agents.246 Unintended consequences are what generally 
change behaviours, however some unintended consequences are positive and some negative. 
Negative consequences will be questioned and should change behaviours.247  
 
Giddens clearly sees all processes as reproduced actions248 and structure, political or 
otherwise, is dependent on the reproduction of behaviour.249 He acknowledges that the 
reproduced structure can be socially hard, meaning that where structures grow in strength due 
to a high level of repetition, they can over time formalise into a forceful approach that affects 
behaviour itself.250 Giddens’ view differs from Hegel’s, but is not more or less relevant. 
Hegel includes aspects of reflexivity, behaviour as well as relationships between people, 
however, his theory looks more at the relationship between individuals and structures. He 
does not, as Giddens does, look at how those structures are created and maintained or why 
they persist. In his view, identity will persist under certain conditions within the structure, 
provided that the structure does not fundamentally change its boundaries. 
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Given the discussion above, it is arguable that these perspectives reinforce the arguments 
around identity and the state. Giddens’ perception of agency can be rationalised to fit into the 
functionalist, constructivist and rationalist models of nationalism and statehood. What 
Giddens supplies is a means to better understand changes in political identity and people’s 
reaction to the state. If reproduction through social interaction allows a structure to form, and 
that structure exerts a force on a population of agents, it is likely to cause a disturbance at 
some point as behaviour and attitudes change. If the process of reproduction has unintended 
consequences, behaviour may change faster than the structure is able to cope, or social 
interaction may not be able to cope with the rate of change within a structure due to elite 
influences. If we tie Hegel to Giddens, and in turn tie this to the notion that nationalism is a 
multi-layered animal, it is understandable that clashes may exist at any given time between 
structure and individual, as well as between individuals within the layers.  
 
Giddens and Hegel come from different times and from difference contexts, however, their 
ideas around agency are not necessarily at odds with each other. Both theories contribute to 
how we should see identity within the process of integration. Firstly, state structure is a 
product, in Giddens’ view, of repeated human behaviour that has created expectations and a 
security complex for the individual living in a state. If we combine this with Hegel, we see 
that the relationship between the individual and the state is far deeper than simply being 
representative. The nation state is intimately linked with the reality of the citizen and dictates 
how citizens exist within a state. At this level economic integration faces a significant 
challenge in changing the focus of the most basic level of the state – its population. It is 
feasible that this relationship could be shifted, but this is far more complex than what is 
accounted for in the assumptions of economic integration. In fact, the burden is arguably 
against change. It is very unlikely that a process that does not account for nationalism, 
sovereignty or identity to the right degree would be able to account for a means to lessen the 
pressure applied in terms of national identity, at both the state level and on an individual 
basis.  
 
Comprehending the concept in this way naturally leads to questions around how and why 
identity is activated, maintained or changed. Considering that identity, nationalism and 
nations themselves are all constructed and related, how they relate specifically requires 




Identity and Nationalism 
 
Due to the fact that both concepts are so complex, it is useful to understand the ways in which 
identity and nationalism interact. As mentioned above nationalism is layered; four levels of 
nationalism can be identified – the individual, societal, national and international. Although 
they interact daily, findings from one cannot necessarily be transferred to others. Having said 
this, they are quite open within their interaction and influence each other.251 Regarding the 
issues dealt with here, our interest is directed to the societal, the national and international 
levels.  
 
The meso-level, or societal level, describes the interactions between people and the state. 
Identity here is usually constructed through what is called “mega-narratives” that vary from 
state to state and can be changed through discourse. These narratives include state history, 
ideals and goals. Actors on this level include the state, societal groups and representatives, 
and it is this level that is most often used in order to gain central political power in a state. 
This level has two primary aspects – the pragmatic and the ideological. The pragmatic aspect 
is one that is dominated by material wealth, while the ideological aspect constructs and 
reinforces or loosens the boundaries between the in and out-group members.252 It is often 
fragmented due to a high level of competition.253 This level therefore directly influences 
national identity by linking causes and ideas to individuals and groups. It is the connection 
between the state and its citizenry. 
 
 The macro level, or state level, is characterised by two goals – the survival of the state and 
the maintenance of the legitimacy254 of the government;255 particularly within democracies, 
governments must continue to supply the economic goods that the state is responsible for.256 
A key ingredient to the success of any national body is the perception of legitimacy. National 
identity is vital in that it plays a part in legitimising the decisions made in the national 
context.257 Legitimacy is affected in two ways by political identity; firstly, the decisions that 
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are made must have positive results. The measure of positivity is mediated by the 
expectations of the community which is in turn directly influenced by the construction of 
identity. Secondly, there must be the perception of public participation in the process of 
decision-making, which is also dependent on identity.258 The intervening issue is that the 
outcome should reflect the will of the nation, and not simply the majority.259 This aspect 
therefore links the national with the societal level, and reinforces national identity from both 
above and below. 
 
Within the macro-level, there are two kinds of collective political identity. The first is 
strategic essentialism, a bottom-up approach, where a group uses the established identities of 
the state to promote its own cause or to protect its group culture from assimilation. This 
approach tends to preserve already existing power ties.260 The second occurs where political 
elites need to strengthen weak ties or create a new political identity in order to legitimise 
policy. This is a top-down approach and often manipulates national symbols in order to 
activate emotions around issues. Both of these legitimising processes mean that identity is 
subverted in the interests of politics. The end result is that governments have a kind of 
monopoly on identity in order to promote their causes, while they maintain a control over 
their critics by continuing to define what the “correct” national identity is.261 The outcome of 
this use of national identity is that an interaction with another group may turn into a zero-sum 
game,262 activating the “us versus them” form of nationalism. These two processes 
demonstrate the fact that the process of identity formation can be influenced by both state and 
citizenry, but more importantly, that it characterises the relationship between the state and its 
citizens. Identity is more than an affiliation; it is a dynamic tool that is used to realise goals 
and legitimize behaviour.  
 
The last level is the supranational or international level; nationalism influences the 
international system through state actions. For example, states may find themselves more 
militarily powerful due to an increased defence budget. In order to legitimize this spending, 
government may choose to argue a case that activates an element of national identity, such as 
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a perceived threat.263 In addition, pressure from citizens may cause a state to intervene in a 
crisis in another state, influencing inter-state relations. It is at this level especially that 
identity may influence regionalism due to its effect on the actions of states at an international 
level.264 Popular will can make or break agreements once a region has been established.  
 
As a result, we find that national identity is a tight web of interlinking influences and 
connections, starting from the individual and leading all the way up to international state 
reactions. It is a broad and permeating concept, but its stability is also deceptively fragile. In 
considering the above description, although we are tied to the idea of a national identity, what 
that national identity is and how it can be used is a more sensitive issue. This becomes 
particularly important in establishing and maintaining regional agreements as well as 
cultivating a regional identity that may be able to support integration. 
 
Regionalism and Identity  
 
Regions as political bodies are much larger than states and have boundaries that are far less 
defined. As noted in Chapter 1, the definition of what may delineate where a region begins 
and ends is difficult to pin down, impacting significantly on the construction of regional 
identity. The best approach to regions is to treat them as if they materially exist. In truth, they 
exist as nations do, as constructs that are granted agency within the international system.265 
The problem is that these features are drawn from the nation-state and mimic the vocabulary 
used to define states. The tendency to treat regions as nations in territorial, political and 
economic terms is problematic.266 This has obvious knock-on effects, namely, that within 
addressing regions as we would the state, we bring expectations along with the vocabulary.  
To see identity and regionalism from two perspectives becomes valuable; firstly, from the 
regional perspective as an identity-generating body, and secondly, from the perspective of 
identity formation, which must cope with and react to the process of regionalization. The 
most effective way to understand how regional identity relates to national identity is by 
assessing the difference in the effect of national and regional identities in relation to an 
individual citizen. This is because an individual is aware of their membership in the greater 
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group (the vertical aspect – regional or national) but the way he views his identity is in 
relation to the individual’s feeling between group members (horizontal aspect – in group, 
national or community).267 Therefore even though identity is based on micro-level 
interactions, the phenomenon itself may be extended to a societal, national or international 
level because the point of comparison remains the individual.   
 
An individual in a nation views identity as a product of shared history, culture and values, 
whereas in a region, identity becomes about the amalgamation of various cultures and 
histories.268 Due to the size of regions, regional identity tends to be more abstract.269 It can be 
activated to support a regional cause, however this depends on a number of factors. 
Regionalism usually lacks a uniform education system in which to promote its values, as well 
as a single language or legal system. Therefore regional identity depends on two factors – the 
type of community and the type of moral resources expected from the community.270 By their 
nature, regions consequently encourage solidarity over loyalty, especially since they do not 
have the resources to guarantee what a nation state can.271 Perhaps citizens of nation-states 
can rearrange their interests along more regional lines, but they are unlikely to abandon their 
loyalty to the state.272  As noted, the issue of legitimacy is a key component within national 
identity and the loyalty of citizens to a nation-state.273 In terms of delivering what a nation 
expects, it is the state which is best structured to enable participation in decision-making, 
avoiding a democratic deficit. Citizens continue to perceive national elections to be more 
important than regional ones.274  
 
The issue at hand, however, is also how identity copes with regionalism – how would Hegel 
have dealt with this in terms of his understanding of political identity? Moland uses Hegel’s 
theory in order to fashion the response he may have given. According to Hegel, one can 
differentiate between patriotism and political identity. If patriotism is the need to act for the 
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greater good within the state and political identity is the means by which people identify 
themselves within a state, it should be possible to separate action from identity and therefore 
allow for multiple identities. According to Hegel, as long as one does not forsake one’s state 
responsibilities, additional identities should simply add to the richness of the individual’s 
existence.275  
 
Having said this, Hegel saw the nation state as the ultimate political body. He did not 
advocate for political cosmopolitanism and certainly doubted the effectiveness of any 
political body beyond the state. Hegel believed that to change the relationship between state 
and citizen would leave citizens without stability and a meaningful connection to political 
representation, rendering states ineffective. Without this connection people risk getting lost 
and degenerating into selfish motives, opening society up to disorder and chaos. The state 
acts as a cradle of safety for individuals in a political sense.276 He held that within any body 
bigger than a state, where no coercive power was present, there would be no need for 
individuals to adhere to its laws. If it did have coercive power, the body would more than 
likely destroy the balance of freedom and identity the state had cultivated.277 This is seen 
clearly in situations where states perceive their well-being to be better safe-guarded through 
independent action than by remaining within the collective. Hegel also held that no individual 
would buy into a system of laws that he did not see as his own. For Hegel, in order for a 
regional body to effectively govern within a geographical space, the laws that it applies 
should not be imposed from above, but should be generated from the collective will of the 




Many have argued that establishing a regional identity can reinforce state commitment to the 
regional cause through the commitment of its citizenry. Within the development of a regional 
identity, it is vital to consider how regions develop; does integration follow the development 
of identity, or does identity only develop through the process of integration? If one of the 
main functions of identity is to reinforce commitment, why is there still a state reaction of 
turning towards independence in the face of crisis? We also need to consider the reality of 
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identity construction; if it is a construct that is developed and reproduced through discourse, 
there is no need for a national and regional identity to exist in competition – if they are 
reproduced to mimic a zero-sum game, then there is a reason for it being so.  
 
The argument that this paper makes, considering the assessment above, is that regional 
identity would have to go a long way to trump overall state identity. In looking towards 
regional identity as a solution to the problem of integration, what we actually ought to 
reconsider is how we view the use of regional identity in relation to a national commitment to 
regional causes. Where regional bodies try to mimic national symbolism and try to inspire 
individual commitment, regional identity is essentially used as an ideological band-aid. In 
attempting to circumvent national ties, regional bodies are attempting to divert attention away 
from statist thinking and are trying to re-route connections to the regional level in the same 
way as economic integration works around politics. It appears that regional political identity 
has been manipulated; it is not a natural progression from national identity, but is instead a 
construction that by its very intention challenges the state. Therefore regional identity is less 
stable because it uses the symbolism of the state without the foundational trust that exists 
between state and citizen.  
 
 Regional identity is a weak solution to a problem that runs much deeper. Where the citizenry 
perceives a threat to its interests and the interests of the state, it will react. Where regionalism 
blocks the ability of a state to act independently and in so doing blocks the ability of the state 
to respond to the needs of the people they are directly responsible to, it erodes the interest of 
the respective communities in the greater regional cause. Federating and relinquishing a 
national currency are arguably the two most extreme elements within the regionalization 
process that block these abilities. With respect to the above discussion, economic integration 
without political will does not seem to have much hope at creating a sustainable system that 
would allow citizens to comfortably relocate their trust. This may be a contributing factor as 
to why states retract support for regional initiatives in times of crisis or instability.  
 
Giddens may argue that, in line with his theories of agency, the reproduced ideas around 
states are such that the force that they exert through cumulative activity is greater than the 
relative force a regional influence could exert, thereby diminishing the validity of the 
attempts to construct an alternative identity. We live in a society of individuals that have, for 
an extended period, exalted the state system through our actions.  Regions as we know them 
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today are relatively new concepts; they challenge the perceived safety of the state which has 
been reinforced throughout history.  
 
The challenge of manipulating political identity is in one stroke made easier and far more 
difficult; it becomes easier in the sense that if we see Giddens’ argument as essentially 
grounding identity in activity, those pushing for a regional alliance can manipulate 
behaviours and change them, constructing a new orientation over time. However, in Giddens 
view, the seat of agency is the individual which makes the process of change far more 
complex. Identity is dependent on internal processes of motivation, rationalization and 
consequences, wrapped in layers of reproduction and reinforcement. Changing identity is not 
simply about extrapolating what makes a state a state and applying it to a region – it is about 
fundamentally altering individual’s perceptions and behaviours. His emphasis on the 
individual and on agency within a process removes the option of aggregate opinion being 
able to change rapidly.  
 
Therefore there are strong arguments as to why, on a foundational level, regional identity is 
simply not as strong as national identity. As Hegel notes, national identity is a dynamic 
concept that defines the individual within the state, but also acts as a tool for both state and 
citizen within the national context. It is underpinned by practical goals that are motivated by 
perceptions around what ought to be prioritized in the national context. The nature of what 
national identity supplies to both the individual as well as the collective is bound up in the 
state structure and therefore cannot be easily replicated at a regional level, despite the 
attempts to transfer some of the state structures that nurture unity and identity to the regional 
level. Regions simply cannot provide the same supportive structures that states have evolved 
to naturally include. Therefore in practical terms, regions, and especially regions driven by 
economic integration, cannot sustain state commitment without promoting political 
integration that supports the structures that individuals depend upon, such as accountable, 
representative and legitimate governments. The simplicity and lack of discrimination that 
economic integration offers is appealing on many grounds, but it is insufficient.  
 
This chapter therefore leaves us with the conclusion that the exclusion of politics from the 
regionalization process cannot be maintained if we intend to create sustainable regions. It 
cannot be assumed that politics will follow economics and moreover, it cannot be assumed 
that citizens will relocate their identity within the regionalization process. As such, a post-
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Westphalian solution will remain unacceptable; the state is a vital participant in the process of 
regionalization, but also within the ongoing life of a region, as it does not lose its 
responsibilities to its citizens. In looking to remove the state, the theory looks for a solution to 
remove a problem that it creates itself, thereby detracting from its value. The following 
section will assess the final statement, and in so doing, will address the question of whether 
Federalism is the best or only option for states in a region. Given that this section has argued 
that the state cannot be removed from the process of regionalization, the outcome of 
integration must take this reality into consideration. The following chapter will link the ideas 






























Statement 3: Leadership within a successful region will require a post-Westphalian solution 
in order to move beyond bounded state politics. 
 
The previous chapter emphasized the role of the state, nationalism and sovereignty as 
remaining relevant within the international system. The following chapter will extend those 
ideas through assessing an alternative option to the federation – the confederation. Having 
challenged regionalism and economic integration, one must concomitantly acknowledge that 
economic integration does have benefits; were the benefits not visible, the concept of 
integration in this way would have lost support. Therefore, we are left with the need to 
achieve a balance – is there a system which could facilitate the benefits without challenging 
the state to the extent that Federalism does? Is the concept of the state dated or are the notions 
within economic integration romanticized? Either way, the space that states find themselves 
in regarding further integration is a paradox; they are simultaneously reaching for a goal that 
would increase their wealth and power, but that would equally extinguish their being.  
 
Federations and Confederations – Differences and Difficulties 
 
Both federations and confederations fall under the process of regionalization; both initiatives 
seek to unify states in binding agreements that require certain sacrifices around sovereignty 
and independence, however, the pivotal difference is in the degree of sacrifice asked within 
the arrangement.278  
 
A federation can most simply be described as a movement by states to unify into a single 
body with centralized leadership. The delegation of power consists of a central government 
that controls certain aspects of federal power and individual states that comprise the federal 
unit. The states maintain a degree of independence and have limited powers within their 
respective jurisdictions, subject to the general federal laws. The majority of the issues within 
the purview of the independent units concern domestic issues, while the central government 
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concerns itself with issues in relation to other states, such as security and the economy.279 The 
devolution of power is set in a constitution, binding the parties into agreement and clearly 
delineating the boundaries of power.280 Federations may be relatively homogenous, but there 
may also be the division of territory ethnically or along other lines.281 The location of 
sovereignty within a federation is based on the people within the federation, not on the states 
themselves, therefore the federation is made up of states, but a singular population.282 There 
are internal mechanisms in order to resolve power disputes, and the federation tends towards 
a singular identity that represents the population. A federation is structured like a 
government, and includes a judiciary, a legislature and an executive. Externally, the 
federation has an independent legal personality and is treated as a single body. Its 
international strength depends on the resources and bargaining power it amasses from the 
collective.283 
 
A confederation, in contrast, can be defined as a group of states united in an alliance or 
league. The alliance is taken to be permanent, depending on the nature of the parties. The 
difference here is that states remain independent entities. Their alliance is bound by treaty 
and the confederation may be dissolved or a party may leave under certain conditions, 
though, leaving is harder in reality than in theory depending on the agreements within the 
treaty. There is a delegation of power to a centralized authority, however, it is by agreement 
only and the means of delegation and decision-making must be agreed upon by the state 
parties.284 The powers granted to the individual members are far greater than in a 
federation.285 This can be understood by explaining the difference through the process of 
where the majority of the power lies. In a federation, the central government tends to delegate 
powers, however, in a confederation, it is more appropriate to say that the independent states 
cede a portion of their power to a body that they establish for a purpose. The reason that 
Coakley argues that confederations are not more present is that they are seen as a stepping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Oxford English Dictionary definition of Federation at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/federation. 
280 Coakley, J. Nationalism, Ethnicity and the State - Making and Breaking Nations (London, UK: Sage 
Publishers, 2012) at p. 236. 
281 Coakley (2012) at p. 237. 
282 Kiljunen, K. The European Constitution in the Making (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004) 
at p.5. 
283 Kiljunen (2004) at p. 6. 
284 Oxford English Dictionary definition of Confederation at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/confederation?q=confederation.  
285 Coakley (2012) at p. 237. 
65	  
	  
stone, either towards a federation, or away from unification and towards independence.286 In 
common perceptions, it is not the “sexy” political option. A confederation never becomes a 
state in itself – the parties always remain independent states.287 As a result, the treaty that 
establishes a confederation cannot supersede the existing constitutions of the relative 
parties.288 In building a confederation, certain institutions may be established in order to 
facilitate cooperation, but the confederation itself does not wield any independent 
international personality. The institutions are simply there to coordinate policy between 
member states, but ultimately, all actions must be agreed upon and instituted by the members 
individually.289 
 
The pivotal distinction lies within the implications of the decision-making process for the 
citizenry of the respective states. In a federation agreements are made by majority and 
citizens are citizens of the federation as a whole. In a confederation, decisions can only be 
made where the decision is unanimous and citizens remain identified with their individual 
states.290 The implications of these distinctions are clear; a federation is a much tighter 
arrangement where the goal is essentially to form a new collective that will remain as a 
permanent body and citizens will relocate their loyalty to the collective. There is no opt-out 
option and although representation does have a local component, the power centre remains 
national. A confederation is much looser, with cooperation relying on the continuation of the 
political will to do so. The seat of power does not change for a member or for the citizenry.  
The differences seem stark, but in reality, these examples are a polarization of the available 
options in order to afford clarity. By this definition, the EU would be neither a federation nor 
a confederation, but rather a mix.291 Consequently, we are able to understand that these rules 
are not solid, but that political realities dictate the pace of change and adjustment that a 
collective is willing to tolerate. Regarding nationalism, and therefore identity, the choice to 
opt for confederation is a far safer one. By maintaining the integrity of the state, and therefore 
the political security of the citizenry, it should reduce the integration costs for nationalist 
causes significantly.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Coakley (2012) at p. 238. 
287 Kiljunen (2004) at p. 5. 
288 Kiljunen (2004) at p. 5. 
289 Kiljunen (2004) at p. 6.  
290 Kiljunen (2004) at p. 6. 
291 Blankart, C.B. “The European Union: Confederation, Federation or Association of Compound States? A 
Hayekian Approach to the Theory of Constitutions” Constitutional Political Economy Vol. 18, No. 2 (2007): pp. 




The issue therefore lies in whether a confederation is actually feasible in terms of supplying 
the benefits that federalism offers. As noted, the final steps in Balassa’s and Haas’ 
programmes are a federation with a monetary union. If a confederation is to be a feasible 
challenge to the statement above it must demonstrate the ability to supply similar benefits to a 
federation without compromising the state structure. In order to demonstrate the potential 
benefits, this paper will discuss the German Zollverein as an economic example of 
confederation and the early United States in relation to the present day EU as a political 
example of confederation. 
 
The German Zollverein and the Movement Towards Economic Confederation 
 
Economic integration is a relatively new driver within confederate agreements. In the past, 
confederations were based on security and the primary motivation to unite was as a defensive 
tactic. Forsyth argues that because states actively pursue both peace and welfare, the 
development from security to security and economic welfare or economic welfare alone 
evolved naturally.292 It also became a more realistic tactic for prosperity when states found 
that their independence and statehood were more threatened by their economic placement in 
an increasingly competitive global economy than they were threatened militarily.293 This 
understanding applies directly to the EAC, in that although there is increased political 
stability in the region as a result of the security of the EAC structure, the economic concern 
looms large over all of the participating states and is one of the strongest drivers in the 
integration process.  
 
The German Bund was formed in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars and was formed due to 
defense concerns. Its founding treaty, the Federal Act, only mentions one short and very 
general provision (Article 19) which relates to trade matters. However, between 1815 and 
1820, German politicians and businessmen embraced the Article as a means to cope with 
economic distress in the German states.294 Prussia was initially the strongest contender of 
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establishing a form of customs union, though, due to its strength, the benefits were not 
equally weighted within the agreement.295 By 1828, the Southern German states had also 
formed a customs union to counter the Prussian-Northern union, which was followed by the 
Middle German Commercial Union.296 After much deliberation, it became clear that the 
states should instead unite under a single union, and after much hard bargaining, the 
Zollverein was established by treaty in 1834. In the eight years that followed, it expanded 
even more.297  
 
Despite the fact that the Zollverein developed over time, it developed within and in 
conjunction with an already existing security-based framework in the region. Economics was 
a new driver of integration, but integration certainly was not a new idea politically. The 
Zollverein was also not established by a single treaty, but by a collection of agreements in 
treaty form that had to be ratified by participating states, reinforcing its confederate nature.298 
The agreements did not exist in perpetuity, but had a designated expiration date. A state could 
choose to opt out at the time of expiration, provided due notice was given, otherwise it was 
taken that the agreement would automatically renew and the party would remain bound by it. 
Although there were threats of withdrawal, no state actually withdrew.299 Designed this way, 
the confederation maintained state sovereignty and the power remained with the participating 
states, rather than with a centralized government.  
 
In terms of its organization, the Zollverein had many strong aspects; the treaties established 
that in the territory, the economic market would become a single tariff and trading area, using 
uniform laws for import, export and transit duties. Any changes were addressed in the 
General Congress in a session that occurred once a year, and then the decision had to be 
ratified and implemented in the respective parties’ territories. With a few exceptions for 
smaller territories, each member had one vote and decisions had to be made unanimously. 
Each member was afforded the final right to make independent pacts with external states, 
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however this was heavily restricted and no state made use of it.300 The revenue from the 
common tariff was pooled and distributed to the states according to population. There were 
also internal mechanisms in which a member state would be responsible to another state in a 
system of reciprocal surveillance, ensuring compliance.  
 
The really powerful idea within the Zollverein was in its monetary policy.301 There had been 
much debate around how to resolve the issue of varying currency values and states were 
obviously unwilling to sacrifice the control of their currencies due to the implications for 
their sovereignty, especially since independence was so guarded in the Treaties. Some 
Southern states had chosen to change their currencies, however, there was still a split between 
the currencies of the North and South. As a result, there was a new currency developed that 
would have universal application in the member states. The parallel currency had an 
exchange value in relation to existing currencies and was accepted by all states as a valid 
currency, equal to their own. The answer was therefore to circumvent the issue by creating a 
parallel currency that would fulfill the function of monetary unification without challenging 
state currencies. It simplified trade by circumventing exchange rate issues as a single 
currency would.302  
 
There are various considerations when looking towards introducing a single currency; as 
mentioned earlier in the paper, Mundell’s ideas around an optimal currency area are 
dependent on the mobility of factors within a geographic region. Mundell’s idea of an 
optimum currency area is that, in a given space, it will benefit participating states to adopt a 
single currency because it will help to facilitate an expansion of markets and the movement 
of goods and people. This implies that markets need to be complementary, and that 
movement is both possible and desirable.303 However, the suggestion of a single currency 
does not necessarily imply that the currency itself will behave as a state currency would. Two 
options exist for single currencies between states; a parallel currency, as in the Zollverein, is 
a currency that runs alongside the national currency. It can be used in all of the ways a 
national currency can be used. The aim of the parallel currency is to maintain harmony, but, 
with increasing integration, it can also crowd out national currencies progressively to match 
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the pace of integration.304 Therefore the movement towards a single currency would be 
organic, with no major shifts by government needed. A substitute currency is not as clear a 
concept; essentially, it is a currency that can replace another either temporarily or, in the case 
of the EU, permanently. It can include a domestic or an international substitute. The Euro is a 
substitute currency since each country has its own interest rates, precluding the idea of a 
single, unified currency within a unified territory, such as the USA. The issue is that an 
incomplete progression towards unified monetary policy disables states. Within the process, 
states lose all of the benefits of a single currency such as the ability to affect inflation or 
correct unemployment.305 
 
 A parallel currency is a powerful and efficient concept that challenges the normal notion of a 
monetary union under a single currency. It also shows that the customs union, although based 
on a unification of interests, was still based on independent sovereign relations. Whether to 
unite under a single currency or not has huge implications. Once states forsake their own 
currencies they also become subject to collective crises, in that they lose their own ability to 
regulate their economies independently. This can be seen in the current Euro-crisis where 
many states are struggling to overcome their issues due to an inability to act independently. 
Currency is controlled by the European Central Bank while interest rates are determined 
nationally, undermining the ability to affect national currency flows.306  The bigger question, 
however, is the degree to which states must be politically aligned in order to support an 
economic agreement of this nature. The confederacy approach means that there can be some 
political divergences, much more so than where states aim to federate. A confederation 
allows states, whether used as a stepping stone towards federation or as an end goal in itself, 
to understand the implications of collective action in a more sovereignty-protecting 
environment. In order to understand the benefits of confederation as it was understood in the 
Zollverein, we must look towards the theory that underpinned it.  
 
This idea of unity was driven by a theory produced by Friedrich List. List’s understanding of 
market economics was vital because he did not base it on the traditional structure of 
households, firms and pricing but focused specifically on the nation state.307 The theory was 
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characterized by a few pivotal understandings; firstly, List’s focus was on the domestic 
market. It was not that external trade was unimportant, but for List, the internal market was 
the key to state survival.308 It was the only market a state could completely depend on in 
times of war. Internal markets were primary, whereas external markets were instrumental 
because they were meant to support a state economy’s growth and stability.309 From his 
writings, and specifically his arguments against popular economists of the time, he was 
clearly openly nationalist. He does not circumvent the reality that states and nations are 
established units of how we should understand economy and politics – instead, his theory 
works within these bounds, taking into account first and foremost national interests.310 
 
As such, internal markets had to be nurtured and developed. A state should ensure that all 
internal barriers to exchange between the productive powers within state boundaries were 
eliminated, subjecting the whole state to uniform laws. The state should promote exchange 
internally, especially by facilitating transport networks and a national banking system. List 
was passionate about completely free trade within the state as it allowed the collective to 
function more effectively and productively. He did maintain that free trade within a state was 
fundamentally different to free trade between states, which he believed could be more or less 
expedient depending on the economic nature of the other states.311 
 
List also held that a state had the obligation to protect and encourage trade. They also had to 
ensure that there was the correct balance of activity within the productive network. Various 
elements of production had to be in place; there had to be agriculture, manufacture as well as 
the supply of immaterial services, such as education, defense and law. Above all, List 
emphasized manufacture as a key activity.312 It was therefore permissible, in his view, to 
allow for protective tariffs to encourage infant manufacturing industries to grow.313 He 
justified this by stating that a state, even though it may have the outward structure of an 
independent body, can lose some of its independence where a foreign state could completely 
capture the market of an essential product, significantly weakening its internal economy. 
Therefore power was as much political as it was economic.314 
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Lastly, List held that the market had to be of sufficient size; modern machine-based 
production could produce far more than traditional methods. Therefore industries required a 
market that could demand the level of production required in order to prosper. Small states in 
particular could never fully realize this potential. List therefore motivated for “a union of 
interests of different states by free treaty” – an economic confederation.315 What was different 
in List’s time was that although the international economy was competitive, it had nowhere 
near the pressure that states today experience.  
 
Levi-Faur sees nationalism as the primary source for guidance and legitimacy within the 
management of the national economy.316 In his view, the role nationalism plays is largely 
misunderstood; to deny nationalism and the role it plays in a state is tantamount to denying 
self-determination.317 Levi-Faur uses List’s theory to highlight the power of nationalism in 
the pursuit of building and sustaining a successful economy. List held that productive powers 
and the causes of wealth must be distinguished from wealth itself. He felt that more emphasis 
should be placed on how wealth is generated. Capital is not simply labour, but material as 
well as mental capital.318 As such, people remained at the centre of List’s concept of 
productive powers.319 Levi-Faur, applying a Listian approach to globalization, states that we 
need to see the processes as more than economic connections facilitating political changes. 
List would have viewed the process as state centered; the theory implies that how we should 
be viewing globalization is as a process facilitating changes in learning and knowledge. The 
state should be the guiding force in how these changes are used and how these forces should 
be directed in order for the state to benefit best from them. In this way, productive forces, and 
not simply growth in the economy remains at the core of the changes taking place.320 The 
state in turn should develop institutions that can facilitate, monitor and adjust to the changes 
and broader range of interests in order to avoid conflict. In addition, time needs to be taken 
into consideration – the state view should always be aimed at the long term.321 This has 
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become particularly problematic as states want to reach confederal or federal goals as fast as 
they can, especially where the idealized Eurocentric model is held as the benchmark.  
 
Productivity for List and Levi-Faur is culturally grounded; in List’s view, the national 
economy is the product of national ideas, ethos and the national workforce. It is intricately 
woven into the fabric of society and people’s need to belong to a society.322 Due to the 
complexity of nurturing and directing an economy, List argues that only the state is equipped 
to cope with the diverging interests and cultural changes over the long term.323 List’s idea 
becomes clearer when we look at how he views relationships in a confederation; where a 
state opens its markets up, but remains the driver of its own economy, it essentially has 
access to a larger market but maintains the ability to take advantage of that larger market. To 
lose control would mean to lose the benefits that should accompany it. Globalization as we 
know it today advocates opening markets and self-regulation within the market, however for 
developing nations in particular, the outcome could be damaging. Instead of claiming that the 
state is obsolete, it is arguable that the theory should be redirected to allow for a changing 
role of government. Our fear of introducing politics into economics is representative of the 
false dichotomy theory has constructed in recent literature. List also specified that the state 
should act as a guide – too much state power is as problematic as none at all. 
 
In Levi-Faur’s view, the state must decrease uncertainty, encourage growth and investment 
and use the ideas around the shared identity and aspirations that exist as part of a nation 
state.324  One argument that Levi-Faur makes based on List’s view is that if an internal 
economy is not properly functioning in isolation, how can we expect it to suddenly do so 
when we open it to international forces?325 The view espoused by both List and Levi-Faur 
describe the fact that regional associations are both necessary and required in order to ensure 
expanding wealth for states over the long term. However, as with any initiative, once the 
doors are opened, the leadership is not absolved from their responsibility to their population. 
People remain at the centre of the political model. List’s view may be termed outdated, his 
focus on the state dangerous and his advocacy for state direction of the economy 
irresponsible, however, his view is one of not reinventing the wheel. This paper has included 
many claims of how we need to move beyond the state, and yet, states persist. We should 
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arguably cease to move past that which we do not fully utilize at the moment. Working 
around the state is essentially throwing the baby out with the bathwater and the long term 
sustainability of this approach is questionable.  
 
We can therefore see the logic of confederations for List; they were not a means of 
liberalizing inter-state trade in order to harmonize the global system, but were instead a way 
of essentially externalizing internal trade in order to facilitate the highest benefit to the 
internal market. The trade between nations was still subject to a defined territory in which 
uniform laws applied.326 He also made it very clear that the act of confederation was not 
sovereignty- decaying, but rather sovereignty enhancing, as the act was performed in order to 
buffer state sovereignty and independence from external challenges. He also saw a strong 
connection between defensive and economic confederations.  One is a complement to the 
other,327 in that economic independence encouraged greater security and protection from 
external threat.328 His emphasis on economic competitiveness in the international market 
feeds directly into his motivation for economic confederations. In this sense, politics and 
economics were directly connected, domestically and globally.  
 
The Zollverein was the precursor to the modern European Economic Community as we know 
it today. Although the structure today cannot be said to be purely confederate, and the initial 
plans put into motion post-World War II could not be said to be confederate, there are 
nonetheless similarities.329 The Zollverein left us with understandings that can still apply to 
economic confederations today; many have argued that the Zollverein was first and foremost 
a political initiative by Prussia to overcome political challenges within the German states. It 
did service this cause, but more importantly, the German states benefitted substantially in 
financial terms. The expansion of territory in which free trade took place allowed for an 
expanded market that benefitted all of the participants.330 The leaders had access to additional 
funds in order to extend their revenue source, thereby allowing them to quell revolutionary 
tendencies in the state and reinforce their sovereignty.331 Ploeckl criticises this benefit in the 
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literature because it cannot explain smaller trade agreement groupings that are not beneficial 
to the same degree since earlier studies do not take externalities sufficiently into account. 
This criticism, although well-founded, is situation-specific and cannot cover every regional 
agreement. 
 
Ploeckl applies game theory to the sequencing of agreements within the formation of a 
customs union, using the Zollverein as a case study. He noted that Evenett,332 after assessing 
trade literature, identifies three types of accession to trade agreements. These include 
Technocratic Entrepreneurship, where the regional process is lead by technocratic experts, 
Geopolitics and Mercantilism, which reflects the strategic trade theory motive and includes 
geopolitical pressure and concerns over international competitiveness, and lastly, Domino 
Regionalism. This last aspect is the one most identified with the EU’s establishment after 
World War II. Domino Regionalism arises where a change occurs in a country, which then 
prompts it to join a trade agreement. The resulting effect in trade diversion and creation 
affects third parties, causing them to also join the agreement.333 
 
The model Ploeckl uses shows that, using cooperative game theory, there are significant 
changes in payoffs when a state joins a trade agreement. The outcome is that a core is formed 
which acts as a solution concept within the game theoretic. The effect is that when a player 
joins, the payoff for a single member becomes attached to the payoff of the whole unit 
included in the trade agreement, with the effect that the payoff for staying is higher than the 
payoff for leaving and starting a new unit, or remaining alone. A customs union fits this 
perfectly since the gains are distributed internally in accordance with an established rule, 
determined by the member states.334 Customs unions are more effective in this respect than 
simple trade agreements since trade agreements lose profits within the administration of 
cross-border trade that custom unions should avoid.335 This is the reason for states in the 
Zollverein not opting out of agreements and failing to complete agreements with third parties. 
The payoff they receive as part of the union should act as a fail-safe against “greener 
pastures”. Therefore, where a confederation is properly functioning and efficient, it should 
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create its own systems of protection. Ploeckl’s argument shows that there is substantial 
benefit from choosing a confederation, both economically and politically, today as much as in 
the past.  
 
Therefore, there is arguably a feasible and beneficial alternative to federalism. A state should 
not find that the only means to achieving collective benefit is through the sacrifice of its 
independence. In fact, a confederation could be seen as a safer alternative for states from an 
economic perspective, particularly taking into account the high degree of international 
integration of markets today. Another strong example set by the Zollverein is the challenge 
that an economic union can only be truly beneficial under a single currency. Although 
alternatives do require higher administrative energy and costs, there are choices to be made in 
light of the degree to which states are happy to cede aspects of their sovereignty. The 
Zollverein shows us that alternatives can not only work, they can increase prosperity as well 
as lay the groundwork for future cooperative efforts.  
 
By assessing the economic impact and benefits of confederation, we are left with questions as 
to how the system would work on a political level. One of the biggest criticisms in this paper 
is the false dichotomy between politics and economics. It divides our view of how states 
function, however no region, confederation or federation, can exist without a degree of 
integration in both politics and economics by necessity. The very idea of creating an 
economic union is political. The following section will assess the ideas around early 
American confederation in order to supplement the ideas above and relate them to the EU 
today.  
 
 Political Confederacy – America, Europe and the Modern State 
 
In confederations, as in federations and most regional arrangements, states are members by 
virtue of their statehood. Forsyth argues that states are essentially social in their nature 
because they define themselves in relation to other states.336 The nature of sovereignty is that 
on the one hand, it gives a state ultimate command within its own boundary, but on the other, 
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independence to act as the state sees fit internationally. The second aspect is vital; the 
implications are that a state must willingly enter into interstate agreements and the only 
binding force is the treaty itself. Treaties and interstate relations are in fact mutual 
recognitions of independence and the acknowledgement that the content of the treaty respects 
the will of both parties.337 There is also a balance struck within interstate treaties – the 
agreement is in one sense a confirmation of the independence and free will of the state, but on 
the other is an agreement made to protect and enhance the internal welfare of the state.338 
 
 In assessing the relationship between pre-civil war America and present-day Europe, we are 
able to once again link the past to the present, and the present to the case of the EAC. Backer 
writes about the opinions of John C. Calhoun, who discussed the tension between 
confederation and federation in the early years of the USA, before it became a defined polity. 
The value of these discussions now is that they seem to be reappearing in the present 
European context. Europe is faced with strong nationalist tendencies, but high levels of 
integration, and many wonder where that integration will lead to. The debate in the United 
States of America essentially ended after the Civil War, however, Calhoun’s understandings 
of federalism in relation to supra-nationalism can give us an idea of alternative options. In so 
doing, his ideas allow us to challenge what have become the accepted ideas around 
federalism today.339 Backer notes that although the USA acts as a benchmark against which 
many federal systems are compared, particularly due to its Constitution, it has taken 200 
years to evolve into its present form. The value of its contribution to the European debate 
comes from a time in which the ideas around federalism were still messy and developing, 
before the law was so cleanly cut between domestic and international issues.340  
 
In the past, federations could only exist as a complete state unit made up of smaller federal 
states and only nation-states could have internal constitutions, essentially applying the same 
rules to federations as to normal states. However, today, federal systems have emerged that 
are not nations, but are integrated states, and have constitutions, or aim to have them soon, 
such as the EU. These constitutions draw force from international law, but service the 
signatory states as a domestic constitution would. Therefore, as these states continue to 
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integrate, the lines between domestic and international law are increasingly blurred.341 
Europe has found itself with two camps – one for integration, and one that supports the 
continued independence of states within an inter-governmental structure.342 Both campaign 
for their cause, however, discounting the views of their opposition could eventually have 
disastrous results for the Community as a whole.343 The following section will discuss the 
cases of the USA and the EU respectively.  
 
In the period after the Civil War, a settlement was reached in the US about how federalism 
would function and how power would be divided.344  The central power and the relative states 
would merge into a single polity. The process effectively narrowed the range of 
characteristics that could be claimed if a system was to be called “federal”. The system was 
based on several basic parameters, which have clearly filtered down to characterize 
federalism today. Power would be split between national government and local units, which 
would in themselves function to a degree like independent governments, however, all action 
would be subject to the central authority.345 The central government, through one or more of 
its branches, could decide what powers were ceded to local government.  Where power was 
maintained at the centre, a direct link between the national government and the people was 
created that could not be interfered with at individual state level. States are not free to secede 
from the union, but if the nation decided to dissolve the federal agreement as a collective, the 
centre would have to then return power to the individual states.346 States have become 
appendages for the national government, rather than the fairly autonomous bodies they were 
originally intended to be.347 Most notable is the inability to secede; the state components of 
the federation have lost their independence to such a degree that should they wish to leave the 
union, they cannot do so amicably. This does ensure stability, but it also leaves states with 
little power to actually change their circumstances. Were a state to join a federation as we 
commonly understand them today, this is the likely outcome. This is not the only construction 
of a federation, but it has become the norm.  
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Calhoun, however, believed in a different policy. He believed that government was a means 
to create social order within a community. Social order meant a balance between liberty and 
security. In order to maintain a balance for the state as a whole, the government should guard 
the community from injustice and anarchy domestically and attack from foreign powers 
internationally. A constitution is meant to limit the possible abuse of power by the 
government itself.348 Universal suffrage also acts as a safeguard, and in addition, government 
action should be based on consensus in order to protect minorities from the majority.349 He 
envisioned a government for the people, simultaneously limited by law with checks and 
balances. He was firmly committed to confederation as a healthier, more balanced version of 
federal organization.350 
 
For Calhoun, the power within the federal system was that, through its constitution, it 
asserted that the central government was not actually a party to the agreement that established 
it. The relationship was similar to that of a principal and agents, in which the states ceded 
power but not sovereignty to the central government. As an agent, the central government had 
to seek an amendment where it sought to assert power that was not granted to it directly 
under the constitution.351 Therefore, where a law contravened state law and overstepped the 
powers delegated to the centre, that law remained void until a constitutional amendment was 
made.352 Calhoun argued that where there are huge steps over the prescribed powers, or over 
the amendments made, the state should have the right to secede from the union.353 Although 
Calhoun speaks about federal arrangements, what he actually advocates for within his 
proposals is a confederation.  
 
This was a radical view at the time and Calhoun’s views were largely discredited and 
dismissed as unworkable.354 His views of the federal system guarded against the abuse of 
power; he vested sovereignty in the parts rather than the centre and sought to maintain a high 
level of independence among the states and a high level of accountability for the centre. He 
disliked the idea of what the USA has become – a centre-heavy system in which states have 
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delegated powers and essentially do not maintain sovereignty in any sense other than a 
symbolic one. His views seem idealized and to that extent they do appear unworkable, 
however they do also provide the basis for what could be a fairly harmonious system, were 
the parties to come to the table in a cooperative way. If we are to assess most of his claims, 
many of his checks and balances seem sympathetic to the democratic cause.355 The system he 
proposes, in this light, seems far more achievable and far more familiar than many are willing 
to concede.   
 
These same debates around federalism are arising in Europe today.356 Since the 1960s, 
debates have focussed on how the Community should function. At the forefront of this debate 
have been states like Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The institutions of the EU have given legitimacy to the regional body 
through promoting three central principles of law. These include the autonomy of the 
European Community and the supremacy of the authority of the Community within the ambit 
of its authority, a direct relationship between the Community and the citizens of the member 
states, and finally, the fact that the sole competence to determine the nature and scope of the 
powers ceded to the Community by the constituent states should fall to the ECJ.357 Therefore 
it seems to be more than just a regional organizing body; the rights accorded to the ECJ as 
well as to the Community as a structure exceed those ever usually allowed to oversight 
mechanisms. The Community is attributed with power over states, significantly affecting 
their sovereignty.   
 
The autonomy granted to the Community institutions sets it apart from the constituent states. 
It constitutes a form of independent government with concurrent competence with states in 
certain areas. Community autonomy is protected from the encroachment of state powers by 
the ECJ.358 This occurs in two ways; firstly, the agreement between the state and community 
is based on the ceding of sovereignty upwards and at the core is the notion of harmonization 
as a means to level national differences.  Harmonization essentially ropes the states into a 
system in which there are limitations on the laws that states may make, creating similarity in 
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laws and thereby facilitating greater interaction with greater ease,359 the purpose of which is 
to encourage greater integration. Secondly, the ECJ has the sole right to interpret the treaties 
to the extent that, where the validity of an Act is challenged, it is up to the ECJ to determine 
whether the challenge is valid.360 This creates a system in which the Community may wield a 
significant amount of power within the scope of their authority in relation to the member 
states. 
 
While there may be consensus among the states around the autonomy of the Community, the 
supremacy of the Community is not as widely accepted and many states challenge the 
relationship between states and the Community in this respect. Germany, as an example, has 
challenged this supremacy in its Constitutional Court as it maintains the view that power 
resides with the state units and should remain there. The question of federalism is as much 
political as it is juridical in the European context. Germany has a history of federalism in the 
form of the union of the Hohenzollern Reich in 1871, and so reacts in light of that history – 
their differentiation of nations is based less on geography and more on culture, language and 
even race.361 There is a belief in integration, but it is limited to a more administrative nature. 
The German Constitutional Court has, for instance, taken the position that it, and not the ECJ, 
should determine the validity of actions taken by the Community within its sovereign 
territory. Where such actions are not approved, these laws cannot be enforced in Germany.362 
This paints a very Calhounian picture of where power should lie and where it should stay in 
the eyes of states – it emphasizes the Community as a group of independent units that remain 
independent, rather than lifting the authority of the Community above sovereignty. Despite a 
feeling of unity within Europe, the attitude in Germany is one in which the Community law 
cannot compromise the German laws that grant basic rights and guarantees.363 Therefore the 
tension between agent and principal has created competition rather than harmony. This 
tension highlights the debate around where the EU should end its integration efforts, and 
what the final outcome should be.  
 
Nationalism and sovereignty are as strong in Europe as they are in any other group of nations 
and despite wanting to enjoy the benefits of integration, states are aware that integration 
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without the maintenance of independence can be crippling. If we link these ideas around 
“basic rights”, as in Germany, to the arguments made earlier in this paper around the 
accountability of a state to its citizens, popular identity and the accountability of government, 
we understand that unless there is an overwhelming will to forsake independence, federalism 
as described above is a pipe dream, even in the EU. What does become clear in the above 
discussion is that Europeans, wary of the federal drift and development that has occurred in 
the USA, have once again ignited the early American debates around ceding power and law-
making in order to protect their sovereign rights.364 Despite the desire to integrate, the focus 
is on doing so in a way that does not fundamentally alter the rights of independent nations.   
 
The European debate has shown that federalism need not be the unitary animal we have come 
to accept – there are variations within the idea of unity that can be embraced without a 
structure falling into a fitted category of recognized regional organizations. What federal 
organisations should be looking towards is efficiency over recognized structure, the effect of 
which is new forms of relationships and unique forms of governance.365 There is substantial 
power in balancing issues and agreements that can be solved communally and individually, in 
the right proportion. Therefore, there is no solid rule that the law of the Community should 
override local law. There could be an agreement where Community law must meet the basic 
requirements of rights and guarantees inherent in the laws of the respective member states. 
There is no reason to believe that a law made by the Community in abstract should be better 
than a law that is already present in the member states, particularly given the arguments made 
regarding the nature of the relationship between state and society.366  
 
The EU has allowed a strong possibility of renegotiating power relations in different 
functional areas due to its commitment to the amendment process as well as to communal 
debate within the EU Parliament.367 Alternatively, federal systems may be based more on 
moral than legal ties,368 or more on political understandings than juridical ones.369 Although 
in comparison to the USA the EU may seem like a mutated version of federalism, so too must 
developing regions look to the EU as a theoretical guide in practice and not simply as a 
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model.370 As the EU is striving to create a model that works for the system at hand, so too 
should developing regions take the principles that the EU member states work within and use 
them in their own context. Developing regions should be as aware and as hesitant to adopt the 
system put in place in the USA as a model, as it raises the same issues of transposing a model 
rather than a theory.   
 
The problem therefore comes back to sovereignty, which, as Germany and many other 
nations show, is still of primary concern. Even Calhoun could not imagine a system in which 
sovereignty was diffused.371 His understanding was based on the fact that, since sovereignty 
itself was vested in the people of a state, the people must ultimately govern the union as a 
collective, since the seat of ultimate sovereignty does not change.372 Backer argues that since 
so many institutions are gaining abilities normally included in the idea of sovereignty that 
directly affect the population, sovereignty as a concept is becoming increasingly irrelevant.373 
However, these regional bodies cannot fulfil the basic requirement of sovereignty – they do 
not have populations to underpin their authority. Therefore, sovereignty in the true sense 




There is a move in international political economy to mould the state into an economically 
friendly mechanism, but the responsibility of the state is more than simply economic.  Gras, 
as early as 1929, argued that the state was acting at the expense of human welfare; he argued 
that within modern state structural policies, people’s needs have been sacrificed for profits 
and economic growth.374 He argued that regionalism, if left unchecked, was a threat to 
nationalism and that nations should rise up through nationalist causes in order to once again 
humanize the state.375 The effect of rising nationalism in the long term would be to weaken 
overbearing government while simultaneously strengthening the economy and the social 
structures within the state.376  
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This is what we see happening in the EU right now; with the austerity measures put in place 
in order to try to regain some semblance of a healthy economy, there is a distinct rise in 
nationalist parties across the continent. As this paper is being written, there are online news 
reports of a meeting between six nationalist parties from various European states in Austria in 
order to hammer out a plan to form a new European nationalist party ahead of the elections 
for the EU Parliament in May 2014. The aim is to challenge Brussels in order to redirect the 
EU. These nationalist groups claim to not be against Europe, but claim that a centralist-super 
state is not the answer. European nations need to reconnect with their citizens.377 This is 
literally the product of the federal initiative divorcing the state from its citizens and this 
argument reinforces the reasoning in the chapters above. The state and identity remain 
relevant, and as a result, federalism as it appears in the USA cannot be a goal in the near 
future for it cannot produce an answer that is sustainable and legitimate. Although political 
parties that advocate for a politically far right response cannot be allowed free reign due to 
the potential for state isolationism and domestic violence, the truth is that they represent a 
wide spectrum of concerns that many citizens who do not identify themselves as politically 
right also hold. The answer is for the EU to listen and to channel the nationalist uprising in 
order to make it beneficial for all parties concerned. In line with the reasoning in the previous 
chapters, this is something that was due to happen as integration made it increasingly difficult 
for states to remain responsive to the needs of their citizens. 
 
Regions will remain necessary as long as states perceive the need to act collectively in a 
globalized environment. However, how those regions are formed, run and how they 
culminate will dictate how useful those regions will be to the state both internally as well as 
externally. Calhoun’s views were based on the argument that healthy regions should feed and 
support states internally rather than the state feeding the region. At the most fundamental 
level, the process must remain people-centered. The search for answers to the problem of the 
persisting state structure is a distraction from the solutions that lie right in front of us all – 
that there is a need to preserve the state structure, to reconnect the state with its citizens and 
that doing so will allow the region to once again return to its economic and political 
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objectives of peace and welfare. A healthy region requires healthy states and as a result, the 
state should remain the focus within any regional process.  
 
In line with the arguments made in this chapter, a commitment to a confederation, rather than 
a federation, has the potential to facilitate healthy states and economies with greater ease. In 
the same way that Mitrany acknowledged the state when Haas and Balassa did not, and in the 
same way that the state must win over a post-Wesphalian concept, confederation wins out 
over federation when it comes down to the interests of the driving force behind states – 
citizens. This is the crux of this paper’s argument; in order to make any model sustainable, it 
must be people-centered. In order to pursue this predisposition, ideas around subsidiarity and 
the power of the relationship between the state and its citizens must be included in any 
regionalization model. Therefore, a post-Westphalian solution is not required; instead, a 
solution that supports the state, and therefore the citizenry, would be most effective. 
 
Having delved into these criticisms against the commonly accepted notions around economic 
integration, the final task of this paper is to apply these discussions to the case study – the 






















The East African Community – Where to from Here? 
 
Within the study of Europe, there is an enduring issue – there is still insufficient attention 
paid to the vast amount of literature with the result that we do not see the study of regions 
within the full ambit of the theory.378 Rosamond argues that political scientists should return 
to the older literature and reassess the region in light of the theoretical underpinnings that 
form the basis of New Regionalism, with particular attention to Neofunctionalism, in order to 
look at the intention of the theory. This will also enable those who study regions to develop a 
more comparative understanding of regionalism by using the theory to assess the case itself, 
rather than by using an idealized standard in the form of the European model or the concepts 
derived from it.379  
 
The following chapter aims to assess the above challenges in light of the case in order to 
understand the potential outcomes for developing regions. The chapter will start by 
discussing a general overview of how regionalism in Africa is perceived in relation to the 
statements used to structure the paper, and will then look at the case study specifically, using 
the same structure to link the case and the theory. The East African community supplies an 
interesting study for regional literature in that it also has an internal comparison – the old 
versus the new version. The following section will start by looking at the key ideas behind 
regional theory in relation to the case, and will follow this by looking at the case with respect 
to each of the statements above.  
 
Regionalism in Africa and the East African Community 
 
The statements used in this paper have established that there is significant room for 
challenging the understanding of regional theory as well as its application. If the challenges 
for the generalised theory exist, they ought to either be compounded or ameliorated by further 
issues inherent in a specific context. The null hypothesis states that if a region wishes to be 
successful then it should follow the path of economic integration. Political integration should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Laursen, F. (ed) Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2010) at p. 27. 
379 Laursen (2010) at p. 30. 
86	  
	  
follow, eventually leading to a federal state. Sovereignty is seen as no longer useful in a 
globalized context. Although there is a theoretical challenge, the ideas in this paper can only 
be used once tested against reality. Where this paper can show that there are significant 
reasons to question the theory in practice, it will open doors to future paths of study by 
linking the actual challenges faced by states with paths of theory to follow. 
 
Africa presents itself as an interesting study of regionalism; it does not have the development 
of the EU, the diversification of the EU markets, the strength of manufacture, or many of the 
other assumptions inherent in regional theory that are prerequisites for the theory to be 
applied effectively. What Africa does have, however, is a strong Pan-Africanist bond that 
underpins many of the early integration efforts as well as a market that produces raw 
materials that are in demand due to booming economies like China. Current trends are not 
only motivated by current issues; the history of the perceived need for collective action 
persists due to Africa’s less powerful trading status. Therefore African states and regions start 
with a disadvantage. Two authors, Qobo and Moore, both look at how regionalism has 
developed on the continent. Their arguments typify literature on regions in Africa; there is a 
move to separate politics and economics and an application of the concepts within 
regionalism rather than the theory itself. In assessing their views, this paper is able to expose 
the initial biases in regional theory in Africa. 
 
Africa has been in transition since the mid-2000s due to a resource boom in China and India. 
Internally, while there is intergovernmental trading, there is also a strong informal economy 
of goods and people crossing state boundaries.380 This gives African states an opportunity to 
start to rise politically and economically. However the reviews of integration are mixed; 
Qobo argues that despite the enthusiasm for African integration, too little has changed since 
the 1980s to warrant the optimism we currently see.381 He argues that leaders need to move 
away from grand gestures and move towards a more pragmatic approach to national 
development, using more focussed and gradual steps to achieve necessary goals. He argues 
that regionally, the focus should be on developmental coordination and the gradual 
harmonisation of policies and regulations.382 Integration in Africa is arguably a desirable 
strategy for overcoming deep-seated developmental challenges, however, Qobo argues that 
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against a back-drop of Pan-Africanism, which focuses on politics rather than economics, it 
will be hard to achieve. In terms of the null hypothesis, Qobo is a staunch advocate of 
following the theory.  
 
 Pan-Africanism was the backdrop to early African integration initiatives, and promoted a 
sense of unity on the continent, however, it also laid blame on the former colonial powers and 
called for little responsibility from the post-colonial African elite. In the 1960s, Africa saw a 
surge of regional initiatives, the EAC included, and the regionalist approach was perceived to 
be a significant player in Africa’s development strategy. However, it was many of the 
policies adopted by the post-colonial African elites that would prove to be the biggest 
stumbling blocks for development. The key considerations were that Africa’s issues had to be 
solved domestically before regions could really prosper. These issues included poverty, small 
economies, the production of similar materials in neighbouring countries, the low cost of raw 
materials and the trade deficit with developed countries.383 Qobo argues that in the past, 
African initiatives failed due to the fact that leaders used regional initiatives to escape 
domestic challenges. In the Pan-African context, regional agreements at this stage functioned 
as a reinforcer of state sovereignty more than an effective developmental programme. He 
argues the same perspective as Nye Jr.; both state that the regional projects established in the 
past were based on weak national foundations. Nationalism was largely a project of African 
elites, and not a popular force, halting the trickle-down effect essential to regional theory. As 
a result, integration was ineffective as it was based on “incomplete states”.  Coupled with a 
distinct unwillingness to cede any form of sovereignty in the regionalising process as states 
had just achieved independence, this meant that any form of regionalism would have been 
largely ineffective.384 However, viewed differently, this reality, in combination with weak 
macro-economic policy, corruption, instability and civil strife, meant that failure was more 
circumstantial than theoretically based. 
 
Regarding the newer regional initiatives, Qobo argues that African internal trade still 
constitutes a small percentage of overall African trade, and this forms a weak base for 
regional endeavours. One change is that regions do seem to have more direction; aims tend to 
be narrow and specified. The Pan-African agenda has started to move towards a more 
pragmatic approach to integration and development, opening the possibilities for more 
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success.385 This, combined with an increased focus on democratisation and a focus on human 
rights, allows for more positive expressions of sovereignty, thereby promoting meaningful 
development.386 Qobo’s view is highly motivated by the typical assumptions made in regional 
theory. He uses the developed concepts around regionalism to identify where African states 
are lacking and what to focus on in order to improve the likelihood of success. Clearly the 
ideas underpinning regionalism remain the same. Although attention is paid to sovereignty 
and nationalism, the focus is on a state’s ability to fulfil the assumptions of the theory and to 
apply it, rather than the considerations around identity and nationalism discussed above. The 
preference is for economics to drive the process, with political integration following. 
Development, in this sense, is little more than the development that could facilitate further 
economic integration. 
 
Alternatively, looking at more recent initiatives, Moore identifies other issues within 
regionalism in Africa; there are serious problems regarding representation in government 
domestically as well as within a region, which implies that the democratic deficit is an issue 
at both levels. Uneven development between countries also threatens regional initiatives.387 
Political instability is an ongoing issue, however, an even greater challenge has been that 
political leaders, though they may start an initiative on an economic basis, quickly have 
difficulty in separating political goals from economic goals.388 Lastly, she notes that one of 
the biggest issues facing Africa is that underdevelopment and poverty persist despite Africa’s 
attempt to model its regional structures on foreign projects.389 In her statements, she appears 
to be on exactly the same path as Qobo – that economics and politics should not only remain 
separate, but that, due to the inability to keep them separate, past initiatives have failed.  
 
Moore’s conclusion is interesting; she states that despite factors that act as blocks to 
successful regions on the continent, and possibly because of them, regionalism in Africa 
today is different to regionalism anywhere else. It does not fit neatly into either open 
regionalism or developmental regionalism, which are the two most acknowledged models in 
use today. Her article focuses on the New African Initiatives, which are the agreements 
debated and signed by African leaders in the 1980s and 1990s. These initiatives turned their 
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focus from political to economic needs and focussed on regionalism as a key factor in future 
African growth.390 She describes regionalism on the continent as an amalgamation of the two 
schools; it incorporates a degree of the de-linking and self-reliance found within 
developmental regionalism, as regions aim to become economically powerful in their own 
right, but simultaneously seek to integrate more in to the international economy.391  
 
Within Moore’s observations, there is little attention paid to deviating from the theory other 
than the mention of a degree of mixing within the systems. Politics is only introduced to the 
extent that the Developmental model connects with the Pan-Africanist agenda to de-link from 
former colonies. Although her understanding of regionalism on the continent shows that there 
is a need for a mixing of the systems, the outcome is shallow; she uses the accepted concepts 
in order to describe a system, but she does not challenge those systems or their effectiveness 
in the African context. Despite the numerous shortfalls ascribed to both Old and New 
Regional theory, the theory is simply applied and the failures noted. Although both Qobo and 
Moore mention the political issues that plague the continent, they do not address how the 
theory ought to change in order to facilitate a different kind of development. Even with all of 
the issues listed, they do not advocate for a different political approach. When Moore states 
that differences in regionalism on the continent are caused by the differences on the continent 
itself, she still does not concede that politics is a vital and relevant aspect of regionalism that 
ought to be prioritised within the process of regionalization.  
 
Having theoretically challenged the ideas of economics before politics and the success of 
theory-driven integration, clearly economic integration both in theory and in practice is 
insufficient for the continent. The separation between politics and economics is typical of the 
application of the null hypothesis, as is the use of concepts to measure success rather than 
direct theory. It is apparent from Qobo and Moore’s arguments that there are significant 
issues to be solved domestically, but still, politics is painted as the problem. Qobo argues that 
regionalism in Africa in the past has sought to escape domestic issues, however, in light of 
the previous arguments, it is arguable that the structures of economic integration do the same 
thing – they remove the state, thereby undermining its ability to deal with domestic issues 
effectively. In de-linking the state from its citizenry, the economic programme is 
undermining sovereignty and national potential, both politically and economically. If strong 
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states make strong regions, then theorists and regional initiatives should start to look more 
towards using the strong political ties that exist in the African context, rather than trying to 
negate them. In order to design integration programmes that meet the needs of growing 
economies and reducing poverty, regional planners should remain conscious of their goals. 
The following sections will look at the case of the EAC in relation to the statements that have 
been challenged. In assessing the case in relation to the statements, this paper will link the 
case to the previous chapters.  
 
Regionalism, Methods and Intentions: The Case in Relation to Statement 1  
Regional theory is well established; if regions follow the prescribed economic theory, they 
will be successful. 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, many of the key ideas in New Regionalism stem from ideas held in 
older theory. Mitrany and Haas have remained relevant directly, but also indirectly through 
their enduring contributions. Since old regional theory forms the basis of many of the newer 
schools, this paper will assess both versions of the EAC in light of what the theory aimed for 
and the intention behind the theory. If a region is to flourish, states must be able to have a 
clear intention within the regionalization process, and must be supported by the methods they 
choose to pursue those goals. In assessing both versions of the EAC, the arguments made 
above become apparent in a practical sense, adding to the weight of the evidence against the 
null hypothesis.  
 
The intention behind Mitrany’s theory of functionalism was to circumvent the government as 
a means of averting future warfare. Mitrany assumed that either the political will was not 
present, or that it would not remain permanent. The aim was to create a system that would 
unite people and would outlive changes in government. His theory intentionally circumvented 
issues around sovereignty and was meant to function from the bottom up. If we consider 
Haas’ theories, we have a far more prescriptive model; the first point of departure is that 
federation is assumed to be the ultimate outcome. Haas emphasised elite attitudes and 
changes based on regional, mostly economic, interests. His sharp departure from 
Functionalism can be seen in the change from a purely bottom-up, to top-down drivers of 
change. However, Haas’ ideas of sustainability included the fact that people needed to change 
in order to allow the system to endure – his intention was to relocate identity to a new 




The EAC produces an interesting study in intentions and methods; before the old EAC was 
even established, there was a call by British colonial forces to unify the protectorates in East 
Africa.392 The British established the East African High Commission in 1948, which had 
multiple common services.393 It also had a singular currency, the East African Shilling, and a 
common Court of Appeal.394 A Customs and Excise Department was established between 
Kenya and Uganda in 1917, which Tanganyika later joined in 1927. An East African 
Development Plan was also formed. There was free movement of people, as well as free 
trading of locally manufactured goods.395 The High Commission also had a central 
Legislative Assembly, though this was severely limited.396 British dominance could not be 
sustained for too long; Uganda gained independence in 1962, Kenya in 1963 and Tanzania in 
1964.397 This integration was warped; it was extractive, but cooperative – the intention was 
incorrect, but the methodology was correct in that it allowed the sewing of seeds for future 
cooperation on a formal level.  
 
After independence the common services were administered by the East African Common 
Services Organisation (EACSO) from 1961-1967. The EACSO consisted of elected ministers 
from all three countries and was directed by the state presidents. The members agreed that the 
services provided were beneficial, but should be transferred to East African hands.398 The 
intention to unify was therefore not a foreign concept to the new states – they started out with 
a degree of integration already established. 
 
In between the flurry of independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s, African nations 
experienced a honeymoon phase of idealism and Pan-Africanism.399 It was on this wave of 
idealism that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda agreed to create a Federation of East African 
States by the end of 1963 in the Nairobi Declaration.400 A working group was established to 
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hammer out the basics of the Federation, but by the third meeting, cracks started to show. 
Uganda in particular expressed concern on grounds that were mostly legislative and dealt 
with the allocation of powers. The Federation collapsed before it started, with the member 
states returning to the Common Services Organisation, which had been maintained 
throughout.401 This clearly taps in to the worries expressed by Mitrany, as well as certain 
issues avoided by Haas – sovereign and nationalist concerns dominated the process, 
thwarting political integration and further economic integration. It also reflects that although 
integration itself was not an issue, the political organisation of the young states was not able 
to cope with the big step of formalising the agreements in a political sense, as argued by 
Qobo and Nye Jr. 
 
As a result of inheriting the patterns established by the East African High Commission 
(EAHC), the EACSO maintained the established patterns of development, including the 
dominance of Kenya over Uganda and Tanzania.402 However, the EACSO had come into 
being in response to local demands and aimed to meet local needs and changing realities.403 In 
order to address the imbalance that was present, the Raisman Commission was elected to 
formulate a strategy.404 The resulting plan called for an internal redistribution mechanism that 
was known as the common revenue pool; each country would be taxed a relative percentage 
of its revenue, with fifty percent of the product being directed towards the common services 
that did not finance themselves, and the other fifty percent to be divided equally among the 
three countries. Although this worked to solve some claims of unequal benefits, in the long 
term the redistribution still failed, as it did not correct the underlying issue – the fact that 
Kenya remained more competitive and experienced faster growth.405  
 
By 1964 an additional agreement was needed to correct the trade deficit which not only 
persisted, but grew. The Kampala Agreement provided a practical answer to the distribution 
of industry. The three countries sought to persuade certain inter-territorial firms to increase 
production in Uganda and Tanzania through the relocation of certain industries and 
inducement schemes to encourage more equitable development.406 However the agreement 
came to nothing and was followed in 1965 by the announcement that each country would 
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establish its own central bank and currency.407 This uncovers a fundamental truth; a state 
cannot give away what it has not fully developed. The political solution was a weak one 
because the states themselves were weak.  
 
Another commission was appointed to review the issue, showing a continued desire to 
formalise the integration agreements. The Phillips Commission (1965) was tasked with a 
wide range of responsibilities, including the task of assessing how the cooperative 
relationship could be maintained and strengthened.408 In 1966, the Phillips Commission 
finally presented its findings, included in which was the formation of the East African 
Community, with the East African Common Market as a central pillar of cooperation. This 
community would also accept and adopt the current cooperative arrangements of the EACSO. 
The governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda accepted the major recommendations of 
the Phillips Commission, and went ahead with planning their integration through the new 
format – the East African Community.409 The first EAC came into effect on 1st December 
1967 with the signing of The Treaty for East African Cooperation. According to Haas, this is 
the rational response to a failure of political integration; it is the methodology that states 
today typically turn to in the hope that political integration will follow economic integration, 
which links even this early incarnation to the overarching premise being challenged here. 
 
It was a success story, until in 1977, the EAC dissolved due to political tension. The 
Community suffered a serious setback with the overthrow of Obote by Amin in Uganda in 
1971. Obote fled to Tanzania, and Nyerere felt that the Amin regime was illegal. Nyerere 
started to block Amin’s appointments to positions within the Community, starting the feud 
that would create serious rifts between the parties. Mediators were required to negotiate even 
the simplest approvals. This made running the Authority and the Community increasingly 
difficult. From 1975, a split was clearly imminent; the language used by the leadership of all 
three partners became more about decentralisation, separation and self-sufficiency than about 
cooperation.410 Once again, politics sabotaged economics, sovereignty trumped cooperation 
and unity was undermined by nationalist politics. Despite the economic track that should 
have acted as a guarantor for integration, political failure undermined even the long-
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established agreements that were in place, significantly calling into question the idea that 
economics alone is sufficient.   
 
Contrast this with the new EAC; born out of the Mediation Agreement for the Division of 
Assets and Liabilities (1984),411 it was the direct result of the collapse of the former 
Community. Fuelled by fresh motivation, the partner states once again embarked on a 
cooperative endeavour, this time more aware of the shortfalls of regionalism.412 From the 
time of signing the mediation agreement, there was consensus that certain projects would 
continue on a cooperative basis, including the East African Development Bank, with bilateral 
agreements governing interactions.413 During the 1980s this basic level of cooperation was 
maintained. Concrete moves to re-establish the community were not made until 1991, where 
numerous meetings between the heads of state led to a final meeting in Nairobi where a 
formal communiqué was issued, confirming a commitment by all three to re-establishing the 
East African Community.414 It appears that what was required was time for the states 
themselves to settle. 
 
In 1993, the heads of state agreed on a Permanent Tripartite Commission for the Cooperation 
of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The aim of this Commission was to move towards closer 
relations between the three states in various spheres, including politically, economically, 
militarily, socially and culturally. After an assessment and approval of the East African 
Development Strategy for 1997 – 2000, the first of a number of five year development plans, 
the heads of state agreed to upgrade the Agreement into a treaty to re-establish the formal 
community. The Treaty to establish the East African Community was signed in 1999. It set 
out their strategy for integration; the aim was to move through a customs union, and to 
progress through to a common market and finally a common currency, the aim of which is to 
eventually give the states the opportunity to federate.415  
 
If we look at the stated intentions of the current EAC, they include the EAC as a prosperous, 
competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa. The EAC’s mission statement is 
to “widen and deepen Economic, Political, Social and Culture integration in order to 
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improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, 
value added production, trade and investments”.416 This is an economically-driven goal, in 
direct contrast to the Pan-Africanist undertones that supported previous integration. One 
commonality shared by both Mitrany and Haas is an emphasis on the process and the 
understanding that integration ought not to be applied in a set programme. Both schools 
emphasize time as a vital component to sustainable connections.  Despite this, both versions 
of the EAC have not only aimed for a federation, but have aimed to do so in a short amount 
of time, despite the fact that regions need time to judge and adjust the rate of unfolding 
integration schemes.  
 
The current EAC is benefitting from its efforts, but instead of maximising the benefits gained 
from the process of integration, and allowing the time for the states to reinvest the progress 
made, they are pushing ahead towards a goal that may once again prove destructive. For all of 
the optimism around the EAC, it still faces relatively large challenges; the member states in 
the region show varying degrees of success relative to the African national average. Data 
from 2012 shows that all of the member states had a measurement of GDP per capita that fell 
significantly below the African average. The EAC average per capita GDP measured US$ 
1338.4 in comparison to the African average of US$3204.00, despite the average growth of 
GDP from 2004-2012 in the EAC region outperforming the African average.417  These 
statistics show that despite the recent rise of the EAC and the recent increase in growth in the 
region, the member states still have a long way to go before they can meaningfully compete 
with other African states.418 
 
One of the goals in opening markets and embarking on an economic integration scheme is the 
desire to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the member states. Levels of FDI have 
either remained fairly stable or have steadily increased in the respective partner states from 
2006 – 2011. Tanzania has the highest levels of FDI, with a total of US$ 1095 million 
invested in the country in 2011. Uganda has the second highest FDI at US$ 792 million, 
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followed by Kenya with US$335 million.419 FDI flows are affected by “push factors”, which 
are factors which cause or allow money to flow to overseas markets, such as international 
interest rates and business cycles in industrial countries, however, equally as important are 
the “pull factors” which make a market more or less desirable to invest in.420 Pull factors 
include increases in domestic productivity, sound monetary and fiscal policy, a safe 
investment environment and infrastructure. In addition, political stability is vital in 
decreasing the perception of risk in investments.421 The problem is that although the EAC 
member states are currently enjoying a high level of FDI, there are reasons to question 
whether, if they do not opt for greater stability within their integration programmes in the 
long term, this rate of investment can be sustained.  
 
Udoh and Egwaikhide found that high inflation rates, low levels of infrastructure and the 
instability of exchange rates negatively affect FDI.422 The statistics for these elements within 
the EAC do expose some cracks in the current confidence in the region; the African national 
average inflation rate for 2011 was 8.5 percent, whereas the average for the EAC was 12.12 
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Table 1: Road Infrastructure in EAC Member States 2000-2009 
 
 
 Data sourced from The World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2012/13. Findings are based on available 





Graph 1: Length of Roads and Proportion of Paved Roads 
 
 
Data sourced from The World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2012/13. Findings are based on available 
data between 2000-2009.425 
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State infrastructure is weak; the graphs above show that Rwanda and Burundi have a higher 
road to land ratio, but this figure is skewed as the states are substantially smaller than their 
partners. However, in assessing the figures around Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, it is 
troubling to see the low density of roads as well as the low proportion of those roads that are 
paved. Considering the majority of these roads would naturally occur around cities, this 
leaves a large part of these countries with infrastructure that cannot support the spread of 
development due to limited access and transport. This encourages poles of development and 
reduces the support networks required to encourage a growth in industry across the respective 
countries’ territories.  From 2007 – 2011, there was no significant increase in the proportion 
of GDP provided by manufactured goods in any member state.426 Without investing in roads 
as well as other infrastructural sectors, sustained growth over the long term, practically 
speaking, cannot materialize.  
 
In relation to the US Dollar, national currencies have progressively devalued, with a steady 
decline from 2000 – 2012. Kenya has a far more competitive exchange rate at KES 88.8 to 
one US Dollar, while Tanzania and Uganda are both significantly lower, at TZS 1579 and 
UGX 2522 to one US Dollar respectively.427 This progressive devaluing of national 
currencies does encourage investment, as US Dollars are worth more in the financial climate, 
however, the progressive devaluation along with weak infrastructure and high inflation 
translate to an investment environment that does require strong political stability in order to 
decrease the potential long term risk. Having stated this, political stability can be affected by 
domestic demographics which undermine stability in the region. In line with the arguments 
made earlier in this chapter, strong regions require strong states and state strength is 
reinforced where the interests of the state coincide with the interests of the citizenry. Given 
this argument, and given the indicators explored above, the most effective means to 
encourage political stability is to encourage meaningful development that will, in a Listian 
sense, benefit the nation and therefore the state. However, the data for the member states 
shows that underdevelopment remains a significant issue.  
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Graph 2: Comparison of Average Basic Health Indicators  
 
 
Data sourced from African Economic Outlook.428 
 
All but one member state fell below the African national average for life expectancy of 58.1 
years, with Tanzania only beating the average by 0.8 years. This is compounded by the 2011 
data on the percentage of the population that is undernourished, with the EAC regional 
average at 41.2 percent of the population, while the African national average was 20 
percent.429 In terms of the coverage of basic services, the EAC member states met the African 
national average of 64 percent service coverage nationally for access to water, but fell short 
in the data regarding access to sanitation, falling below the African national average of 39 
percent with an average of 35.4 percent.430 Other than in Rwanda where the data is deficient, 
this data is compounded by the fact that, whilst the public perception of corruption has on 
average decreased from 2006 – 2012, 431 measures show an increase in public protest in 
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Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.432 One cause for protest could arguably be reflected by the 
changes in the respective states’ GINI indexes. Only Burundi and Uganda have managed 
decrease their inequality nationally from 2000 – 2010, with the decrease in Uganda being 
marginal. Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania have seen increases in their GINI indexes, indicating 
an increase in levels of income inequality.433 
 
These statistics paint a far less optimistic picture of the EAC than financial indicators do. 
While the states may be showing significant growth, financial inflows and may appear to be 
bounding through Balassa’s levels of integration, reality for many of the citizens in the 
member states is far less positive. With these statistics, there is no wondering why public 
protest has increased. This data has been selected for the given period for a purpose – it tracks 
the same time period that the new EAC has been in existence. In terms of the age of the 
region, it is impossible to establish what ought to have been achieved 13 years into the 
regionalization process, but these statistics do not show radical improvements in practical 
terms.  There is the possibility that these are early days and that the benefits of the region will 
filter down more at a later stage, but the crux of the issue is whether it is reasonable to expect 
citizens to live in these conditions until that time, whenever that may be. As argued, where 
the citizenry finds that their interests have diverged from those of the state and their needs are 
not met as a result, the reaction in a region is a nationalist backlash to reorientate the focus of 
the state. In terms of FDI, political stability is a vital aspect in building confidence in the 
region. If state interests continue to diverge from popular interests, this stability could be 
jeopardized, significantly affecting the long term trajectory of both the member states 
individually as well as the region as a collective.  
 
This section started by discussing the intention behind the theory, as well as the resulting 
methodology. It seems that, along with the theoretical critiques mentioned above, a failing 
must be acknowledged; the intention of the theory itself is being lost in the methodology. The 
intention must be separated from what have become prescribed and accepted outcomes. If the 
EAC is to be guided by the intention of the theory, it arguably ought to abandon its mad rush 
towards federalism, particularly considering its development needs.  
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The choices made by the EAC within their model of regionalization expose why they are 
currently facing issues. The style of integration they have chosen falls directly into the 
purview of Neofunctionalism and as a result, the issues they are currently experiencing link 
to the issues that arise as a result of the theory. The integration process is experiencing 
dislocations as a result of it being driven by the elite and the state, rather than being a popular 
movement based on welfare, as Mitrany advocated. Success is pinned on the progressive 
solving of issues at the regional level, which is supposed to relocate identity and 
progressively reduce nationalist interests. In addition, Haas assumed that the cumulative 
effect of accommodation as well as spillover would continue, but his theory was very much a 
fair-weather process. He also assumed that institutions with legitimacy and authority could 
bolster the integration process, progressively removing power from state hands.  
 
Unfortunately, the effect for the EAC has been that the interests pursued have not been 
people-oriented. Instead of Mitrany’s idea of common interests driving the process, elite and 
regional interests dominate integration. The facilitation of trade and growth and the drive 
towards further integration may have popular benefits in the long term, but this is a by-
product. The strategy of economic integration is to put trade and production at the centre of 
the process, not popular needs. Institutions within the EAC are young, and lack the 
legitimacy assumed by Haas. They remain state-driven and state-centric, negating the hope 
that they will relocate identity to a regional body soon. States, despite their recent growth, are 
still developing and therefore many of Haas’ assumptions are not present. Nationalism and 
independence remain valuable for the developing states and citizens. The institutions that 
have been established mimic those established for the EU, but lack the power those 
institutions wield. They have not been the product of integration, as espoused by Mitrany, but 
rather, have been established to pre-empt the future structure of the EAC.  
 
This has effectively put the cart before the horse, leaving institutions to function within the 
limited purview allowed by states. This is not the intention in Haas’ theory; where institutions 
cannot encourage the relocation of identity through their increasing legitimacy, the whole 
process loses its lynchpin. Mitrany’s approach of relocating power to those states with the 
most experience in a given field may contribute to a more trusting relationship between 
partner states, however, Haas does not address this, as his theory focuses too heavily on 
institutions. As a result, states will remain competitive and challenged by their relative power 
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positions until such time as these institutions start to function as they were meant to, 
effectively leaving regional initiatives as reinforcers of sovereignty, as Qobo discussed. The 
cumulative effect of these theoretical inadequacies is that the EAC’s attempts to head in the 
same direction as the EU are fairly hollow; there is a significant gap between the theory and 
the practical reality of the region. 
 
The fact that regions in Africa have not been successful and continue to struggle suggests that 
the theory applied needs revision. Studies on regionalism in Africa tend to use the typical 
format of applying the theory to a case study, picking out its flaws and concluding with 
failure. What studies should do is assess why the theory does not work; they should be 
interrogating the concepts within the theory, questioning their application and amending the 
areas in which theory cannot or should not apply in order to reach the goals set out by 
regional groupings. The emphasis should shift from regional failure to theoretical failure. If 
we look at the application of the theory in the African context, there are too few questions 
asked about how, where and why the theory is applied. The literature suffers from laziness 
through the use of concepts - there is too little interrogation and too many assumptions. As 
we see in the case, time and time again, where politics has failed, economics has taken over, 
with the assumption that following the theory will guide a partnership to a successful 
federation.   
 
The outcome is that the theory compounds issues in Africa rather than ameliorating them. 
Where states cannot fulfil the requirements of a theory from the start, more attention should 
be paid to how it is used. Regional theory, in this sense, has ceased to be a tool for 
understanding and has lost much of its value for two reasons; firstly, the concepts have 
become crystallized. When theory itself is insufficiently interrogated, it loses its efficacy. 
Secondly, despite the criticisms levelled at Haas, there is still the belief that one system can 
be universally applied. If Africa intends to succeed in its regional endeavours, this 
assumption must be abandoned. Future studies would find greater power in examining these 
questions and re-examining the theory. The most effective path to escaping the flaws that 
travel down through the theory and in to the case is to return to the use of regional theory as 
an active and engaging tool, rather than as an established framework. In listing the shortfalls 
of Neofunctionalism, Chapter 2 found that the theory itself was never intended to be a 
framework and that the criticisms of Haas’ approach were substantial. The effect of the 
omissions and the economics-before-politics approach within the theory can be drawn down 
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through Balassa’s theory, through regional studies in Africa as well as directly through to the 
case. As a result, the findings in relation to the case match those of Chapter 2; regional theory 
is not established correctly and following it without amendment or challenge may disable 
more than it enables within the integration process.   
 
Identity, Sovereignty and Nationalism: The Case in Relation to Statement 2 
 A successful region will lead to a federation and a monetary union. 
 
In Chapter 3 this argument was challenged by asserting that sovereignty is still an important 
concept, not just because the state system on the whole is still the basis for international 
affairs, but because of the nature of sovereignty itself. Political identity, agency and 
nationalism are all vital in supporting the state and are influenced by the population, which is 
the seat of sovereignty within the state. If, as Calhoun holds, the government’s role is to 
safeguard liberty and security and to ensure balance, there would need to be a compelling 
argument as to why the state should cease to exist in the African regional context. One 
argument could be that, given the strong history of political turmoil, it would suit the process 
to remove political aspects that could lead to future conflicts. This would suit the null 
hypothesis well, however, given the arguments made by Hegel and Giddens, it is equally 
arguable that the state is essential given Africa’s history of colonialism and relatively recent 
independence. Before states can be asked to function effectively, they need to develop the 
fundamental aspects that will enable them to do so with legitimacy and stability. For Africa, a 
far more compelling argument is that stable regions should be preceded by stable states. 
 
Buthelezi argues that a focus on economics has significantly weakened the state and welfare 
programmes designed to protect Africa’s citizens. It is essential that the state is able to fulfil 
its function as the overall organizer of citizens’ lives, and therefore change is expected to be 
driven by the state.434 The problem occurs where the convergence of the theory and practice 
seek to minimize the role of the state to the “most fundamental” functions. Considering the 
development status of many African states, it is not feasible for the state to disengage from 
economic activity,435 as shown in the statistics above.   
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Having noted this, an interesting take on an alternative option is that of Dunn and Hentz,436  
who argue that Africa should not only be seen as regionally distinct from other continents due 
to its history, but that internally, regions also ought to be treated differently.437 There is a need 
to readdress the state in the African context; while the New Regionalism approach allows for 
a process to move beyond state-centrism, it can also allow for the opportunity to re-envision 
the nature of the role of the state, state-making and state structures. The issue is that in the 
African context, the state is still a powerful driver in both development and security and it 
cannot simply be removed from an equation in which it still plays such a vital role.438 In order 
to understand the role of the state within the process of regionalization, decision-making and 
development, we need to understand the forces that contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of the state itself.439 The state must cease to be seen in the conventional sense, as 
a static, two-dimensional structure, and must instead be reconceptualised as a dynamic entity 
that changes as citizens’ identities and citizens’ relationships to leadership change over time. 
 
The redefining power of the state may have a substantial impact; in places where there is a 
local identity, usually of ethnic or tribal origin, it can be attached to land tenure and is 
consequently tied to security issues. A strong state and state identity may be able to overcome 
these differences, creating stability internally while maintaining interstate connections across 
boundaries that remain peaceful. Dunn and Hentz refer specifically to the Great Lakes region, 
however, the argument can apply across the continent. Interstate relations are powerful forces 
for peace and stability when used appropriately.440 This links in to the arguments made above; 
the state is still a vital player for citizens and regions alike and to minimize its role is to 
equally minimize its potential. 
 
 Once again, the issue of Eurocentrism is raised; when a region does not behave as it should 
in comparison to the “standard case” of Europe, it is seen as a failure. Shaw et al. argue that 
the collapse of the former EAC may have been due to too much dependence on formal state-
structures. As a result, the regional structures could not withstand the quarrels between the 
political leaders at the time. These structures were inherently weak, but, since they were 
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effective in the European model, they seemed to be the correct route to follow. Shaw et al. 
argue that a continued dependence on state-based institutions will lead to similar conflicts, 
but that although there have been some changes in regionalism on the continent, few regions 
have learned from this lesson.441 The EAC does not seem to have deviated from this 
methodology, even in its new version. If anything, the EAC has reinvigorated this old 
structure with new enthusiasm. Shaw et al. also argue that state formation is a recent 
phenomenon on the continent, having only flourished in the last hundred years. 
Consequently, states in Africa are arguably not set structures yet, but are states-in-the-
making.442  
 
If we are to accept the arguments above – that states in Africa are still in the process of 
defining themselves and therefore their relationships with their citizens – we equally have to 
accept that, in line with the views of Hegel and Giddens, a federation and a monetary union 
are not acceptable goals for African states right now. Populations are forming their identities 
through state structures that are themselves developing. In countries where there is 
widespread poverty and illiteracy, voting is a powerful concept. Local issues are not yet 
solved and the state still has a strong role to play in the African context, both practically as 
well as ideationally. To introduce the thought of removing the state as a stabilizing factor is 
to court with conflict. In the context of Hegel’s arguments of inclusion and exclusion, to 
destabilize the state is to destabilize the individual, the community and therefore the political 
balance within a state. 
 
Therefore, the argument is that the state will remain central to African development, peace 
and security for the foreseeable future. Regionalism, for all of the potential it offers the 
continent, must accommodate this reality, and not the opposite. The only stumbling block is 
that the theory has not been asked to do this. The continent has been asked to adjust to the 
theory, which has proven to be ineffective. In much of the literature, Africa is shown as 
wishing to de-link from its colonisers, yet, despite this desire, it chooses to follow the same 
paths of integration. The most powerful means of asserting identity is through asserting 
independence and states in Africa ought to reassess their attitudes to the most powerful force 
of domination – knowledge. The biggest challenge for the regionalization process on the 
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continent is the ability to formulate African solutions to African problems through using 
theory in an active and conscious way.  
 
The Westphalian state system dictates that states are individual actors in the international 
system. They are granted personality by virtue of their statehood. The state is not simply a 
body that must control and dominate the domestic realm, but must equally be responsible for 
providing public goods and welfare.443Jeng argues that part of the issue is that the parties that 
held leadership positions pre-colonialism were also used during colonialism in order to 
reinforce relationships of domination.444 As a result, that same elite inherited the newly 
independent states and were not only left with economies that needed restructuring,  but were 
also left with populations that demanded the rights accorded to them under the accepted 
social agreements between state and citizenry which, as leaders, the elite had not previously 
had to accommodate. Jackson notes that states, as they were constituted under colonialism, 
were not “real states”, but were rather territories arbitrarily delineated and run as territories of 
European empire.445 Independence was not granted because territories met the criteria for 
statehood in a meaningful way; it was a consequence of the changes in the norms around 
colonialism in the international arena and was, as a result, quite arbitrary.446 What it 
essentially produced were quasi-states, underdeveloped in their ability to function as states 
and underprepared to face the needs of their citizens.447 Jackson notes that as a result, many 
African citizens were members of “two publics” – one civic, constructed and young, and one 
that was primordial, moral and ingrained.448 In that sense, both people and state have had to 
come to understand and progressively utilize concepts like sovereignty, self-determination, 
territoriality and legitimacy.449 This introduces the issue of time into regional considerations 
as states need time to develop.   
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Nationalism is therefore especially important to developing nations; if we consider the 
Functional, Constructivist and Rationalist descriptions of states, all three reinforce that states 
in Africa have not achieved their “full state status” yet. Brubaker’s non state-seeking 
nationalism has endured, and will continue to grow as a force until a developmental 
equilibrium is reached. As long as defensive-populist nationalism endures, it will need 
management, retaining the importance of the state.  
 
Mentan450 discusses how the state has evolved and has developed the responsibilities and 
obligations now commonly expected from it. Within the evolution of the state, the political 
mechanisms involved in the maintenance of the state have become further linked to the 
people that hold those expectations. The nation and the state are distinct, but simultaneously 
dependant on each other.451 The state, as seen in Jackson’s perspective, ceased to be 
legitimate from its very inception and has even in recent literature been portrayed as weak, 
inefficient, a stumbling block to development and disinterested in the needs of African 
people.452 Mentan argues that one perspective as to why this occurs is that within the age of 
globalization, the needs of states and the needs of nations, which are meant to remain 
connected, are diverging, with the interests of citizens being sacrificed for the interests of the 
state.453 In contradiction to this, the state, even in its apparent “African form” has managed to 
maintain itself, and has in many ways become more important to the nation, particularly 
because of globalization, reinforcing identity and an “us-versus-them” perception of 
politics.454 Issues of identity are still understood in the context of the state, and as such, the 
state and its citizenry are still tightly woven.455  
 
From the viewpoints represented in the literature above, the relevance of the state can be seen 
from two perspectives; firstly, it could be that the state is not yet fully evolved, and therefore 
should not federate based on the fact that structurally, the state does not possess the relevant 
political maturity to do so, or alternatively, that it cannot give away aspects of statehood that 
have not yet been fully realised. Secondly, even where the state may have reached these 
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levels of development within its structure, national interests, or the expectations of the 
citizenry, still need to be prioritised with many yet to be met. This leaves the state with a 
complex matrix of obligations to fulfil before it should consider federalizing if it intends to 
maintain popular support throughout the process of integration. African states face the 
challenge of simultaneously balancing international competition and internal development. In 
the long term, international competition cannot be maintained meaningfully with due 
consideration to national interests, unless the state has invested, in the Listian sense, in its 
own economy. Therefore, the model of economic integration has produced a strategy by 
which African states may see success over the medium term, but it is doubtful whether it can 
continue to produce positive developments over the long term without substantial political 
support, political drivers, meaningful development and national reinvestment. 
 
Welz speaks about the fact that although the EAC is primarily an economic grouping at the 
moment, the hope is that it will form a political federation. Having said this, the economy is 
not free from political drivers. The market only acts within the political boundaries that are 
set by the national governments, who are the main drivers of the process of regionalization in 
the EAC.456 This ties in to the argument that politics and economics are almost impossible to 
separate; in order for the economic integration model to work, governments still need to 
implement the prescribed changes. As such, the changes made must have state support. 
Where national or governmental support is absent, the regional agreement cannot have the 
required effect. This is the basis for the argument against the economic integration model in 
Africa, and specifically in the EAC; where states are not committed, the process is stalled and 
the integration is not meaningful. 
 
 Politically, there is already a lot of cooperation between the member states, included in 
which are joint army exercises and a common East African passport that allows for free 
movement of citizens between the countries.457 Officials from Uganda appear to support the 
view that if Yoweri Museveni, the Ugandan president, were to head the proposed federation, 
the state may be willing to cede their sovereign rights, but this has been met with resistance 
from both Kenya and Tanzania.458 Although there have been declarations supporting the 
moves towards federalism and all of the presidents appear to be behind the cause, there are 
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other moments that echo different sentiments. This clarifies where the tension between the 
partner-states lies; in the area of low politics, where the threat to sovereignty is low, states are 
happy to join forces. However, when it comes to issues around sovereignty, the same support 
is lacking. 
 
In October 2012, a panel of experts met to consider the Zero Draft Model of the Structure and 
Plan of Action of the Political Federation in line with the wishes expressed in April 2012 at 
the 10th Extraordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State.459 However, despite the emphasis 
on the move towards a federation, at the 11th Extraordinary Summit, just a year later, in his 
speech Museveni congratulated Kenya on successful elections, stating “I also salute the 
people of Kenya for the successful and peaceful elections.  I further salute them for affirming 
the sovereignty of Kenya”.460 As an addition, Kenya intends to borrow $1 billion from 
international markets in order to finance infrastructure projects in its own territory.461 
Although Kenya has always been the strongest player in the region, these actions smack of 
independence and issue a challenge to federalist sentiments. A news article published on 27th 
July 2013 entitled “Hands Off: Tanzania’s Sovereignty is Sacrosanct”462 quotes President 
Kikwete as saying “We shall not let anyone play around with our sovereignty, just as we did 
not allow Idi Amin to mess around with our country”. This is quite a strong message, 
considering the apparent Tanzanian commitment to federalism.  
 
The Community does seem to be pushing ahead within their endeavours to change the 
attitudes of the citizens of the region, especially through activating dialogue and encouraging 
linking activities across borders in the private sector and civil society.463 The emphasis placed 
on public participation within the move towards greater integration is heavy – the leadership 
attending the EAC forum titled “The EAC We Want” acknowledged that the process has to 
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be owned equally by government and the people. Efforts in the region by the private sector, 
civil society and other interest groups in collaboration with the EAC Secretariat include 
national and regional Secretary General’s Forums, Civil Society Consultative Forums, youth 
meetings, children’s rights conferences, conferences on good governance and the first EAC 
Cultural Festival (JAMAFEST) amongst others. It even includes political dialogues on the 
role of women within political integration.464 What this effectively shows is that the EAC is 
aware of the need to pull the process down in to domestic politics, thereby also 
acknowledging the link to nationalism and identity within the process of integration. It shows 
that as a region the EAC is striving towards a union, displaying an awareness of the need to 
reorient attitudes and perspectives towards the regional level.  
 
Can an EAC regional identity replace a national one? According to Hegel and Giddens, 
political identity has a functional as well as ideational basis. Identity, and therefore 
nationalism, cannot be divorced from the state structures that encourage and nurture them, 
included in which is the use of symbols, such as flags and anthems. However elements like 
these are insufficient if there is no functional basis to link the citizenry to the region, such as 
voting. In relation to the EAC, can citizens in the member states lobby a regional body? Do 
they have the power to make changes to the region in a way that could circumvent national 
governments? The answer is no – they do not. The EAC remains, despite its efforts, a region 
driven by states and inter-governmental efforts.465 Therefore what is the point in trying to 
create a regional identity where there are no reinforcing factors of substance other than state 
action (which defeats the purpose) to support it? Add to this the recent addition of the notion 
of two track integration within the region, where some partners will push ahead while others 
may choose to join initiatives later.466 How can this facilitate a singular identity? In 
September 2013, reports surfaced that Tanzania had “expelled” thousands of Rwandans, 
calling them “illegal immigrants” and citing that there was a fear that Rwanda wished to 
destabilize Tanzania as a retaliatory action for sending troops into the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.467 With this clear “us-versus-them” sentiment, it becomes hard to ignore that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Tenywa (2013). 
465 Mwapachu, J. EAC integration- Are citizens players or spectators? The Citizen, 5th November 2013 at 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/oped/EAC-integration--Are-citizens-players-or-spectators-/-/1840568/2048802/-
/item/0/-/kmqsfe/-/index.html .  
466 Kalinaki, D.K. EAC states pull in different directions as Dar is isolated Africa Review, 21st September 2013 
at http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/EAC-states-pull-in-different-directions-as-Dar-is-isolated-/-
/979182/1975670/-/fffna6/-/index.html . 




regional identity is a sentiment; external threats pull the state and citizenry together, 
reinforcing the established national bond.  
 
In order to link the state to the people effectively, the issue must be seen in a theoretical 
context. By virtue of the construction of political identity in a nation-state there is the need to 
encourage homogeneity and collective interests, which can promote isolation. Von Busekist 
notes that identity is based on history and tradition, and in the context of the EAC, this 
includes the history of regional relationships, included in which is the competitive nature 
between the members with Kenya overshadowing its partners. It is therefore natural to see the 
kind of state behaviour noted above, since it has arguably become part of the identities of the 
member states that have evolved after the dissolution of the first EAC, and even before that – 
in the region’s original colonial structure. Hegel’s ideas of political and practical identity call 
for individuals to feel empowered and included within the state context; they require a 
connection between state and citizenry that must be nurtured for the benefit of both. If we 
link Hegel’s ideas of agency to Giddens’ ideas around the reproduction of identity, the image 
of what faces the respective member states becomes even more challenging. Giddens’ ideas 
of structures exerting a force on citizens requires that those structures develop sufficiently in 
order to harden and exert a force; if behaviour is acceptable, it is because it has positive 
outcomes and as a result, has been reinforced. The behaviour of states and people need to be 
seen in this context; where EAC members have behaved in a protectionist manner, it has been 
understood as a state defending its citizens, encouraging support from a grassroots level for 
these behaviours and opening the door to future actions that are similar.  
 
If we view the behaviour of the member states as well as the individual citizens in this light, 
we are able to more fully understand why conflicts between regions and states exist; Giddens 
notes that where unintended consequences occur they will provoke a reaction which ought to 
change the behaviours that are inconsistent with the accepted norms. Within the domination 
of regional concerns over national concerns in the EAC and within the EU, the by-product 
has been the sacrifice of welfare and meaningful development. The result has been that the 
state orientation has changed, but popular expectations and behaviours that are still forming 
have not. These expectations have not adjusted because of how political identity is formed 
and maintained. As a result, a nationalist backlash ought to be expected, since the change in 
structure has not been met with a change in expectation or experience. In turn, identity 
formation cannot change as rapidly as the state’s orientation because, as Hegel notes, it is so 
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tightly woven into the individual’s sense of being a citizen and is reinforced daily. The result 
is that, in terms of their identity, citizens clash with each other as well as with the state, 
pulling the state away from its regional partners. 
 
Despite the ineffective nature of the theory, member states are still using the model of 
economic integration and hoping that political integration efforts will follow. The problem is 
that changing attitudes is becoming a state issue, where motivation to relocate identity is as 
much an issue as economic integration itself. This ought to be a natural process and it ought 
to be progressive. This facilitation is the reflection of a disjointed process. The role of people 
in the process of regionalization has effectively become a political band-aid to support and 
invigorate the integration process. State behaviour within the EAC is a product of turbulent 
internal challenges that place both the state and citizens in compromising positions. The state, 
seeking legitimacy externally, seeks to reinforce regionalism as a means to increase its 
relative power and recognition. Internally, legitimacy is tied to popular support for state 
action and it is therefore compromised by the state’s regional endeavours. This becomes an 
issue particularly where these actions are not sanctioned because of the sacrifices around the 
needs of the citizenry that they require. As a result, nationalism is activated to reinforce 
internal obligations. Therefore, they pull each other along, extending the discomfort of the 
loss of synchronicity in the belief that one partner will correct themselves. In this case, it is 
arguably not the citizenry that will do so, since their demands are welfare-based; it must be 
the state. The relationship should be symbiotic, balancing interests, mutually protecting each 
other and working for a beneficial and peaceful environment. State interests should not have 
to diverge from popular interests, unless they are deliberately separated. Economic 
integration separates the state from society by encouraging the state to follow a construct that 
dislocates it from its citizenry. Economic integration essentially has an internal self-destruct 
mechanism that renders its success uncertain. 
 
The biggest challenge within regional theory is to accept the notion that the state will remain 
relevant. If this is accepted, the theory will naturally have to adjust, treating the state as the 
dynamic entity that it is. In line with these comments, future paths of study should focus on 
working through these issues; one path is to assess how development projects may be linked 
to the regionalization process, as well as how the state may be re-envisioned in a more 
supportive role. Another aspect of further study is to examine regionalization models and to 
open them up to alternative contexts, providing possibilities rather than closing them off. One 
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way to do this is by comparing regions within the African context in order to see how they 
deal with these issues comparatively and where solutions may lie. This would facilitate the 
de-linking of ideas from models, effectively opening the theory to new applications. Lastly, 
future studies need to re-link the state to its citizenry; it is clear that there is value in retaining 
the state structure. The state itself can be used to empower the theory, rather than to remain at 
odds with it.  
 
Federation or Confederation: The Case in Relation to Statement 3 
Leadership within a successful region will require a post-Westphalian solution in order to 
move beyond bounded state politics. 
 
The assumption within the movement towards a federation and a monetary union is that it is 
the best outcome for a region. The reality is that, as seen in Europe, integration does require 
some defined outcome otherwise it is left as an invasive force, bringing states progressively 
closer together with no defined end point. The “bicycle theory” holds that, as with a bicycle, 
integration must remain moving forward in order to maintain its stability.468 As this paper has 
shown, this progression can be destabilizing because of the threat it creates for state 
sovereignty. The end-point of a regional integration scheme should seek to reinforce state 
commitment to integration by ensuring that the elements integral to statehood are protected in 
the long term. This paper has argued for confederation as a means to safeguard sovereignty. 
In order to understand whether confederation is a feasible option for Africa, the challenges of 
integration must be examined in light of the options offered by confederation in order to 
assess its acceptability.  
 
Acharya argues that under the New Regionalism initiatives, intrusive regionalism is actually 
providing a new basis for identity.469 Initially states in the third world turned to regionalism as 
a means of protecting their sovereignty while gaining influence through collective action.470 
Although regionalism was not a first option for the UN post-World War II, and despite the 
fear that regions may come to compete with a pacific dispute resolution body like the UN, 
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regions were conceded to under the Charter471 due to the fact that regions were still comprised 
of states that would remain under the purview of the UN. The UN, after all, aimed to 
protecting sovereignty.472 New Regionalism is, however, intrusive, and actively works against 
the concept of sovereignty. The early models of integrative regionalism focussed on the fact 
that states would consent to giving up aspects of their sovereign rights for the collective 
interest, but in contrast, New Regionalism does not require consent – it simply permeates the 
system.473 In terms of identity, New Regionalism could give rise to more robust forms of 
collective identity due to the fact that it works with multi-level players within the state and 
could also be responsible for tighter security communities. Conversely, this form of 
integration may also fuel conflicts for the same reason.474 Acharya notes that despite the 
change in ideas, sovereignty in the Third world is still too new and valuable to let go of, 
highlighting the fact that what remains is a tension between New Regionalism and states.  
 
There is no clear way to apply the New Regionalist theories without them having potentially 
adverse effects. To expect every regional collective to tailor-make a regional structure to their 
needs is far too complex, however, to expect them to fit into boxes defined by theory is 
equally ineffective. If we are to accept that African states are still to a degree in the process of 
developing, then the effect is that it is problematic to remove the state from a regional 
partnership. As a result, we cannot see a federal outcome in the foreseeable future for the 
EAC. Despite this, the EAC is actively working towards a federal union with a single 
currency, within an economic integration framework. 
 
If African states, and especially the EAC, wish to continue to pursue a form of regional 
economic integration the solution to the regional outcome must lie in how the region will 
combat the issues of political and economic integration. Two of the issues that require 
specific attention are political power sharing and the monetary issues that arise in the 
regionalization process, namely, a monetary union and unequal development within the 
region. 
 
Calhoun’s arguments around political confederation and power-sharing agreement seem to 
make sense in the African political landscape. A confederation ensures that decisions must be 
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unanimous, with only agreed powers being ceded to a central authority. The seat of power 
remains with the states, and the states, due to the pay-off described by Ploeckl, benefit a 
sufficient amount to justify their combined efforts. Where states have the ability to maintain 
their independence, there is strength and sustainability within agreements. The states 
themselves are not threatened, therefore their concern is free to remain with their constituent 
populations. Their aims are not redirected from domestic concerns, allowing them to apply 
the politics this paper has argued for without the concern of building up their local economic 
and political structures just to lose those structures to a region.   
 
A confederation leaves room for the domestic issues that need solving to be solved within a 
supportive environment. The amorphous structure of confederations also leaves the door open 
for states to define how much power they would like to cede and how the structures of a 
confederation should function. There is a need, as in economic integration, to harmonize state 
policy in order to allow for the freedoms that are essential for healthy integration – the free 
movement of goods, people, capital and services.475 States would find it far less threatening to 
facilitate these freedoms in good faith rather than as an imposed condition of federalization. 
This returns to the argument that instead of expecting reality to bend to theory, states should 
accommodate their realities by adjusting the theory to suit where they are politically. There is 
no need for states to cede their sovereignty in order to form lasting regional structures, 
despite how the theory has been constructed. This would give African regions the political 
stability that is so badly needed.   
 
Despite the optimism politically, how would states fare economically? For integration to be 
successful, it must be perceived to be relatively low-cost and high-benefit. The problem is 
that within the integration process, there is a tendency for resistance to occur where one 
partner receives an overwhelming benefit that is perceived to be unfairly distributed among 
the partner states. This also leads to poles of development and poles of stagnation, which 
requires the intervention of a redistributive mechanism.476 This must be partnered with the 
harmonisation of state policies to facilitate a convergence of economic policy that will allow 
intra-regional trade to flourish within the newly expanded markets.477 A final issue to note is 
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that since Africa has low levels of industrialization, there are few opportunities to integrate 
factors of production into common productive processes.478  
 
The free movement of goods requires a high level of political harmonization and facilitation. 
The process is more than just the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and requires the 
harmonization of policies in various sectors in order to facilitate the easy travel of goods and 
people across boundaries.479 Economic integration should promote both static and dynamic 
economic efficiency; it should allow domestic markets to become more efficient due to 
expanded markets and should provide the ability to embrace the industries in which they have 
a comparative advantage. However, in the long term, it should also promote dynamic 
economic growth in the region.480 A single currency within a monetary union is even more 
challenging. In addition to the negative effect of the single currency on sovereignty, the 
creation of the currency itself may be contentious. If we look at the Euro, its name and 
symbol are potentially politically explosive, as no nation may be favoured in its structure. In 
choosing to join the Eurozone, many states had to meet certain minimum economic 
requirements, creating domestic pressures. Although European nations look to their states in 
times of crisis, states have had to give up certain rights in joining the Eurozone. Individual 
states cannot set interest rates, as they are set by the European Central Bank. States have lost 
the ability to use common economic tools to combat the effects of the recession, such as 
increasing government spending or printing more money, leaving their hands tied in trying to 
combat the effect of the crisis. Although the currency is the glue that binds the region, 
compelling states that could otherwise opt out of agreements to work out their differences, it 
also magnifies the tensions between states because of the loss of domestic power.481 
 
Looking at the crisis Europe is currently facing, it becomes clear that if developed nations are 
struggling with the effect of abandoning national currencies and national control of 
economies, then it would be a poor choice for regions in Africa, given the weaknesses 
already noted. With economies that are not diversified, not industrialised and that are trying 
to build themselves up in relation to the global economy, not only are African markets 
arguably not developed sufficiently to begin with, they are too unstable. It is at this juncture 
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that we return to List’s theory that productivity is culturally grounded. If, as in List’s view, 
the national economy is the product of national ideas, ethos and the national workforce and 
these are intricately woven into the fabric of society and people’s need to belong to a society, 
then African states must look inwards in order to grow their economies to the point at which 
regional relationships may be more successful. The Zollverein, as a confederation, 
maintained independent banks and currencies, but created a parallel currency in order to 
facilitate cross-border exchanges. This appears to be a far more feasible alternative in the 
given context.  
 
There is no question that there would need to be a meaningful and acceptable redistributive 
mechanism that would enable states to feel as though the regional network was supportive 
rather than exploitative. If List’s beliefs constituted the basis for regional integration and they 
were coupled with the idea of long-term success of each of the partner states within the 
region, redistribution could be more easily framed as a supportive exercise for each state’s 
national economy. Redistribution would be seen to be supporting the trading networks that 
would indirectly facilitate national growth. If states were equally allowed to prioritize 
growing their own economies within the structure, poles of development and stagnation could 
be countered from the start, as the state could drive the pace and placement of development.  
 
Although this smacks of overwhelming state intervention in markets, the state cannot be a 
passive participant in developing nations – not in List’s view and certainly not in practice if 
populations wish to see meaningful benefits. Although this is a thorny issue, it can be 
overcome by maintaining political independence and, as Haas advocates, the right political 
alliances. It is arguable that political insecurity inspires distrust in a region; when states are 
unsure of where their partner state’s allegiance lies, the insecurity is overwhelming. How is a 
state that is asked to relinquish sovereignty supposed to trust that a partner state will 
necessarily do the same? Treaties and bilateral agreements should act as guarantees of the 
process, however, particularly in the EAC, treaties have a history of being dissolved. In 
Realist terms, it would be far more beneficial for developing nations to act with transparency, 
reinforcing each other’s sovereignty and maintaining a level and secure playing field by 
acting as the sovereign states that they are.   
 
One possible option for remedying the issue of the monetary union is to look towards a 
parallel and exchangeable currency. Considering that exchange rates are already applied to 
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currencies, one could feasibly argue that a new currency could fit into the framework that is 
already in existence. Most currencies are either floating, pegged to another currency or are a 
hybrid system of floating-pegs. The most feasible answer would be to devise an exchange 
rate system that would facilitate exchanges with an additional currency that could succeed 
within the floating-peg system.482  
 
If we look at the conversion of the multiple currencies of Europe to the Euro, there was a 
conversion period that may offer some suggestion as to how to achieve this. When the 
independent currencies were in the process of changing to the Euro, many of the prices of 
goods were listed in both Euro and in national currencies due to the fixed conversion rates 
that had been established through using the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. This 
Mechanism ensured fixed margins of currency exchange for the European currencies within 
the changeover period.483 Although this was temporary, it shows that a third currency can 
exist and function in addition to two or more trading currencies. Having said this, it would 
require administration, as with all currencies, in that states would need to still have integrated 
banking systems in order to facilitate the process and to protect their national currencies in 
relation to potential fluctuations. There is no defined rule to say that states should have to 
forfeit their financial independence for integration. It has just become an accepted notion 
along with federal aspirations. There is already the need to convert Kenyan, Tanzanian and 
Ugandan Shillings as well as Rwandan and Burundian Francs in order to trade between 
partners. Instead of eliminating all five currencies, a common currency with set exchange 
rates could facilitate much easier trade without intervening in state sovereignty.  
 
In relation to the argument that the Euro is the glue that holds the EU together, Ploeckl shows 
that where a regional integration movement is successful, the success of one partner is tied to 
success of the whole unit. The pay-off for remaining within the region becomes the 
motivating factor for sustaining agreements. Therefore, where agreements are correctly 
applied and are successful, there should be no need to monetarily tie states into a collective. 
The pay-off should be sufficient to ensure future compliance.  
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Therefore there is a strong argument that a confederation could supply what regions in Africa 
need; an easier, less threatening but just as enduring system of integration that will not 
compromise on African goals, but will equally not hinder African state’s integration efforts. 
In linking politics with economics, we are able to expose more creative solutions that may 
lead to the potential for greater prosperity without the threats associated with revolutionising 
the system currently in place. New theory has a tendency to reach ahead, grasping at new 
ideas, when the old ideas have not yet been fully used. This paper argues that the march 
towards a post-Westphalian ideal epitomises this pre-emptory reach.  
 
 It is this paper’s view that a confederation could prove to be a more feasible alternative. In 
truth, a confederation is a safe choice. It gives partner states the choice to push on towards 
federalism or to maintain whichever level of integration they choose. Either way, one 
unmentioned challenge is that federalism and economic integration have been marketed in 
literary circles as a panacea for states wishing to remain competitive. One of the biggest 
challenges in working with theory is to break that view, for options only become feasible 
alternatives when they are acknowledged as such.  
 
The EAC, after decades of integration efforts and surviving a regional collapse, should 
seriously reconsider its aspirations for the future. Integration has the potential to benefit states 
in many ways, however, that does imply that the integration programme must be sustainable. 
What the literature above shows clearly is that this potential exists, where we are willing to 
change the way in which we view theory and its effect. This chapter started by looking at 
methods and intentions, and it will conclude by looking at the same issue. If our intentions 
are to create a regional economic body in which politics is subverted and ineffectively used, 
then the crystallized notion of economic integration will suffice. However, if our intentions 
are to create not a model but a guide as to how regions could work within the principles 
already tested then confederation must be a better alternative. In the case of the EAC, we see 
that although there is optimism around integration and a need to push forward constantly at a 
pace, the states themselves show that integration is not evenly spread and not close to where 
it ought to be to discuss federating.  
 
The Economic and Social Research Foundation published a document based on a dialogue 
workshop entitled ‘The Implementation of the East African Community: Regional Integration 
Processes in Tanzania” which took place in October 2012. The dialogue was intended to 
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assess the progress of integration and the issues facing Tanzania in further integration. A few 
issues that were highlighted include some aspects that ought to be expected in any integration 
process, namely, issues around persisting non-tariff barriers and the fact that trade and 
movement of people are controlled by widely differing agencies. However it also includes 
others that show that the EAC is not yet prepared to reach for federalism, for example, the 
fact that Tanzania has not yet started to create a welcoming environment for the East African 
Monetary Union (EAMU). In addition, there are major concerns around the fact that there is a 
rush towards federation despite the fact that member states still suffer from internal political 
issues and conflicts.484 Although the paper is aimed at reflecting the Tanzanian perspective of 
integration, the issues remain pertinent for the Community as a whole.  
 
Despite the customs union being in place for eight years, the partner states have not yet 
managed to create an integrated customs union. Although the partners support the common 
market initiative, huge delays have been caused due to the slow amendment of national laws. 
As a result, the EAC negotiations for a monetary union are not only premature, they present a 
significant issue.485 This should be a concern to partner states and to theorists studying the 
region; it is not only over-reaching, it reflects a worrying “box-check” attitude. It seems as if 
the region is going through the motions with the hope that the outcome will be guaranteed. 
Additionally, despite the initiatives mentioned, people on the ground still do not fully 
understand the integration process and therefore cannot fully benefit from it. Many are 
Swahili speaking, however English, which is the language that links the partner states, is not 
as widely used. People are undereducated about the process, and as a result, cannot be active 
participants.486  
 
Although on paper the EAC seems to be a success story, it is missing integral aspects within 
the integration process; the process is disjointed, not fully formed at the earlier stages, and 
strong states and state attitudes persist. The pace at which the process has moved has been 
remarkable, especially considering the history of the EAC. The success of many of the 
Community’s initiatives shows a dedication to the Community cause, however, where there 
are aspects lacking, the gaps are significant. It seems that one product of globalization, instant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Lunogelo, H.B., Mashindano, O., Kaino, D., Kida, T. and Hassan, A.K. (eds) “East African Regional 
Integration Process in Tanzania,” Quarterly Economic Review Tanzania Special Issue (May 2013) at  
http://www.trademarkea.com/download/Special%20ESRF%20QER%20Edition%20on%20RI%20%20-
%20October%202013.pdf   at p. 1.  
485 Lunogelo et al. (2013) at p. 3. 
486 Lunogelo et al. (2013) at p. 3.  
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gratification, has filtered down to political integration, using economic integration as a fast-
track to a goal that neither the state nor the people are in truth fully able to accept just yet. 
Whether or not they should federalise in the long term is a question of desire; in the interim, 
confederation will allow them many of the benefits of federalising without the accompanying 
challenges.  
 
If the EAC aim for a monetary union, as seen in the example of the Zollverein, the option of 
creating a system which works alongside national currencies is appealing. A single currency 
has been effective in the original partner states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda previously. 
The East African Currency Board supplied and supervised the use of the currency in East 
Africa from 1919 to 1966. The Board was authorized to issue its own currency notes and 
mint coins according to the designs approved by the Secretary of State and the rate of 
exchange between the Board's currency and the pound sterling was fixed. The Board’s main 
function was to maintain the local shilling on par with the shilling in the United Kingdom; 
this was possible because sterling securities were used to back up local currency at all times. 
The Board itself stopped functioning in 1966, when Central Banks came into existence in 
Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.487 Therefore although it is not a foreign concept, the struggle 
will lie in the fact that as British protectorates, leadership within the territories was not 
focussed on the priorities that motivate independent, nationalistic states. A single currency 
now must make room for those obligations and protections.  
 
In order to follow the case from the old version to the new, this paper will assess the case by 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Graph 3: Kenyan and Tanzanian Exchange Rates  
 
 
Exchange rates between the Tanzanian Shilling (TZS) and the Kenyan Shilling (KES) between 10/6/2013 and 
11/3/2013488 
 
Graph 4: Ugandan and Kenyan Exchange Rates 
 
 
Exchange rates between the Uganda Shilling (UGX) and the Kenyan Shilling (KES) between 10/6/2013 and 
11/3/2013.489 
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The option of a common currency in addition to national currencies seems, in light of the 
discussions above, the safest option for developing states. As shown in the graphs, there is 
already the need to combat fluctuating exchange rates, with the Kenyan Shilling (KES) being 
consistently far stronger than both the Ugandan Shilling (UGX) and the Tanzanian Shilling 
(TZS). This discrepancy affects the comparative ability of these countries within their terms 
of trade. The difference has proven to be a long-standing and contentious issue within 
integration. Due to the phenomenon of poles of development and stagnation, Kenya has 
always been the most desirable market due to its placement as a trading hub within Africa.490 
However the region as a whole is changing, and in turn, it is changing the dynamics of the 
regional structure and the potential for the region itself.  
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Data is a graphic representation of GDP statistics below.491 
 
In the last few years, growth levels between the partner states have changed with Tanzania 
and Uganda overtaking Kenya. This is partly due to the fact that the Kenyan economy is 
overly-dependent on agriculture and tourism, which makes it more susceptible to 
international shocks. It has also experienced internal political conflict, with the election 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Stein, P. “The Economies of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda: Report Prepared for Swedfund 
International AB” (2010) at http://www.swedfund.se/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/updatedreportoneastafrica2010.pdf at p. 17.  
491 Graphic is of data as cited in text. Please see text citation for referencing.  
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violence in 2008 compounding the effect of the economic downturn in the same year.492 In 
comparison, Tanzania and Uganda are resource rich, but have poor infrastructure.493 In 2012, 
Kenya grew by 4.7 percent, with predictions of 5.7 percent in 2013.494 Between 2000 and 
2008, Tanzania had one of the strongest growth rates of the non-oil-producing countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Annual real GDP growth has exceeded 6 percent for ten consecutive 
years, standing at 6.9 percent for 2012 – 2013, with 7 percent and 7.2 percent projected for 
2013 and 2014 respectively.495 Uganda’s annual growth rate averaged 5.76 percent from 2008 
until 2013, reaching an all time high of 12.2 percent in June of 2009. Growth in 2013 has 
averaged 5.7 percent.496 There may still be a substantial discrepancy between the states due to 
Kenya’s dominance, but comparative growth of this nature shows that there is hope for an 
evening out of the poles of development and stagnation issue. The reduction of the 
development gap will also reduce the tensions within redistributive mechanisms, as the 
overall growth ought to diminish the feeling that Kenya is “dragging” its partner states 
forward. In the near future, if growth rates continue as they have been, particularly with the 
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493 Stein (2010) at p. 32 and p. 37.  
494 World Bank Time for Kenya to Shift Gears to Accelerate Growth and Reduce Poverty (17th June 2013) at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/06/17/time-for-kenya-to-shift-gears-to-accelerate-
growth-and-reduce-poverty.  
495 OECD Investment Policy Reviews – Tanzania (6th August 2013) at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/DraftTanzaniaIPR.pdf . 
496 Trading Economics Uganda Annual Growth Rate at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/gdp-growth-
annual.  





Graph 6: Growth in Exports 
 
 
Contribution of each member state to intra-regional trade between 2000-2010.498 
 
As shown in the graph above, intra-regional trade has increased substantially, adding 
significantly to the growth of the region and adding to the supportive networks that will 
encourage all of the member states to invest further in infrastructure and development. The 
economic outlook for the region is therefore strong, with solid figures to back up the idea that 
the current development trend will continue. The issue arises, however, when we look at the 
political realities of moving towards a federation in relation to the growth that has taken 
place. Feasibly, from the figures above, it is arguable that continuing with economic 
integration alone will grow the economies sufficiently to fulfil the economic integration 
programme. However, as noted earlier, despite this substantial growth, issues persist amongst 
the states within the implementation of the elements of the programme, which may in time 
stall this growth. At this juncture, we must return to politics.  
 
This paper has argued that in order for the partner states to enjoy the full benefits of 
integration and to make it sustainable, political realities cannot be ignored. If we look at the 
election violence in Kenya, as well as the persisting issues of poverty, illiteracy and 
underdevelopment in the region, clearly politics cannot be excluded. In addition, there have 
been reports about political side-lining in development and infrastructure projects, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Winston, S. and Castellanos, C. “Trade in East Africa” Finance & Development Vol. 48 No. 4 (December 
2011) at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/12/pdf/data.pdf at p. 56. 
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Tanzania being left out of meetings involving Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.499 A two-track 
integration programme has also been suggested. These are aspects which may not be 
addressed by a purely economic programme. The growth that has taken place has benefitted 
from the regional programme, however, it has been driven by the individual states. Given the 
reality of this structure and given the arguments made around why a confederation is more 
beneficial than a federation, the argument seems convincing. If the states were to continue 
along this road, heading for a confederation rather than a federation, this growth could 
feasibly continue unhindered by the threat of losing sovereign rights, freeing the partner 
states to pursue their development challenges. If, however, the states continue to pursue 
federalism directly, these political issues have the potential to break down the entire process. 
 
Calhoun and Levi-Faur advocate for a people-centred process; for Calhoun, the role of the 
state is to balance security and liberty within the checks and balances that are put in place to 
limit state power and prevent it from becoming too intrusive. In Calhoun’s view the state is 
meant to act as a mediator of interests and powers; the aim is to link political identity, citizens 
and the state by virtue of List’s understanding that productivity is culturally grounded. If a 
state is to be successful, it must have a rounded view of capital, including mental and material 
capital. As List notes, a state should develop its economy internally before it expands beyond 
state bounds, which requires that a state have a stable and thriving internal trading system. 
The state should also concentrate on maintaining the right balance within economic 
development; development must include agriculture, manufacture, as well as immaterial 
factors, such as education. List’s view becomes all the more important in the context of 
developing states such as in the EAC because his economic theories tap into the idea of 
identity, nationalism and the need to build a healthy domestic economy. Where we 
acknowledge that a weakened domestic economy leaves a state dependent on its partners, it 
becomes easy to understand why that dependence represents a significant domestic political 
threat to stability. In relation to the case, this approach would see Kenya diversifying its 
economy and expanding its manufacturing ability, while Tanzania and Uganda would have to 
invest more in their infrastructure in order to open their internal markets. If the states 
facilitated these changes, they could fulfil their role as envisioned by Levi-Faur – as guides 
and directors of the forces of regionalization and globalization, rather than as defenders 
against them.  
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Ultimately, any decision around a regional outcome will need to be based on the internal 
development of the EAC states, which still have a long way to go before a definitive and 
sustainable outcome can be designed. It would be ill-advised for the EAC to continue to 
pursue federalism and a monetary union at its present rate. The partner states understand the 
value of political drivers in support of the economic programme, however, a more valuable 
understanding of political drivers would be to relocate them to the domestic realm, directing 
attention within political alliances to reinvesting in their own economies and populations, 
putting politics before economics. To return to the beginning of this chapter, states should 
own their intentions, and instead of chasing an ideal, should match their means and their 
methods to their goals. 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, where theory is flawed, these flaws travel down into regional 
structures, directly affecting the member states. In the EAC, the data does appear to show that 
cracks in the process are forming that, without serious consideration, could significantly 
destabilize the region in the future. There is a compounded reason why regions in Africa 
should not follow the overarching hypothesis; not only is it flawed in terms of regional theory 
in general, but this is doubled in the African context since developing states start off with 
significant issues to address. To apply the theory given the evidence above is irresponsible, 
and it clarifies why so many African regions are thought to fail; failure is not the product of 
misapplication, but the product of circumstance. The state cannot de-link from its people or 
national expectations. The state’s legitimacy depends on this connection and successful 
regions depend on efficient and functioning states. In the context of the EAC, the evidence 
above shows that in order to strengthen themselves, member states still need to heavily invest 
in their own countries, both in development that facilitates trade and in the development of 
welfare, before they can start to see the true benefits of a strong region.  
 
In de-linking the theory from the European case, the theory itself has the ability to open up 
and once again become a tool, rather than a programme. To remain competitive has become a 
solely economic endeavour, when it ought to be more inclusive and far deeper within its 
supportive structures. The statistics above show that despite integration, significant welfare 
benefits have not been seen in the last decade. This begs the question, what should the 
benefits of integration be? Economic integration theory states that a region supplies bigger 
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markets, easier, simpler trade and an increase in power through collective bargaining, 
however, for the average citizen, the effect must trickle down. This translates to the main 
participants in the integration process being the last to experience tangible benefits as a result 
of it. Within the EAC the members support integration, are striving to achieve it as fast as 
possible through talks and commitments, but are simultaneously neglecting their own 
domestic issues, as argued by Qobo. However, in contradiction to his argument that states are 
avoiding domestic issues, I would argue that today, the perception is that the theory will 
benefit the state, thereby legitimizing the “short term” neglect by focussing on the long term 
benefits. The difficulty is that the model is flawed, as is the theory, therefore in actuality, 
what is laid before us is a clear example of the state’s interests diverging from the citizenry’s.  
 
In line with List’s arguments, what the EAC members need is a state-driven domestic 
development plan that can be enacted with the same level of enthusiasm as their regional 
programme. The evidence shows that from the perspective of political identity, the state is 
still central and vital and despite the attempts to create a regional identity, it persists. Member 
states have the ability to capitalize on this within the integration process, but only if they 
choose to do so by electing to aim for a regional programme that supports the state rather 
than one that undermines it. Regional integration needs to re-link the components of the 
integration process, acknowledging state, nation and economy. For developing nations, a 
confederation with a parallel currency could prove to be valuable alternatives to the current 
path of economic integration. 
 
The value in assessing the case in light of the challenges above is that it allows a practical 
insight into the potential for future studies. It is not only regional theory itself that needs 
reassessment, but the value of its alternatives as well. Future studies will need to assess 
confederation as a feasible political option, and will need to investigate the possible benefits 
of a parallel currency, both in theory as well as in context, as once again, it cannot be 











This paper has challenged the null hypothesis in order to seek out a means to improve the 
theory around regions and the process of regionalization. The primary concern has been the 
case of the EAC, as well as regions in Africa, however, the results found here are equally able 
to be generalized to regional theory globally. The value in a study like this is that to challenge 
the theory in one context opens the doors for changes in theory across the board, since the 
same theory is applied universally.  
 
Regionalism, as a political animal, has changed over time; it has changed in motive, in 
application, in desired outcome. Regionalization has morphed from a promoter of peace and 
order to an economic weapon of defence, a means to link and delink from global pressures. In 
the process, regionalism has lost some of its intentions and as a result, has lost some of its 
benefits. If we look back to the ideas discussed in this paper, clearly both political and 
economic integration are vital to sustainable regions. One cannot be separated from the other. 
However, there must be a change in the application of the theory. To see Africa as a continent 
that cannot cope is counter-productive. Instead, it is the choices made within the application 
of the theory that make the biggest impact.  
 
 This paper will conclude by summarising the approach it proposes be taken in the future. In 
addition, it will then link the EAC to the EU in order to attempt to generalize the findings.  
 
Regional Theory – Where To From Here? 
 
Within the study of regionalism and states, theorists have ceased to use regionalization as a 
tool for effective long term growth. Regionalization has to a large extent become a buzz-word 
to gain recognition and a more competitive front. However, without fully using the concepts 
in the theory, the results will continue to be less than effective. In challenging the literature, 
this paper seeks to return regionalism to its rightful place as a reinforcer of sovereignty, and 
in turn, to realign it with the needs of states and peoples. If supporting the citizenry leads to 
stronger states politically and economically, and stronger states can take better advantage of 
the process of regionalization, then the process of economic integration cannot supply what is 
required to sustainably build a region. When put in place without political support, economic 
integration undercuts the structures that are most valuable to the process. One important 
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distinction to make is that not only must politics once again be introduced, the right kind of 
politics must be activated; politics, as with economic programmes, must remain connected to 
the seat of sovereignty – the citizenry.   
 
In order to acknowledge the value of the state, its role in the process must be re-envisioned. 
The theory works hard to work around the state when what it ought to be doing is engaging 
with it. There must be a distinction made between theory and models; economic integration 
has become a widely applied model, however, the theory behind it has become crystallized 
and ineffectively used as a tool for understanding regions and the process of regionalization. 
Theory is meant to be dynamic; models tend to be static. However, theory informs models 
and the goals they are meant to achieve, therefore where theory ceases to engage in a process 
because of the structure of a model, dislocations must be expected. How states react to those 
dislocations contributes to the success or failure of the regional programme.  
 
Where theories appear to be inefficient, new ideas around outcomes emerge. The problem is 
that new ideas are responses to false crises, since the crises themselves are the product of not 
sufficiently engaging with the concepts within the theory itself in the first instance. Few 
states are willing to concede that their existence is a hindrance because they are still required 
to meet the needs of their citizens. If these needs are ignored, it will activate a nationalist 
backlash, undermining the integration process. If economic integration is as successful as it 
claims to be, there should not be so many issues within economically-driven regions. At some 
point, it becomes more valuable to stop directing criticism at states and to start directing it 
towards the theory. 
 
As a result, a new approach must be taken; this paper started by assessing the criticisms of 
Functionalism and Neofunctionalism, but the changes must be broader than simply 
acknowledging the criticisms that have been transferred between the waves of regionalism 
and the effect that has had on regional projects. The approach taken by this paper has been to 
advocate for a kind of “Developmental Functionalism”.500 Essentially, this translates to an 
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Critical or Developmental Regionalism and Functionalism. DF requires more than the inclusion of the state in 
the regionalization process; it calls for the state to be an active participant both domestically and regionally. It 
includes the organic, bottom-up predisposition of Functionalism, and marries these ideas with state-driven 
development initiatives of the Critical approach, bringing the parties within the regionalization process much 
closer in terms of their interests and responsibilities. See Chapter 7 in Stephan et al.’s The Scramble for Africa 
in the 21st Century for an introduction to Developmental Functionalism.  
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increased internal focus for states within the regionalization process, but goes beyond 
Developmental Regionalism as it was described at the beginning of this chapter. It is 
insufficient to simply include the state or make the regionalization programme state-centred; 
this approach feeds into Functional ideas because the idea of state participation is much 
deeper. It includes incorporating the notions of identity, nationalism, welfare and meaningful 
and managed development. Developmental Functionalism also includes re-linking the state 
with the individual citizen, thereby going beyond what is advocated for in the Developmental 
regionalism model. The approach is Functionalist to the extent that it must focus on moving 
from the bottom-up, despite the process being state-driven. The process of reconnecting the 
interests of the state and the citizenry calls for a more pervasive approach to how states 
should work with domestic interests in order to facilitate their regional endeavours. 
 
 The assumption is that through economic integration and an outward trade orientation 
development will occur as a by-product of increased efficiency, with political integration 
following the economic changes. In addition, by allowing national flows to move outward, 
the benefits will circle around and flow back in to the states. In line with the arguments of 
this paper, the more correct approach is to use the regional network to build states internally 
and over time, to allow the networks that will expand the benefits received to move outwards 
and spill over. In this way, the tension between a purely economic or political approach may 
be dissolved, allowing for a mutually beneficial and parallel integration process. Without the 
inclusion of politics within the integration process, the changes produced by economic 
integration lack a substantive base upon which to resolve disputes, weather crises and 
negotiate future changes; without political agreements, economic agreements are 
unsustainable.  
 
Although this paper advocates for a change in the use of regional theory, this paper by no 
means negates regional theory in its entirety. Due to the reality of international pressures, 
regionalism will persist as a means to combat issues that can benefit from international 
cooperation. The choice to be made within that reality is how to maximise the effectiveness 
of the regionalization process for states. A politics-first approach should encourage greater 
transparency, support and sustainability in agreements between states, while its effect on 
domestic issues should encourage meaningful state development. This could decrease 
interstate conflict by undermining many of the issues that currently sabotage the integration 
process, included in which are issues of sovereignty, underdevelopment, the democratic 
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deficit and persisting issues related to nationalism. Instead of looking to new models in order 
to once again dissect aspects of the process and work around them, a more holistic view of 
the problem presents a simple solution – regionalism needs to be more, not less, inclusive. 
 
The Nationalist Challenge: Reviving the Role of the State 
 
One interesting question to ask is whether we should consider states at differing levels of 
development so differently? Of course, the answer must be affirmative in many instances, 
however, in others, the answer is a definite no. The needs of citizens do not change. The 
relationship between state and citizen does not change. An interesting perspective to 
acknowledge is that while the model of regionalization is not universal, the relationship 
between state and citizen is. This highlights the fact that, while different regions may need 
different regionalization models because of the different contexts in which regions exist, the 
basic understanding within those models should be the same. In terms of reinvigorating the 
theory around regions, the aspect of universality must move from the models back to the 
subjects of the process – the state structure. In linking the EAC to the EU, we can better 
understand where both models may benefit from the changes prescribed here.  
 
The European Union at present seems to be heading towards a point of conflict; with the 
United Kingdom’s decision to potentially allow a referendum on its membership to the EU, 
nationalist politics have once again become a force in integration.501 The interesting reality 
within the EU is that it is a model burdened by itself; it has presented the world with the 
foremost model for economic integration and has provided widespread inspiration for the 
effectiveness of its own structures. Now, in crisis, we see nationalist politics being activated 
throughout Europe with the effects of the economic crisis leaving many jobless and 
dependent on welfare states that are struggling to support them.502 Domestic politics have for 
too long been sacrificed at the altar of integration, with the hope that sustained wealth and 
growth would act as a significant enough relocater of identity to avoid this reaction. Despite 
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the duration of the Union, this has not happened. The EAC will likely find itself at a similar 
crossroads; the difference is that, due to the compound needs of welfare and development in 
the EAC, it may hit them faster.  
 
Although the EU and the EAC have very different regional experiences, the commonality 
must start by acknowledging the role of Eurocentrism in the model and methods used by the 
EAC. In terms of the comparability of the EU to the EAC, the development track followed in 
both regions includes almost identical initiatives regarding the progressive de-emphasis of the 
state; both models started politically and moved to economic integration programmes. Both 
started through common services, namely the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
East African Common Services Organisation. Both have followed Balassa’s stages of 
economic integration, and both have followed structured year-based plans for integration. 
The EU has become dependent on regional institutions, while the EAC is attempting to do the 
same in order to relocate the political centre. Both regions have sought to relocate identity 
formation by allocating national symbols and structures to regional bodies. Subsequently, 
both regions, albeit at different stages of development, are experiencing distancing behaviour 
and nationalist backlashes. These backlashes are arguably the result of removing power, or 
the threat of removing power, from the member states. This commonality of crises points to 
the fact that both regions require a reassessment of their regionalization approach.  
 
Changing the goals of a region fundamentally changes the direction of movement within the 
process. In both cases, the strengthening of ties between state and society will mean halting 
the integration process, pulling the process inward and restructuring how states function in 
relation to the community. This does not have to evoke the traditional fears of economic 
nationalism, war and protectionism; if the process of regionalization is based on trust between 
member states surely that trust, if the integration process up until this point has been 
effective, would remain despite a change in prerogative? The primary assumption is that a 
return to politics must be equated with a return to isolationism – however where the correct 
politics are put in place, this fear can be unnecessary. The approach should not be that states 
should cease to pursue regionalization, but that their methods for facilitating integration must 
change. 
 
In both regions, strengthening states and the state’s ability to be accountable to its citizens 
should reduce these conflicts. If we look at the structures that exist between state and society 
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around political identity, nationalism and popular needs, there is a strong argument that those 
connections can produce a system in which both states and populations feel more secure in 
regional arrangements. List’s ideas bolster this notion by associating productivity and 
economic success with investing in non-labour capital and understanding that productivity is 
culturally grounded. More secure citizens translate to a more secure and supported workforce 
that is better able to contribute to a growing economy. Through investing in the economy in 
the right way, List incorporates nationalist needs with state goals, uniting the interests of the 
people and the state. Where these interests can be united, these goals are then able to be 
pursued at a regional level because they create effective links between citizens, the state and 
the region, supporting all three spheres.  
 
Within the EAC, these connections are valuable because states themselves are still 
developing. In supporting the domestic processes that will build the state, the region will 
naturally become more appealing, as the benefits will not need to be prospective – they would 
be presently unfolding. In the same way that this paper discusses the fact that voting is 
essential in order to confirm Hegel’s ideas of practical and political identity within agency, 
tangible benefits would go a long way in not only building sustainable regional networks, but 
starting to build a regional identity that citizens did not feel was imposed on them. In the case 
of the EU, many states now find themselves in compromised positions regarding their ability 
to meet the needs of their citizens. In relinquishing aspects of their sovereignty, they have 
failed to maintain the ability to act appropriately, severely affecting their legitimacy and 
accountability. The nationalist backlash we currently see ought to be met with decreasing the 
efforts to support the region and increasing the efforts to support the state. In so doing, the 
regional agenda in Europe should not have to be abandoned.  
 
Confederation: The Better Alternative? 
 
Both the EAC and the EU have embarked on integration programmes with federalist 
outcomes. The EAC, despite the arguments above, believes that a federation and a monetary 
union is the optimal outcome. They are making concrete moves, as the EU has, to establish 
the economic and political structures that will support the move towards a federation. 
However, despite the extended period that the EU has been in place, states are now no more 
willing to relinquish their independence than they were a decade ago. Economically, while 
the EAC is fighting to complete the establishment of a customs union and is feverishly 
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sprinting towards talks of a monetary union, the EU is reassessing theirs. Considering the 
similarities noted above, this should call for a reassessment in both regions of what the best 
outcome for a regional partnership ought to be. In a sense the process of regionalization has 
ceased to be voluntary to some degree; when one method of integration has been ineffective, 
another means has been sought to achieve the same goal. Few states have ever stopped to 
contemplate if, perhaps, the outcome of the process was not suited to them.  
 
In Africa, confederation could allow for far more accommodation of the current political 
structures; as a concept it has the potential to be empowering for states and people because of 
its flexibility. If states are willing to concede that there is a middle ground to communal 
action, that there are more than the choices to be federal or isolationist, then they could start 
to conceptualise more tailored solutions to their regional needs. One aspect of further study is 
to assess how much the confederal process can be tailored to the needs of different regions, as 
well as how much can be changed within the “typical” confederal structure before the value 
of the system is compromised.  
 
Although confederation appears to be a feasible outcome for African states, European states 
can still use the findings of this paper to reassess the nature of their integration. The move to 
return to national currencies would more than likely prove to be too big a step for Europeans, 
however, a reassessment of their integration policies and structures along the lines 
investigated above would still prove beneficial. One of the biggest issues presently in Europe 
is the issue of the so-called single currency. As the EU has managed to institute a single 
currency, the EAC has the benefit of learning from its shortfalls. As discussed, according the 
Balassa’s programme of integration, monetary integration and the move to a single currency 
is the final stage of economic integration and calls for the highest levels of commitment. The 
effect of a monetary union within the theory is that it acts as the glue that binds the states in a 
region in a far deeper way, however, the effect in practice is that it is a process through which 
states lose a vital aspect of their sovereignty, namely the ability to affect their currency and 
thereby support the welfare needs of their respective communities.  
 
In Europe at the moment the Euro has been seen as a single currency, a unifying force across 
the region, however, its benefits in fostering a regional identity and easing regional trade have 
been far outweighed by the stark reality that countries are drowning in the wake of the 2008 
recession. Although the Euro is seen as a single currency, it is actually a substitute currency; 
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if countries are able to set differing interest rates, the notion of the Euro as a centralized 
monetary system is incorrect. The Euro system is integrated enough to give the impression of 
integration, but not actually integrated enough to achieve the full potential benefits expected 
from the theory. One reason for this is no doubt the fact that states cannot bring themselves to 
abandon their sovereignty in totality. The EU should use this movement to change the 
priorities of the region. In light of this, one of the biggest issues for future studies to deal with 
is the reality that the European model does not travel; it has not yet achieved a federal 
outcome in Europe or in other regions. As such, Europeans should reassess their methods and 
intentions in light of their federalist goal to the same extent as regions using the same 
methodology elsewhere. 
 
Despite the fact that the EAC has not actually achieved full integration in the early stages of 
Balassa’s programme, talks are already underway to establish the foundations for a 
federation. As a result, the EAC may soon be faced with the repercussions of moving too far 
too fast and ought to reassess its goals. Europe, having simultaneously been both leader and 
test-subject within regional studies, has allowed a peek into one potential outcome of regional 
economic integration. The benefit of having an observable outcome for a region that has used 
a similar programme but that is far more established than the EAC itself is that it should 
allow the EAC to anticipate upcoming issues. This can, however, only be done if the EAC 
chooses to acknowledge that the EU’s crisis should cause concern for their integration 
programme, not just from an economic or trading perspective, but from a theoretical 
perspective. In addition, the EAC will have to choose to reinvigorate their integration process 
and return to a “methods and intentions” approach, buying into all of the changes that 
accompany that change. This is a substantial shift which could appear to destabilize the 
process and given the history of the EAC, this could mean that members would be more 
hesitant, however, the payoff could be significant.  
 
Looking to Future Studies 
 
This paper has chosen to challenge the statements above for the sake of producing future 
possibilities for research into regions and regional programmes. The outcomes within the 
challenges above have exposed loci at which regional theory no longer serves regional 
endeavours and requires reconsideration. The outcomes themselves are compelling enough, 




One aspect for future study is definitely to tease out the structures that would be most 
beneficial with regard to both regions’ specific goals. Pulling the process of regionalization 
down will extend the timeframe for the process, however, it will also create buttresses that 
will pay off in the long term. Whether regionalization should have an imposed timeline at all 
is questionable since it is an ongoing and evolving process. Possible future hypotheses should 
focus more on the links between internal politics and regional initiatives. Although two-level 
games can be useful for this, the focus should not be on state relations at two levels; the links 
as they run up and down from domestic politics to regional initiatives should be the focus, 
changing the orientation of how we view the process. The connections should not be seen as 
two distinct levels, since this construct compartmentalizes responses and responsibilities; 
connections should instead be seen as a single chain within a given issue, since that is how 
the impact of decisions plays out. For example, studies for the EU may be more beneficial 
where they assess how the region has undercut state initiatives, or where the outcome of 
regional legislation unduly affects the state’s ability to respond to the needs of citizens. This 
may start to unpack some of the dislocations between the levels.  
 
It may be equally worthwhile to assess what aspects of sovereignty may need to be returned 
to states, and how the European Parliament could work more within existing government 
legislation, given that states can respond more readily to domestic needs. In line with the 
concept of subsidiarity, states are best equipped to assess the needs of their respective 
communities and ought to be empowered enough to use regional ideas to the best interests of 
the state, as seen in the German Constitutional Court. The effect of some disharmony within 
domestic policy would translate as greater freedom for states within the region and as a result, 
possibly greater trust between partners. One major drawback of the EU is that it creates a 
blanket of unity, however, that blanket simultaneously smothers the participating states. The 
EAC is already experiencing political contradictions and instead of seeking to squash those 
differences, they should embrace them. Rather than relying on an all-encompassing regional 
network, there is significant room in future studies for the development of smaller 
programmes for integration that will facilitate greater cooperation.  
 
Regarding monetary unions, there is also the need for feasibility studies to assess whether 
there is a durable solution, for example the one advocated for here, for a common parallel 
currency in addition to national currencies. There are many areas in which the EU may need 
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to return some sovereign powers. These areas require individual research and study in order 
to formulate the best possible solutions to European issues that will maintain the sentiments 
that drive the Community. Some significant issues for future study include the maintenance 
and development of domestic as well as regional legislation, the facilitation of more 
meaningful democracies and the issue of the democratic deficit both nationally and 
regionally. If we change our perceptions around what ought to be prioritised within the 
process of regionalization, we must equally change how we understand citizens as active 
participants in the process.  
 
The overall effect of this paper is to launch the study of a new understanding of regionalism 
and what it is meant to promote. There is a richness within regional studies that is lacking 
because of how it has evolved. In a sense, what is required is the launch of a new wave of 
regionalism. This wave ought to be characterised by a drive to develop a more inclusive, 
developmental, conscious effort to understand why regions can and ought to be more 
beneficial and sustainable than what they presently are. As in all political processes, 
unintended consequences that result from stagnation are the biggest catalysts for change. That 
space is arguably where we find ourselves at present. The current unhappiness with the 
effects of regionalism is the springboard that this paper hopes will be used to further a more 
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